Page No.# 1/8 GAHC010231162025 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Bail Appln./3410/2025 SAYEED AHMED S/O SAMSUL HOQUE VILL- BHANDARA PT.III, P.S.MANIKPUR, DIST. BONGAIGAON, ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM REP. BY THE PP,ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M KHAN, MS J AKTAR,MR A K DAS Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN ORDER 09.12.2025 Heard Mr. M. Khan, learned counsel for the accused and Mr. B. Sarma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent. 2. This application, under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 is preferred by accused, namely, Sayeed Ahmed, who has been languishing in jail hazot Rajib Kumar Roy Digitally signed by Rajib Kumar Roy Date: 2025.12.11 11:51:29 +05'30' Page No.# 2/8 since 22.04.2022, in connection with Special (UAPA) Case No. 111(J)/2023, pending before the Court of learned Special Judge, Bongaigaon, arising out of Joghighopa P.S. Case No. 56/2022, registered under Sections 121/121(A)/120(B)/124(A) of the IPC read with Sections 17/18/18(B)/19/20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, for granting bail. 3. Notably, the aforementioned case has been registered on the basis of one FIR lodged by Inspector Dinanath Mili, on 08.04.2022. 4. The allegation against the present accused, in the FIR dated 08.04.2022, is that he had harboured one Bangladeshi National, who is a member of Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) having affiliation to Al-Qaeda, which is a declared terrorist organization and he is involved in motivating youth in Joghighopa area and he also hatched a criminal conspiracy with other members of ABT for facilitating training of indoctrinated youth and men for waging Jehad and related terrorist activities in the district of Bongaigaon and some of the youths of the district had already joined a module and started working advocating, abetting, inciting, assisting, harbouring, recruiting and collecting funds for organizing/committing unlawful terrorist activities in India, in the name of Jehad. 5. Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the accused submits that the accused is behind the bar for 3 years 7 months and 10 days as he was arrested on 22.04.2022. Mr. Khan further submits that this is the second bail application and the earlier bail application, being BA No. 3830/2024, was rejected by this Court on 04.02.2025. Further submission of Mr. Khan is that as many as 25 witnesses have been cited in the charge sheet and out of the said 25 witnesses, 9 witnesses have been examined so far, and the said witnesses have Page No.# 3/8 not implicated the petitioner. According to Mr. Khan, except the mobile handset, nothing has been recovered from his possession and that he is ready to face the trial and therefore, it is contended to allow the petition. 5.1. Mr. Khan has also referred to decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Coiurt in (i) Union of India vs. K. Nazeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 and (ii) Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51, in support of his submission. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Sarma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has raised the question about the very maintainability of this present petition. According to him, only appeal will lie as the offences against the petitioner are schedule offences under the NIA Act. 6.1. Further submission of Mr. Sarma is that though 9 witnesses have been examined so far, 14 witnesses are yet to be examined and it is not the stage to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses already examined in the Court. Mr. Sarma further submits that the offences are serious and that there is prima- facie case against the accused and charges have been framed against him under Sections 121/121(A)/120(B)/124(A) of the IPC, read with Sections 17/18/18(B)/19/20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and that there is also a requirement for satisfying the Court that he is not guilty of the offence, and in view of the provision of Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, since the accused is charge sheeted under Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and unless the said provision is satisfied with, by the accused, bail cannot be granted to him and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. Page No.# 4/8 7. Page No.# 4/8 7. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also perused the scanned copy of the record received from the learned trial Court. Also I have carefully gone through the decisions in K. Nazeeb(supra) and Satender Kumar Antil(supra). 8. It appears that the accused was arrested on 22.04.2022, and since then he has been languishing in jail hazot for 3 years 7 months and 10 days. He has been charged under Sections 121/121(A)/120(B)/124(A) of the IPC, read with Sections 17/18/18(B)/19/20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. It is to be noted here that in the case of Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 616, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the offences under the UAPA under Sections 16, 17, 18, 18-A, 18-B, 19, 20, 22-B, 22-C and 23, being offences which contain maximum sentences of over 7 years, would be exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions when read with Part II of the First Schedule to the Code, but after the NIA Act was enacted that the definition of “court” was extended to include Special Courts that were set up under Section 11 or Section 22 of the NIA Act. It has also been held that the scheme of the NIA Act is that offences under the enactments contained in the Schedule to the Act are now to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under that Act, which may be set up by the Central Government under Section 11 or by the State Government under Section 22 of the Act. 8.1. In the instant case, under Section 22 of the NIA Act, Special Courts have been set up within the State of Assam vide Notification No. E-297135/2, dated 31.05.2023. Further, it appears that the present accused had preferred one bail application before the Special Court so constituted under Section 22 of the NIA Page No.# 5/8 Act and vide order dated 02.08.2024, the same was dismissed. And against such dismissal order only appeal lies before a Division Bench, in view of Section 21(1) and such appeal shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court in view of Section 21(2). 8.2. But, instead of filing such appeal against the order of dismissal of the bail application by the learned Special Court, the accused has preferred the present bail application, directly before this Court, which seems to be not maintainable, as rightly submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 9. Further, from a perusal of the record of the scanned copy of the record it becomes apparent that prima-facie materials are there to show his complicity with the offence under which he has been charged. Besides, the accused having been charged under Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, there is a requirement of satisfying the provision of Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. 10. Notably, in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan, Criminal Appeals No. 3528-3534 of 2025, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the courts are not expected to render findings on the merits of the case at the bail stage. The relevant observation is extracted herein below:- “It is a settled principle that at the bail stage, courts are precluded from undertaking a detailed examination of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the merits of the case. Only a prima facie assessment of the material is warranted. The court cannot conduct a mini-trial or record conclusions that could influence the outcome of the trial.” Page No.# 6/8 11. In the said case, the Court also remarked that the reading of the High Court’s Order gives an unmistakable impression that it has pre-judged the outcome of the trial, thereby setting the stage for discharge or acquittal, which is contrary to law. It has been observed as under:- “… the findings of the High Court, while deciding bail, are to be treated as expressions of opinion only for that purpose and should not, in any manner, prejudice the trial or other proceedings. In the present case, however, the High Court has relied upon irrelevant and premature assessments, and entered into questions best left for the trial, thereby committing a grave jurisdictional error”, it clarified. 12. Further, it has also been held that filing of charge sheet or lengthy list of witnesses does not justify grant of bail. It has been reiterated that mere filing of a charge-sheet does not confer an indefeasible right to bail and likewise, the mere prospect of a prolonged trial cannot, by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence, the incriminating material gathered during investigation, or the likelihood of tampering with witnesses. Relevant observation is reproduced herein below:- “The mere filing of the charge-sheet, the existence of a long list of witnesses, or the possibility of delay in trial, cannot, by themselves, constitute valid reasons to dilute the gravity of the offence or to disregard the case put forth by the prosecution”, it added. 13. In view of aforesaid proposition, the submission of Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the accused that the witnesses examined so far have not Page No.# 7/8 implicated the accused and that there are 14 witnesses, which are yet to be examined, left this Court unimpressed. 14. As already observed in the forgoing para, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true as provided under Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. In the case of K. Nazeeb(supra), it has been held that at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has discussed about Section 309 Cr.P.C. and held that Sub-section (1) mandates courts to continue the proceedings on a day-to-day basis till the completion of the evidence. Therefore, once a trial starts, it should reach the logical end. It has also been held that any delay on the part of the court or the prosecution would certainly violate Article 21. This is more so when the accused person is under incarceration. This provision must be applied inuring to the benefit of the accused while considering the application for bail. 15. In the case in hand, it is nobody’s case that there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Trial is going on and enlarging the accused on bail at this stage will cause further delay in the trial. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the decision referred by Mr. Khan, learned counsel for the accused would not advance his argument. As indicated herein above, the charges against the accused are serious in nature. And keeping in view the ratio laid down in the Page No.# 8/8 case of Sri Darshan (supra) and considering the interest of the accused and balancing the same with that of the societal interest, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case where the privilege of bail can be granted to the present accused. 16. Under the given factual and legal matrix, this Court is of the view that this petition is liable to be dismissed on two counts:- firstly, it is not maintainable and secondly, it is not a fit case where the privilege of bail can be extended to the accused. Accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, the learned trial Court is directed to make an endeavour to complete the trial as soon as practicable, without being influenced by any of the observation made herein above. JUDGE Comparing Assistant