1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 390 of 2024 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station Nandini, District Durg (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Tara Chand Chandel S/o Udheram Chandel, Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khajri, Police Station Nandini, District Durg (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant / State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, GA and Mr. HAPS Bhatia, PL. For Respondent : None (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Judgment on Board 31/07/2025 This appeal under section 378 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 05.01.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge 4th FTSC, Special Court (for short trial Court), Durg District- Durg CG in special criminal (POCSO) case no. 17/2021 whereby the respondent has been acquitted from the charges punishable under Section 341, 354 of the Indian Panel Code,1860 (for short IPC) and under Section 08 of the Prevention of Children from Sexual offences Act, 2012 (for short POCSO Act). 2. Case of the prosecution in nutshell is that the complainant/prosecutrix (PW- HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2025.08.07 16:42:22 +0530 2 1) lodged a written report on 02.02.2021 at Police Station Nandini, District Durg (C.G.), alleging that on the date of the incident, at around 5:00 PM, while she was returning home from her fieldwork and had reached in front of the house of the accused/respondent, the accused/respondent approached her, abused her in filthy language, and molested her. Based on the said report, an FIR was registered against the accused/respondent under the aforementioned crime, and the matter was taken up for investigation. During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent were medically examined by the doctor, certain articles were seized, and the statements of the prosecutrix and other witnesses were duly recorded. Thereafter, the accused/respondent was arrested. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the learned trial court against the accused/respondent under Sections 341 and 354 of IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act. 3. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the competent Court, which subsequently committed the case to the Court of Sessions. The accused was charged for the offence punishable as stated above. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and exhibited 10 documents. The statements of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, wherein he denied all allegations, claimed innocence, and stated that they had been falsely implicated in the case. 5. By the impugned judgment, learned trial Court on the basis of evidence, acquitted the respondent of all the charges which led to filing of this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondent of the aforesaid charges. They submit that the prosecution succeeded in proving the guilt of the respondent through cogent 3 and reliable evidence. He further that the learned trial Court committed an error in disbelieving the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1). Although there may be certain contradictions and omissions in her statement, the same are minor in nature and not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Therefore, they submit that the impugned judgment of acquittal may be set aside, and the respondent be convicted for the aforesaid offences and sentenced appropriately. 7. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the records. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 observed that an appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial Court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. It has been held in paragraph 9 as under - “Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. [See : M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Dass vs. Ram Narain & Ors. (1979 (3) SCC 279), State of Punjab vs. Balraj Singh alias Chhajju (1978 (3) SCC 129), State of Maharashtra vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar (1981 (3) SCC 199) and Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 (3) SCC 815)]. In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a 4 finding which is not based on evidence, still on re-appreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited cases cannot be sustained. 9. In the case of M.C.Ali and anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573, it has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 in which it has been held as under - 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 5 10. Learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the evidence available on record in respect of all the offences which has been charged against the respondent and after analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, in paragraph 27 gave following finding - “From the analysis of the evidence on record, it is evident that there existed a prior enmity between the applicant and the accused. It has also been established that, on the date of the alleged incident, the accused was not present at the place of occurrence but was, in fact, at his uncle's residence attending an engagement ceremony. Therefore, the possibility of the accused being falsely implicated in the present case due to prior rivalry cannot be ruled out. In view of the above, the entire prosecution case becomes doubtful, and recording a finding of guilt against the accused based on such unreliable and doubtful evidence would not be legally sustainable. In criminal jurisprudence, where the life and liberty of an individual are at stake, it is imperative that the prosecution proves the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving innocence does not lie upon the accused. Though the accused in the present case has been charged under Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and while Sections 29 and 30 of the said Act provide for certain statutory presumptions, it is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the prosecution has failed to establish, even prima facie, that the accused committed any act of molestation upon the prosecutrix when she was a minor. Therefore, the presumptions under the aforesaid provisions do not stand attracted in the present case.” 11. The star witness in the present case is the prosecutrix (PW-1). In her examination-in-chief, she levelled allegations against the respondent to the effect that he pressed her chest, due to which she became frightened and, in panic, threw the cow dung basket she was carrying and fled from the spot. The report of the incident was lodged on the following day at around 3:30 PM. However, during her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that there was an existing dispute between the respondent and her father. She further deposed that an engagement ceremony was taking place in the village on the date of the incident and that the 6 respondent remained present at the said ceremony from 4:00 PM to 8:00 PM, whereas the alleged incident is said to have occurred at around 5:00 PM. Additionally, she further admitted that no such incident actually took place and that the report was lodged at the instigation of the villagers. She also admitted that she had not read the contents of the report and merely signed it. 12. It is well-settled that the appellate court has the power to re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion. However, if the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are not perverse or manifestly illegal, such findings ordinarily ought not to be interfered with. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/State and is not persuaded to take a view different from that taken by the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is hereby affirmed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE H.Ansari