- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR N. V. ANJARIA, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT APPEAL NO. 885 OF 2024 (SC-ST) BETWEEN: 1. SHANTHAMMA D/O BYATAPPA W/O MUNIYAPPA AGED 50 YEARS R/O PERUMACHANAHALLI VILLAGE KAIVARA HOBLI CHINTAMANI TALUIK CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT PIN - 563 126. …APPELLANT (BY SRI D.S. RAMACHANDRA REDDY, ADVOCATE [V/C]) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT MULTISTOREYED BUILDIGN DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU - 560 001. 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CHICKBALLAPUR DISTRICT CHIKKABALLAPUR - 562 101. Digitally signed by PRABHAKAR SWETHA KRISHNAN Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER CHICKBALLAPUR SUB DIVISION CHICKBALLAPUR - 562 101. 4. VENKATESHAPPA S/O EARALAPPA AGED 70 YEARS R/O KONGANAHALLI VILLAGE KAIVARA HOBLI, CHINTAMANI TALUK CHICKBALALPUR DISTRICT - 563 128. 5. BYRAREDDY S/O EARALAPPA AGED 65 YEARS R/O KONGANAHALLI VILLAGE KAIVARA HOBLI, CHINTAMANI TALUK CHICKBALLAPUR DISTRICT - 563 128. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI K.S. HARISH, GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR R-1 TO R-3 & SRI N.K. RAMESH, ADVOCATE FOR R-4 & R-5) THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 22.04.2024, MADE IN WRIT PETITION No. 9526/2024 (SC-ST) AND ALLOW WRIT PETITION BY No. 9256/2024 BY GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN IT AND ETC. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.I.ARUN ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA) Heard learned advocate Mr. D.S. Ramachandra Reddy for the appellant, learned Government Advocate Mr. K.S. Harish for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and learned advocate Mr. N.K. Ramesh for respondent Nos.4 and 5. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22.04.2024 of learned Single Judge, whereby the petition of the appellant-petitioner came to be dismissed. 3. The challenge in the original petition by the appellant - petitioner was to the orders dated 05.01.2024 passed by the respondent No.2 - the Deputy Commissioner which confirmed the order dated 06.12.2021 of the Assistant Commissioner, whereby the authorities refused the prayer of the appellant-petitioner seeking resumption and restoration of the granted land under Section 5(1) of the the Karntaka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The rejection of the application and prayer of the petitioner was on the ground delay and laches. 3.1 The land in question was of old Survey No.68 (new Survey No.197) admeasuring 4 Acres situated at Perumachanahalli Village, Kaivara Hobli, Chintamani Taluka, Chikkaballapura District which was granted to one Sri Byatappa by the order dated 07.06.1961 and saguvali chit was issued on 14.10.1962. Sri Byatappa was the father of the petitioner, who belonged to Bedar community. 3.2 The said Sri Byatappa sold the said land to one Sri Erlappa on 26.06.1975 who happens to be the father of respondent Nos.4 and 5. The Assistant Commissioner, Chikkaballapura initiated suo motu proceedings in respect of the said sale under the provisions of 1978 Act and closed the proceedings stating that the original grantee belonged to Bedar community and could not have been treated as the person belonging to schedule tribe. 3.3 Again on 16.01.2014, the petitioner filed an application before respondent No.3 - the Assistant Commissioner for resumption and restoration, which application culminated into the - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 orders dated 06.12.2021 and 05.01.2024 passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner respectively. 3.4 Learned Single Judge, noticed the facts about grant of land to Sri Byatappa on 07.06.1961, selling the same to one Sri Erlappa and the factum of respondent No.3 initiating suo motu under Section 5(1) of 1978 Act for inquiry. Respondent No.3 - the Assistant Commissioner passed the order dated 28.07.1981 dropping the inquiry. Noticeably, the said order dated 28.07.1981 was not challenged by the original grantee and it attained the finality. 3.5 Learned Single Judge has rightly observed that its finality will bound the appellant-petitioner. Following was reasoned by learned Single Judge, " The original grantee has accepted the said order. After lapse of 19 years, the daughter of original grantee filed an application for restoration of possession before the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant Commissioner dismissed the application on the ground of delay. The petitioner aggrieved by the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, preferred an appeal in RA/SCST/36/21-22. The Deputy Commissioner upheld the order passed by respondent No.3 and consequently, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner" - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 4. The legal provisions and development of law in the subject deserve to be noticed. While ‘granted land’ is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act, Section 4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of transfer of granted lands, to provide that notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or commencement of the Act, in terms of the contravention of the grant or in contravention of the law in that regard or in breach of sub-Section (2) of Section 4, such transfer shall be treated as null and void, not to give any right, title or interest in favour of the person to whom the land is transferred. 4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Under sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1) and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution of granted lands. 4.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as under, "5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands- - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 (1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may,- (a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard; (b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. (1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly. (2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. (3) For the purposes of this Section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4." 4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision that there is no prescription of time limit for resumption or restitution of the land which is null and void under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), which was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein that the application made for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay. It was held that there was no annulment of transfer could be allowed. 4.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), “However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.’’ (para 8) 4.3.2 It was further stated, “An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ……” 4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27.07.2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, “(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” 4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not touch anything on merits of the said validity proceedings and it is clarified that the said proceedings before learned Single Judge shall be decided on their own merits. 4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29.07.2024. 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the Division Bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the Division Bench then held as per para 3(f), - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the Division Bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and laches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and laches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of laches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by laches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from laches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (para 22) 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and laches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the laches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, laches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 19 years. The question of laches would come into play. 19 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:2188-DB WA No. 885 of 2024 grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. 6.1 These discussions would apply to the present case also and would form the reasoning of this order. In that view, the judgment and order of learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is meritless and the same is dismissed. Sd/- (N. V. ANJARIA) CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE KPS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16