1 2025:CGHC:16867 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPL No. 37 of 2013  Smt. Laxmi Dewangan Wd/o Late Sukhitram Dewangan Aged About 45 Years R/o Ward No. 44, Near Lalit Kiran Store Gandhi Nagar, Ksaridih, Durg, Tahsil And Distt. Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus  The Divisional Forest Officer Durg, Forest Division Durg, Distt. Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Rishi Sahu, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Tarun Dansena, Advocate For State : Mr. Dashrath Prajapati, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 11. 04.2025 1. The petitioner has challenged the award dated 20.11.2012 passed by THE Judge under I.D. Act, Labour Court, Durg in Case No. 18/ID Act/ 2009 (Reference). 2. As per THE statement of claim, the petitioner was appointed under the respondent on 31.12.1988 and was removed from services on 30.04.2000. In the year 2009, the matter was referred by the Learned Labour Commissioner, Chhattisgarh, Raipur to the concerned Labour Court to decide the reference as under:- " क्या ्ቦीमቈኌ लቌኚमी देवी देवांगन को काय से पृथक किकया जाना वैध एवं उचित है? यकिद नहीं तो आवेकिदका किकस सहायता का पा्ቔ है? अतः इस SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.04.15 18:44:32 +0530 2 संबंध में किनयोजक / ्ቚबंधन को क्या किनद+श किदया जाना ाकिहए?” 3. The learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner approached the Court after 10 years without explaining the delay. It is further held that the petitioner could not produce documents to establish the fact that she worked for 240 days in a calendar year. It is also held that the petitioner worked from 1988 to 2000 for a period of 12 years, but she could not produce a single document with regard to her engagement, and consequently, the statement of claim preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the department was in possession of the relevant documents including the muster roll, but those documents were not produced. He would further submit that a plea was taken by the department that the documents including the muster roll got destroyed on account of the natural calamity. He would also submit that the learned Court below ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the department. He would pray to set-aside the award passed by the learned Labour Court and to allow the statement of claim. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose. Mr. Prajapati would submit that the petitioner failed to prove the fact that she worked for 240 days in a calendar year. He would further submit that she also failed to produce any document to establish that she worked under the respondent. He would also submit that the petitioner did not move any application for the production of muster roll or attendance register; therefore, there was no occasion for the learned Labour Court to draw an adverse inference against the department. He would pray to 3 dismiss the petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 7. According to the pleadings made in the statement of claim, the petitioner was engaged from 31.12.1988 and her services were orally terminated on 30.04.2000. The petitioner moved an application before the learned Labour Commissioner in the year 2009 and the matter was referred by the State vide order dated 18.11.2009. It appears that the petitioner failed to approach the authority for a considerable 9 years and she has not explained the delay. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department And Another reported in 2015 15 SCC 1, while dealing with the issue of limitation in para 36, 38 and 42.3 held as under:- “36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.c. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not 4 demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. 38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred.” 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination 5 and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It is further held that after a lapse of several years, such a claim is not acceptable. It is also held that if the workman is able to give a satisfactory explanation for laches and delays and demonstrates that the circumstances disclose that the issue is still alive, the delay would not come in his way because of the reason that the law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such a delayed dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be a non- existent dispute which cannot be referred.” 10. In the present case, the matter was referred by the State in the year 2009; at that time, the age of the petitioner was 45 and at present, her age would be more than 60 years, therefore, the dispute has no longer remained alive, and the claim of the petitioner is dead. Further, the petitioner failed to produce any document to demonstrate that she worked under the respondent from 1988 to 2000, though she worked for 12 years, but she could not produce a single document to prove her engagement. The petitioner also failed to move any application for the production of muster roll or attendance register therefore the contention made by learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to the adverse inference appears to be misplaced. 11. Taking into consideration the above-stated facts including the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the delay, in the opinion of this Court, no case is made out for interference. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant