1 2025:HHC:33512 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) Nos.: 2304 & 2305 of 2025 Reserved on    : 24 th   September, 2025 Decided on    :   26 th   September, 2025 Cr. MP(M) No. 2304 of 2025 Rajinder Singh …Applicant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Cr. MP(M) No. 2305 of 2025 Varinder Singh …Applicant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant      :  Mr. Sahil   Thakur   &   Ms. Supriya Chaudhary, Advocates. For the respondent   : Mr. Mohinder   Zharaick,   Additional Advocate General with  Ms. Ranjna Patial,   Deputy   Advocate   General, assisted by HC Devender Prakash, No.   96,   Police   Station   Tahliwal, District Una. Virender Singh, Judge The above titled bail applications are disposed of by a common order, as, both the applicants have filed 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33512 these  applications,   under   Section  483  of   the  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita  (hereinafter referred to as the 'BNSS'), seeking the relief of bail, during the pendency of the trial, in a case, arising out of FIR No. 63/2024, dated 22.08.2024,  registered   with  Police   Station   Tahliwal, District Una, H.P., under Sections 15 and 29 of the Narcotic   Drugs   and   Psychotropic   Substances   Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NDPS Act’). 2. According to the applicants, they are innocent persons and have falsely been implicated and arrested by the police, in the present case. 3. As per the applicants, they have been roped, in the present case, by some influential persons deliberately, in connivance with the local police. 4. It is the further case of the applicants that the investigation, in the present case, is complete and charge­ sheet has been filed in the competent Court of law and the case is now fixed for PWs for 18th November, 2025. 5. According to the applicants, they are entitled to the   bail,   as,   their   custodial   interrogation   is   no   longer 3 2025:HHC:33512 required. According to them, the grounds of arrest have not been supplied to them. 6. Applicants   have   earlier   tried   their   luck,   by moving similar  applications,  before  this Court,  however, the   said   applications   were   dismissed   as   withdrawn   on 01.05.2025. 7. Apart from this, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, have given certain undertakings, on behalf of the applicants, for which, the applicants are ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released, on bail, during the pendency of the trial. 8. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the applications. 9. When   put   to   notice,   the   police   has   filed   the status report, disclosing therein, that on 22.08.2024, HC Devender   Prakash,   No.96,   I.O.   Police   Station,   Tahliwal, along with other police officials, was on patrolling duty, traffic   checking,   picketing   duty   and   duty   to   detect   the crime relating to excise and narcotics. 9.1. At about 2.55 p.m., when, the police party had put   a   picketing,   for   traffic   checking   at   Tahliwal,   near 4 2025:HHC:33512 ‘Bhajne the Dhaba’, they noticed a car, being driven by its driver, coming from Santoshgarh side. The I.O. had given the signal to the driver to stop the car. Consequently, he has stopped the car bearing registration No.HP80A­9899, on the side of the road. 9.2. On inquiry, the driver has disclosed his name as Sahil Thakur. When, the I.O. was talking to the driver of the said car, meanwhile, he noticed a truck, being driven by   its   driver,   coming   from   Santoshgarh   side. The   I.O. directed the driver to stop the same. Consequently, the truck   driver   stopped   the   truck,   in   front   of   ‘Bhajne  the Dhaba’. Registration number of the said truck was HP19B­ 7437. 9.3. The   truck   driver,   on   seeing   the   police   party, became   perplexed   and   apart   from   the   driver,   another person was also found, in the truck. Since the truck driver became perplexed. As such, the I.O. developed suspicion that some illegal article could be there in the truck. 9.4. Thereafter,   Sahil   Thakur   (car   driver)   and   HC Hardeep Singh No.108, were associated, as witnesses and the   names   of   truck   driver   and   his   companion,   were 5 2025:HHC:33512 inquired. The person, on wheel disclosed his name, as Varender Singh (applicant in Cr.MP(M) No.2305 of 2025) and   the   person,   accompanying   him,   had   disclosed   his name as Rajinder Singh (applicant in Cr.MP(M) No.2304 of 2025). Both the persons were found to be perplexed, as such, both were directed to come out of the truck. 9.5. In the presence of the witnesses, ‘Dalla’ of the truck   was   got   opened   and   on   checking,   under   the tarpaulin, five sack were found, out of which, four were of black coloured and one was of white colour. When the sack were opened, three sack were found to be containing ‘poppy husk’ and in two sack, ‘Khas­Khas’ (poppy seeds) were found. Poppy husk on weighment was found to be 54.910 grams and the Khas­Khas was found to be 49.730 kilograms. 10. Other   codal   formalities   were   completed   and after registration of the FIR, case property, was taken into possession   and   accused   persons   were   arrested. After conducting inventory proceedings, the case property was sent  to  SFSL,  Junga,  for  analysis,  from   where,   positive report has been received. 6 2025:HHC:33512 11. After completion of investigation, charge sheet has been filed in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una and the matter is now listed for evidence on 28.11.2025. 12. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the applications. 13. The applicants, in the present case, have been arrested,   under   the   provisions   of   NDPS   Act. The legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted this statute to curb the   menace   of   drug   abuse   with   stringent   punishment. Certain conditions are there, in the NDPS Act, in the shape of Section 37 of NDPS Act, which are, in addition to the conditions,   as   contained   in   Section  483   of   the   BNSS. Before   releasing   a   person   on   bail,   those   conditions,   as enumerated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are to be fulfilled, if the accused has been arrested for the offence, involving ‘commercial quantity’ of contraband. Contraband, i.e., 54.910 kilograms of poppy husk (Bhukki), falls within the definition of commercial quantity. 14. Once,   it   has   been   held   that   the   contraband allegedly   recovered   from   the   possession   of   the   accused 7 2025:HHC:33512 (applicants) falls in the category of ‘commercial quantity’, as per the Notification issued by the Central Government, then, the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act come into play. 15. In   a   recent   decision,   in   case,   titled   as Narcotics   Control   Bureau   versus   Mohit   Aggarwal, reported   in  AIR   2022   SC   3444,  the   Hon’ble   Supreme Court has reiterated the earlier view regarding compliance of the conditions, as enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act,   in   a   case,   where,   the   accused,   involving   the commercial quantity of contraband, seeks his release on bail. Relevant paragraphs 10 to 15 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act read as follows: “[37. Offences   to   be   cognizable   and   non­ bailable.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained   in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)­ (a)   every   offence   punishable   under   this   Act shall be cognizable; (b)   no   person   accused   of   an   offence punishable for [offences under section 19 or section   24   or   section   27A   and   also   for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be   released   on   bail   or   on   his   own   bond unless­ 8 2025:HHC:33512 (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii)   where   the   Public   Prosecutor   opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail. 11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non­ obstante clause inserted in sub­section (1) and the conditions imposed in sub­section (2) of Section 37 that  there  are  certain   restrictions   placed  on  the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under   Section   439   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 37   are   also   to   be   factored   in. The   conditions imposed in sub­section (1) of Section 37 is that (i) the   Public   Prosecutor   ought   to   be   given   an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused   person   for   release   and   (ii)   if   such   an application   is   opposed,   then   the   Court   must   be satisfied that there are reasonable   grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied   that   the   accused   person   is   unlikely   to commit any offence while on bail. 12. The   expression   “reasonable   grounds”   has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi   v. Ahmadalieva   Nodira”,   (2004)   3   SCC   549,   a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus:­ 9 2025:HHC:33512 “7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to   the   Public   Prosecutor,   the   other   twin conditions which really have relevance so far as   the   present   accused   respondent   is concerned, are: the satisfaction of the court that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged  offence and that he is not likely to commit   any   offence   while   on   bail. The conditions are  cumulative and not alternative. The   satisfaction   contemplated   regarding   the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable   grounds. The   expression “reasonable   grounds”   means   something more   than   prima   facie   grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not   guilty   of   the   alleged   offence. The reasonable   belief   contemplated   in   the provision requires existence of such facts and   circumstances   as   are   sufficient   in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused   is   not   guilty   of   the   alleged offence.” [emphasis added] 13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs. Rajesh and others” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this Court has observed as below: “20. The   expression   “reasonable   grounds” means   something   more   than   prima   facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief   contemplated   in   the   provision requires   existence   of   such   facts   and circumstances   as     are   sufficient   in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused   is   not   guilty   of   the   alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems   to   have   completely   overlooked   the 10 2025:HHC:33512 underlying   object   of   Section   37   that   in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”  [emphasis added] 14. To   sum   up,   the   expression   “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub­Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused   person   is   not   guilty   of   the   alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe that   the   accused   person   would   not   have committed such an offence. Dove­tailed with the   aforesaid   satisfaction   is   an   additional consideration   that   the   accused   person   is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 15. We   may   clarify   that   at   the   stage   of examining   an   application   for   bail   in   the context of the Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required  to record  a finding that  the accused person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not. The   entire   exercise   that   the   Court   is expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty   of   the   offences   that   he   has   been charged with and he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail.” 16. The   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   a   case, Criminal Appeal No. 5544 of 2024, titled as ‘Narcotics Control   Bureau   versus   Kashif’,  Neutral   Citation   No. 11 2025:HHC:33512 2024   INSC   1045,   has   again   reiterated   the   law,   as enumerated by it, in Mohit Aggarwal’s case (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, has held that the provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act are mandatory in nature. Relevant paragraphs 8 and 39 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under: “8. There has been consistent and persistent view of this Court that in the NDPS cases,  where the offence is punishable with minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally be not released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. The recording of finding as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act. Apart from the granting opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor, the other two conditions i.e., (i)   the   satisfaction   of   the   court   that   there   are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, are the cumulative and not alternative conditions. xxx xxx xxx 39. The  upshot   of   the  above   discussion   may   be summarized as under: (i)  The provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object and purpose of the Act; as also the impact on the society as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally and not liberally, which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and Preamble of the Act. (ii)  While considering the application for bail, the Court must bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act which are mandatory in nature. 12 2025:HHC:33512 Recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is sine   qua   non   is   known   for   granting   bail   to   the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act. (iii)  The purpose of insertion of Section 52A laying down the procedure for disposal of seized Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was to ensure the early disposal of the seized contraband drugs and substances. It was inserted in 1989 as one of the measures to implement and to give effect to the International   Conventions   on   the   Narcotic   drugs and psychotropic substances. (iv) Sub­section (2) of Section 52A lays down the procedure   as   contemplated   in   sub­section   (1) thereof,   and   any   lapse   or   delayed   compliance thereof would be merely a procedural irregularity which   would   neither   entitle   the   accused   to   be released on bail nor would vitiate the trial on that ground alone. (v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to have been committed in conducting the search and seizure   during   the   course   of   investigation   or thereafter,   would   by   itself   not   make   the   entire evidence   collected   during   the   course   of investigation, inadmissible. The Court would have to   consider   all   the   circumstances   and   find   out whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the accused. (vi) Any lapse or delay in compliance of Section 52A by itself would neither vitiate the trial nor would entitle the accused to be released on bail. The Court will have to consider other circumstances and the other primary evidence collected during the course of investigation, as also the statutory presumption permissible under Section 54 of the NDPS Act.” (self­emphasis supplied) 17. In view of the above, there is nothing on record to give an occasion for this Court to hold that the twin 13 2025:HHC:33512 conditions, as enumerated, in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are in favour of the applicants, in the present case. 18. Learned  counsel for  the  applicants  have  also argued that the grounds of arrest have not been supplied to the applicants. To buttress their contentions, learned counsel for the applicants have relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vihan Kumar versus State of Haryana & Another, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169. 19. With due respect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the applicants are not entitled to any benefit, as the recovery, in the present case, is not on the basis of the prior information. The recovery, as per the case of the police, is chance recovery. 20. Considering the stand of the police that on the spot, the police put the contraband in the same sack and the sack were sealed with one seal having impression ‘K’, NCB forms, in triplicate, were filled­in and the memos were duly signed by both the applicants and copy of the said memos were supplied to both the accused persons. When the documents, which were prepared, on the spot, were duly signed, by the applicants, then, it cannot be said that 14 2025:HHC:33512 the grounds of arrest were not supplied to the applicants or the applicants were not apprised about the grounds of arrest. 21. From   the   above   documents,   the   substantial compliance is proved, in this case. 22. If the facts and circumstances of the present case is seen in the light of the decision of a three judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in, Madhu Limaye & Others,  1969   (1)   Supreme   Court   Cases   292,  the applicants   are   not   entitled   to   the   relief   on   the   alleged violation   of   non­supply   of   grounds   of   arrest. Relevant paragraph 10 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ 10. Article 22(1)  embodies a rule which has always been regarded as vital and fundamental for   safeguarding   personal   liberty   in   all   legal systems   where   the   rule   of   law   prevails. For example, the 6th amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America contains similar provisions   and   so   does   Article   XXXIV   of   the Japanese   Constitution   of   1946. In   England whenever an arrest is made without a warrant, the arrested person has a right to be informed not only that he is being arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the arrest. The House of Lords   in   Christie   &   Another   v.   Leachinsky ((1947) 1 All EER 567) went into the origin and development   of   this   rule. In   the   words   of Viscount Simon if a policeman who entertained a reasonable  suspicion that  X had  committed  a felony were at liberty to arrest him and march 15 2025:HHC:33512 him off to a police station without giving any explanation of why he was doing this, the prima facie right of personal liberty would be gravely infringed. Viscount   Simon   laid   down   several propositions   which   were   not   meant   to   be exhaustive. For our purposes we may refer to the first and the third : "1. If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, he must   in   ordinary   circumstances   inform   the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other   words,   a   citizen   is   entitled   to   know   on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. 2. X X X X 3. The   requirement   that   the   person   arrested should   be   informed   of   the   reason   why   he   is seized   naturally   does   not   exist   if   the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained." Lord   Simonds   gave   an   illustration   of   the circumstances   where   the   accused   must   know why he is being arrested. "There   is   no   need   to   explain   the   reasons   of arrest if the arrested man is caught red­handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven." The two requirements of clause (1) of Article 22 are meant to afford the earliest opportunity to the   arrested   person   to   remove   any   mistake, misapprehension   or   misunderstanding   in   the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him. Clause (2) of Article 22  provides   the   next   and   most   material safeguard   that   the   arrested   person   must   be 16 2025:HHC:33512 produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of such   arrest   so   that   an   independent   authority exercising   judicial   powers   may   without   delay apply   is   mind   to   his   case. The  Criminal Procedure  Code  contains  analogous  provisions in  Section   60  and   340   but   out   Constitution­ makers were anxious to make these safeguards an integral part of fundamental rights. This is what Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said while moving for insertion   of   Article   15­A   (as   numbered   in   the Draft   Bill   of   the   Constitution)   which corresponded to present Article 22 : "Article 15­A merely lifts from the provisions of the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  two   of   the  most fundamental   principles   which   every   civilised country   follows   as   principles   of   international justice. It is quite true that these two provisions contained   in   clause   (1)   and   clause   (2)   are already to be found in the  Criminal Procedure Code and thereby probably it might be said that we are really not making any very fundamental change. But   we   are,   as   I   contend,   making   a fundamental change because what we are doing by the introduction of Article 15­A is to put a limitation upon the authority both of Parliament as well as of the Provincial Legislature not to abrogate the two provisions, because they are now introduced in our Constitution itself." As   stated   in  Ram   Narayan   Singh   v.   State   of Delhi & Ors. this court has often reiterated that those   who   feel   called   upon   to   deprive   other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive   to   be   their   duty   must,   strictly   and scrupulously,   observe   the   forms   and   rules   of law. Whenever that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release.” (Self Emphasis supplied) 23. Even otherwise, the applicants were arrested on the spot, along with contraband and the documents, which 17 2025:HHC:33512 were prepared on the spot, were duly signed by them, as such, they cannot take the stand that they were not aware about the offence, for which, they have been detained, by the police. 24. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the applicants are not able to make out a case, on the basis of which, it can be said that the applicants are not guilty of such offence and in case, they are ordered to be  released, on bail, they are not  likely to commit  any offence. As such, in the absence of the satisfaction of the twin conditions, the applicants are not held entitled to any relief, under Section 483 of the BNSS. Consequently, the bail applications are dismissed. 25. Any   of   the   observations,   made   herein   above, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case,  as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present bail application. ( Virender Singh ) September 26, 2025 ( ps ) Judge