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2025 DAILYLAW 25905 (CHH)

SHANKAR RAO v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/4643/2021 · 2025-08-04

Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:38730 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4643 of 2021  Shankar Rao S/o Late Jagdish Rao Aged About 60 Years Working As Veterinary Attendant, Govt. Ayurvedic, Community Health Center, Bilha, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2. The Director Ayurved Yoga And Natural Medicine Unani, Siddh And Homeopathy (Ayush) Chhattisgarh, Indravati Bhawan, Mantralaya, New Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3. The District Ayurved Officer Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Harish Khuntiya, Advocate For State : Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta, Addl. Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 05. 08.2025 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, thereby directing the respondent authorities to consider the case of petitioner for grant of promotion to the next higher post with all consequential benefits, in accordance with law. 10.2 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the cost of the petition may be given.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that initially, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Veterinary Attendant. He would further submit SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.08.06 14:55:54 +0530 2 that a gradation list was published by the department on 01.04.2007. He would also submit that the petitioner was eligible for promotion to the post of Compounder Ayurved Class-III in the year 2008 itself. He would also submit that similarly situated employees were promoted to the said post vide order dated 28.03.2008, but the petitioner was not considered for promotion. He would pray to allow the instant petition. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose. He would submit that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Veterinary Attendant and became eligible for promotion to the post of Compounder Ayurved Class-III in the year 2008. He would further submit that the petitioner preferred the instant petition in the year 2021, after a lapse of 13 years, and the delay has not been explained properly. He would further contend that the petitioner has already retired from service on 30.06.2023. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents placed on the record. 5. From a perusal of the documents, it is apparent that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Veterinary Attendant. The petitioner became eligible for promotion to the post of Compounder Ayurved Class-III in the year 2008. The petitioner is claiming promotion from 28.03.2008, when similarly situated employees were promoted to the said post, and the instant petition was filed on 24.08.2021. The petitioner has approached this Court after a lapse of 13 years without explaining the delay. Further, the petitioner has retired from his services, and after retirement, the claim of the petitioner for promotion cannot be considered as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Dr. Amal Satpathi & Ors., 2024 (14) SCALE 294. 3 6. With regard to the delay and laches, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152, while dealing with a similar issue, in para 2, held as under:- “2. ………………...One cannot sleep over the matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to 4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years because of the tempting prospect of the Chief Engineership he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be reproduced now. In any case as the Government had decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do, not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to consider the appellants' case as if nothing had happened after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3 and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their merits deserved their promotion over the head of the appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over his head. He could have come to the Court on every one of these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his bead should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that 'here is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Jindal 4 vs. Rajni Mahajan and Others reported in (2023) 19 SCC 533, in para 5, held as under:- “5. We are not finally opining on the issue as to whether the DPC should have been postponed or not; the ACRs only up to the year the vacancy arose should have been considered or it should be up to the date of holding of DPC. the fact remains that Respondent 1 was promoted way back in the year 2007. More than 15 years have elapsed. She was otherwise also senior to the appellant in the cadre of Lecturers and there may have been further promotions of both the parties as well as in the department where they are working. Any order passed at this stage may affect number of persons and further may result in unsettling many positions which have already settled with the lapse of time. Hence, we do not find that a case is made for interference by this Court.” 8. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have an impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation, which, in an acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons; such delay does not deserve any indulgence, and on the said ground alone, this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter, statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of P.S. 5 Sadasivaswamy (supra) and Manoj Kumar Jindal (supra), it is quite vivid that the petitioner has approached this Court after a delay of 13 years. The petitioner utterly failed to explain the delay caused in filing the instant petition. 10. Taking into consideration the above-stated facts, I do not find any good ground to entertain the instant petition. 11. Accordingly, the instant petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant