1 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 13990 of 2025 Order Reserved on 17.03.2026 Order Delivered on 06.04.2026 1 - Piyush Mishra S/o Shri G.K. Mishra, Aged About 33 Years Presently Working As Aee/trs/secr, R/o Infront Of Parihar Petrol Pump, Village- Barbaspur, Post- Barbaspur, Tehsil- District- Anuppur, Madhya Pradesh- 484224. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Union Of India Through The General Manager, South East Central Railway, New Gm Building, Bilaspur C.G. 495004. 2 - The Secretary, Railway Board, Ministry Of Railways, Rail Bhawan, Raisena Road, Rafi Marg, New Delhi- 110001. 3 - The Principal Chief Electrical Engineer, South East Central Railway, New Gm Building, Bilaspur- 495004. 4 - The Chief Personnel Officer, Personnel Department, South East Central Railway, Gm Office, Bilaspur- 495004. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 For Petitioner :- Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate For Respondents:- Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSG alongwith Mr. Palash Tiwari, Advocate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench : Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Order Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and final order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench at Circuit Sitting, Bilaspur, in O.A. No. 203/669/2023, whereby the learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim of the petitioner in a mechanical and arbitrary manner without proper appreciation of the factual matrix, applicable statutory rules, and the settled principles of natural justice. 2. Subject matter in brief is that the present petition arises out of denial of a fair opportunity to the petitioner, a Railway officer with an unblemished record, in a departmental inquiry initiated pursuant to a Central Bureau of Investigation trap case. The petitioner’s request to engage a suitable Defence Assistant, particularly a retired Railway employee, has been repeatedly rejected by the respondents in a mechanical and arbitrary manner without recording any reasons. Despite subsequent developments and the 3 coming into force of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024, which expressly permit such assistance subject to reasoned consideration, the respondents failed to reconsider the petitioner’s request and proceeded with the inquiry. This has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice, leading to filing of the present petition. 3. The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs in the present writ petition:- “i. To kindly call for the entire original record pertaining to the impugned proceedings and the orders passed by the respondent authorities, for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court; ii. To kindly quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench at Circuit Sitting: Bilaspur in O.A. No. 203/669/2023, and allow the Original Application filed by the petitioner; iii. To kindly direct the respondents to conduct and conclude the departmental inquiry strictly in accordance with law, only after providing the petitioner a fair, reasonable, and effective opportunity of 4 defence, including permission to engage the Defence Assistant of his choice. iv. To kindly pass any other or further order(s) as may be deemed fit, proper, and just by this Hon'ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case, including an order awarding costs in favour of the petitioner.” 4. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner, a dedicated Railway officer serving as ADEE (O.P.)/RIG/SECR with an unblemished service record, was arrested on 01.08.2015 in a Central Bureau of Investigation trap case, which allegation he has consistently denied. Thereafter, a charge memorandum dated 03.08.2016 was issued initiating major penalty proceedings against him. During the course of the departmental inquiry, the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself, as his request to engage an experienced retired Railway officer, Shri M.V.D. Satyanarayana, as Defence Assistant was arbitrarily rejected. The said request was also not accepted by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the year 2019 on a narrow interpretation of the applicable rules. It is further the case of the petitioner that subsequent developments revealed that retired Railway employees had been permitted to act as Defence Assistants in other departmental proceedings. Despite repeated representations 5 submitted by the petitioner from the year 2022 onwards seeking reconsideration of his request, the same were mechanically rejected without assigning any reasons. Meanwhile, the inquiry was continued in haste, compelling the petitioner to participate without effective defence assistance, thereby causing serious prejudice to him. It is further submitted that even after the coming into force of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024, which liberalized the provision relating to engagement of Defence Assistant and required reasoned consideration of such requests, the respondents failed to apply the amended provisions and continued to deny the petitioner his legitimate right. Ultimately, the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, by order dated 12.11.2025, dismissed the Original Application preferred by the petitioner in a mechanical manner, giving rise to the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Learned Central Administrative Tribunal is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts and is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in invoking the principle of res judicata, as the present proceedings arise out of fresh and independent causes of action, including subsequent rejection orders passed in the years 2022 and 2023, as well as the significant statutory development brought 6 about by the amendment dated 16.07.2024 to Rule 9(13)(a) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. It is further submitted that the said amendment has substantially liberalised the provision relating to engagement of Defence Assistant and casts a mandatory obligation upon the authorities to consider such requests by recording reasons in writing. However, despite the amendment being in force and fully applicable, the respondent authorities failed to consider the petitioner’s request in light of the amended rule and continued to reject the same in a mechanical and arbitrary manner, thereby violating statutory mandate and principles of natural justice. It is further contended that the petitioner has a fundamental and statutory right to a reasonable opportunity of defence under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, which includes the right to be assisted by a competent Defence Assistant, particularly in a complex and technical inquiry arising out of a CBI trap case. The denial of permission to engage an experienced Defence Assistant, namely Shri M.V.D. Satyanarayana, has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and has vitiated the entire inquiry proceedings. It is submitted that the respondents have failed to demonstrate any prejudice or administrative difficulty in permitting the said Defence Assistant, especially when he has been allowed to act in similar proceedings in other Railway units, thereby rendering the denial arbitrary and 7 discriminatory. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that RBE No. 177/1990 is merely illustrative and not restrictive in nature, and cannot be interpreted to curtail the petitioner’s right to seek appropriate assistance. It is also submitted that the Tribunal has overlooked the fact that the respondents proceeded with the inquiry despite pending representations of the petitioner, thereby compelling him to defend himself without adequate assistance, which is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. In view of the aforesaid, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned order and grant appropriate relief to the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed at the threshold, as the issues raised herein stand conclusively adjudicated by the Learned Central Administrative Tribunal in earlier as well as subsequent proceedings. It is contended that the petitioner, while serving as ADEE (OP)/RIG, was caught red- handed by the CBI on 31.07.2015 while demanding and accepting illegal gratification and was arrested on 01.08.2015, pursuant to which a major penalty charge-sheet was issued on 03.08.2016, and departmental proceedings were initiated strictly in accordance with law. During the inquiry, the petitioner sought permission to engage a particular Defence Assistant of his choice, which was 8 duly considered and rejected in terms of the prevailing rules and administrative instructions, and the said rejection was specifically upheld by the Learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 203/224/2017 vide order dated 11.01.2019, thereby attaining finality. It is further submitted that despite the issue having been conclusively decided, the petitioner continued to file repeated and successive representations on identical grounds with the sole intention of creating artificial and fresh causes of action and delaying the departmental proceedings. The respondents, however, considered such representations and rejected them in accordance with law, while simultaneously affording the petitioner full and adequate opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings. It is contended that the petitioner has, in fact, been regularly attending the inquiry, and the allegation of denial of reasonable opportunity is wholly baseless and an afterthought. Learned counsel further submits that the subsequent Original Application being O.A. No. 669/2023 was rightly dismissed by the Learned Tribunal vide order dated 12.11.2025 on the ground of res judicata, as the issue regarding appointment of Defence Assistant had already been adjudicated and could not be reopened. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and others AIR 2011 SC 1113, wherein it has been held that not only issues actually raised but also those 9 which ought to have been raised earlier are barred by the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata, and such principles apply with full force even to writ proceedings. It is further submitted that the reliance placed by the petitioner on the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024 is wholly misconceived and legally untenable, inasmuch as the disciplinary proceedings in the present case were initiated in the year 2016 and the issue regarding appointment of Defence Assistant had already attained finality by virtue of the Tribunal’s order dated 11.01.2019. The said amendment does not operate retrospectively and cannot be invoked to reopen settled issues or to unsettle judicial findings that have attained finality. Even otherwise, the petitioner cannot claim any vested right to insist upon a particular Defence Assistant, and the competent authority has the discretion to regulate such appointment in accordance with applicable rules. It is also contended that permitting the petitioner to repeatedly agitate the same issue would amount to abuse of the process of law and would defeat the very purpose of disciplinary proceedings, particularly in a case involving serious allegations of corruption. The conduct of the petitioner clearly demonstrates a deliberate attempt to prolong and delay the inquiry proceedings by raising untenable objections, filing repetitive representations, and making unfounded allegations against the Inquiry Officer and 10 authorities. The record would show that the inquiry has been prolonged for several years primarily due to such obstructive tactics adopted by the petitioner. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the present writ petition, as the same is barred by the principles of res judicata, and devoid of any merit. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. From a bare perusal of the record, it appears that the petitioner was issued a charge memorandum dated 03.08.2016 proposing initiation of major penalty proceedings in a departmental enquiry. During the course of the enquiry, the petitioner submitted an application seeking assistance of a defence assistant of his choice. However, the said application came to be rejected by the competent authority on the basis of the interpretation of Railway Board Circular RBE No. 177/1990, according to which the delinquent employee cannot claim appointment of a specific defence assistant of his own choice, particularly when such person is a retired railway employee and is not otherwise permissible under the applicable rules. 9. It is not in dispute that a retired enquiry officer has already been appointed in the matter and the departmental proceedings are continuing. The record further reflects that earlier also the 11 petitioner had approached the competent forum raising substantially similar grievance regarding appointment of a particular defence assistant, and such original application was dismissed. Therefore, merely by reiterating the same grievance through subsequent representations, no fresh cause of action can be said to have arisen. 10. The material available on record further indicates that after rejection of his request, the petitioner submitted multiple representations raising repetitive and untenable grounds, which were duly considered and rejected by the competent authority from time to time. Such repeated representations, founded on the same cause, cannot be permitted to reopen an issue that has already attained finality. 11. It is also evident that the petitioner is regularly participating in the departmental enquiry and has been afforded full and adequate opportunity of hearing. However, instead of availing such opportunity and cooperating in expeditious conclusion of the proceedings, the petitioner appears to be insisting upon appointment of a particular defence assistant of his own choice, which is not a vested right under the governing service rules. The insistence upon a specific individual, despite clear rejection under the applicable circular, indicates an attempt to prolong the proceedings rather than facilitate fair adjudication. 12 12. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that for one reason or another, the petitioner has succeeded in delaying the departmental enquiry for a considerable period of time. The charge-sheet was issued as far back as in the year 2016 and even after lapse of nearly ten years, the enquiry has not attained finality. Such prolonged pendency adversely affects disciplinary administration and frustrates the very purpose of departmental proceedings. 13. Since the earlier application seeking substantially identical relief had already been considered and rejected, the subsequent application raising the same grievance would clearly attract the principles analogous to res judicata. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal has rightly taken note of the fact that earlier proceedings had already culminated and directions were issued only to decide the petitioner’s representation, which representation also stood rejected thereafter. Filing successive applications on identical grounds, after rejection of earlier claims, cannot be permitted in law. 14. In this regard, reference may aptly be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in AIR 2011 SC 1113, wherein it has been held that repeated litigation on the same cause after 13 adjudication is impermissible and cannot be allowed to create recurring causes of action. 15. This Court is also of the considered opinion that the scope of interference in matters arising from interlocutory stages of departmental proceedings is extremely limited. Unless it is demonstrated that the proceedings suffer from patent lack of jurisdiction, violation of mandatory statutory provisions, or manifest denial of natural justice resulting in serious prejudice, interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not ordinarily warranted. 16. In Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana 2006 (12) SCC 28, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that ordinarily no writ petition should be entertained against a charge- sheet or during pendency of disciplinary proceedings, as the delinquent employee has adequate opportunity to raise all permissible objections before the disciplinary authority itself, and premature judicial interference would unnecessarily obstruct the disciplinary process. 17. Likewise, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma 1987 (2) SCC 179, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that repeated representations in respect of an issue already decided do not furnish a fresh cause of action, nor can they revive a stale or concluded claim. 14 18. In the present case, the grievance regarding appointment of a particular Defence Assistant had already been examined and adjudicated in earlier proceedings. The petitioner, instead of permitting the disciplinary proceedings to attain their logical conclusion, continued to submit successive representations and initiate fresh rounds of litigation on substantially identical grounds. 19. The plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that the subsequent amendment in the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 2024 creates a fresh enforceable right also does not merit acceptance. A statutory amendment, unless expressly made retrospective, cannot reopen an issue that has already attained finality by judicial adjudication. More particularly, the amendment does not confer an absolute right upon a delinquent employee to insist upon appointment of any specific individual as Defence Assistant. 20. In this regard, the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh Tripathi (1993) 2 SCC 115 squarely applies, wherein it has been held that representation in disciplinary proceedings through a chosen person is not an unrestricted right and remains subject to statutory regulation. 21. The record further demonstrates that the petitioner has been participating in the enquiry proceedings and no material has been 15 brought on record to establish that any actual prejudice has been caused so as to vitiate the enquiry itself. Mere refusal to permit a preferred Defence Assistant cannot ipso facto amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity when other lawful means of defence remain available to the delinquent employee. 22. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the charge memorandum was issued on 03.08.2016 and despite lapse of considerable time, the enquiry has remained pending. Departmental proceedings, particularly in matters involving allegations of corruption, are required to be concluded within a reasonable period so that administrative discipline is maintained and public confidence in institutional processes is preserved. 23. Delay tactics adopted by a party cannot be permitted to defeat the course of justice and deserve to be deprecated, as held by the Supreme Court of India in (2019) 8 SCC 134 State Bank of India and Others vs. Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya and Another. It has been held that once adequate opportunity has been granted, a party who fails to avail the same cannot seek repeated opportunities on the pretext of justice, as such indulgence would amount to rewarding delay and obstructing finality of proceedings. Relevant paragraph is quoted hereinbelow:- “11. The learned Single Bench has set aside the order of punishment as well as the penalty order directing the employer to serve a notice before 16 imposing penalty. The respondent avoided availing the said opportunity when offered on 24- 3-2016, 7-4-2016 and 22-4-2016. Once opportunity has been granted to the respondent, he is not entitled to another opportunity on the ground of compassion. The only reasoning given by the Division Bench [Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya v. SBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 2559 : (2017) 2 CLR 385] is “justice demands” that the respondent be given one last opportunity to place his version. The respondent has lost his chance to put his version before the competent authority when called upon by the authority to do so. Time and again opportunity of hearing cannot be granted on the pretext of justice. The delaying tactics cannot be rewarded in such a manner. Once the respondent has failed to avail of the opportunity of hearing granted, the Bank cannot be directed to give another opportunity for the sake of justice. Therefore, we find that the directions contained in para 18 of the judgment passed by the Division Bench [Atindra Nath Bhattacharyya v. SBI, 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 2559 : (2017) 2 CLR 385] are not sustainable and the same are set aside.” 24. The principle of res judicata is equally applicable to departmental and administrative proceedings once an issue has been finally adjudicated between the parties and has attained finality. The Supreme Court of India in Puja Ferro Alloys P. Ltd. v. 17 State of Goa and Others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 326 , reiterated that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy to ensure finality in litigation and to prevent re-agitation of issues already decided, holding that the same principle extends even to administrative proceedings and proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relevant paragraphs are quoted hereinbelow:- “22. For the principle of res judicata to be applied in the subsequent proceeding, it must be between the same parties and the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding must be the same as in the previous proceeding. The Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi15 has succinctly noted that the principle of res judicata is essential in giving a finality to judicial decisions by observing as under: “The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter — whether on a question of fact or a question of law — has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party 18 will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. …” 24. It is now well settled that the principle of res judicata applies even to petitions arising for decision in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. If any authority is required one may profitably refer to the decision in T.P. Moideen Koya v. State of Kerala17. 25. In the instant case, we are convinced that the writ petitions before the High Court were hit by res judicata in view of its previous decision in 19 GR Ispat (supra) which, when challenged before this Court, was upheld with the further observation that a balanced view of the matter had been taken and no interference was called for. The appellant-companies were all parties and are bound by the decision in GR Ispat (supra). Having failed up to this Court, the appellant-companies could not have adopted a stand different from the one taken in the first round of litigation. They sought to challenge the demand notices by re-opening the litigation and arguing that they are entitled to the benefit for five years, which they would have been entitled to had they availed the supply of power within the time that the notification dated 30.09.1991 was in force.” 25. The learned Tribunal has rightly appreciated that once earlier relief stood declined and such order attained finality, the subsequent Original Application raising identical grievance was not maintainable and was rightly rejected. 26. The learned Tribunal, therefore, committed no error in rejecting the petitioner’s application vide the impugned order dated 12.11.2025. The reasoning assigned by the Tribunal is in consonance with settled legal principles and does not suffer from perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 20 27. In light of the aforesaid, this Court does not find much less sufficient ground, to entertain the present petition. It appears that the petitioner is unnecessarily delaying the departmental enquiry and obstructing its logical conclusion. 28. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. 29. No order as to cost(s). sd/- sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha 21 HEAD-NOTE “The principle of res judicata applies equally to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once an issue has been finally adjudicated between the same parties and affirmed up to the higher Courts of India, the same cannot be reopened in a subsequent writ petition by adopting a different stand. Re-litigation of an issue already concluded is impermissible.”