APHC010369332010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] FRIDAY,THE FOURTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1533/2010 Between: Vankayalapati Brahmaiah, ...PETITIONER AND The State of Andhra Pradeshrep by Puplic Prosecutor ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Petitioner: G.Srinivasula Reddy Counsel for the Respondent: Public Prosecutor The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’) challenging the judgment dated 30.08.2010 in Crl.A.No.89 of 2010 on the file of the learned VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Markapur, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner, by the learned Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Markapur in C.C.No.178 of 20098 vide judgment dated 07.05.2010 finding the petitioner guilty for the offence punishable under Section 337 and 338 of the Indian 2 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and also fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred Only). 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the Revisionists and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri G. Srinivasula Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the grounds of the revision case argued that the prosecution could not prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt for the offences allegedly charged; the evidence of P.Ws.2 to 6 is not trustworthy and requested to allow the revision case. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the accident occurred in the 2007. Nearly, 18 years have passed by and the petitioner was in jail for 10 days. The petitioner volunteers that he would pay Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) each to the witnesses who suffered grievous injuries and Rs.2,000 (Rupees Two Thousand Only) each to the witnesses who suffered simple injuries in the road accident and urged to consider by taking lenient view. 5. Per contra, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt, he drove the vehicle rash and negligently and caused grievous injuries and simple injuries to the witnesses and urged to dismiss the revision case. 3 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 7. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.89 of 2010 dated 30.08.2010 passed by the learned VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Markapur, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. It is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1 wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. … We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 4 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. 13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph No.10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one 2AIR 1951 SC 196 3AIR 1962 SC 1788 5 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 11. Thus, this Court, while exercising it’s jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ cannot invoke its revisional power as a Second Appellate Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, D. Stephens and K. Chinnaswamy Reddy. 12. Prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the petitioner had examined P.Ws.1 to 10, and marked Exs.P1 to P13. The evidence of the eye-witnesses and injured is clear that the petitioner drove the vehicle in rash and negligent way and caused grievous and multiple injuries to the witnesses. The learned 6 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 Trial Court having appraised the evidence on correct prospective convicted and sentenced the petitioner. The learned Appellate Court also confirmed the same. In view of the concurrent findings of the guilty of the petitioner and no material irregularity or flagrant violation of justice the conviction under Section 337 and 338 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 187 (3) read with 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, shall be maintained. 13 In regard to the imposing the sentence on the petitioner, the accident occurred in the year 2007, the petitioner was 23 years at that time. Now the petitioner is aged about 41 years. Nearly, 18 years passed by. The right to speedy trial is a fundamental right as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar4. This right includes speedy disposal of appeals. In addition to the appeals, the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar5. The petitioner was incarceration in 10 days. The voluntary statement of the petitioner that he would pay Rs.10,000/- each to P.W.5 and 6 and Rs.2,000/- each to P.W.2 and 3 as a measure of penance, is recorded and approved. 14. In the result, the criminal revision case is disposed of confirming the conviction for the offences charged and sentencing the petitioner to the imprisonment which he had already undergone, while directing the petitioner to pay Rs.10,000/- each to P.W.5 P. Surendra and P.W.6 K. Saritha and 4 Air 1979 SC 1360 5 2000 (1) BLJR 37 7 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 Rs.2,000/- each to P.W.2 P. Lakshmi Surekha and P.W.3 G. Nagendra Reddy or their legal representatives, in case they are not alive, towards compensation under Section 357 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ within two (02) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the petitioner shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for three (03) months. 15. The learned Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Markapur is directed to take follow up steps. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 04.04.2025 KMS 8 Dr.YLR, J Crl.R.C.No.1533 of 2010 Dated 04.04.2025 160 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1533/2010 04.04.2025 W KMS