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2025 DAILYLAW 25891 (CHH)

SMT. SARSWATI RAJAK v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WPS/4620/2025 · 2025-06-24

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2025

Judgment text

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2025:CGHC:27911 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4620 of 2025 1 - Smt. Sarswati Rajak W/o Ramesh Kumar Aged About 34 Years R/o Village- Banjari, Post- Madai, Tahsil And Block- Podi-Uproda, District- Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Commissioner Health Services, Indirawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Director Directorate Health Services, Indirawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Joint Director Health Services Seepat Road, Sarkanda Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Chief Health And Medical Officer, District Korba C.G. 6 - Block Health And Medical Officer, Podi- Uproda, District- Korba C.G. ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Ravikar Patel, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. S.P. Kale, Additional A.G. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.07.09 19:09:27 +0530 25/06/2025 1. The petitioner is questioning his suspension order dated 26.05.2025 (Annexure P/1) issued by the respondent No.5 and order dated 27.05.2025 (Annexure P/2), passed by the respondent No.6 and filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming the following reliefs:- “10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased call records of this matter for the pertaining of this Hon'ble Court. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be please to quash/set-aside order dated 26.05.2025 & 27.05.2025 (Annexure P/1 & P/2), in the interest of justice. 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in favour of the petitioner as per the facts & circumstance of the present case, in the ends of justice.” 2. The brief facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition are that the petitioner is working as ANM and was posted at Sub-Health Centre, Madai, Block Podi- Uproda, District Korba. A complaint was made against her that, she demanded bribe of Rs. 500/- from the patient Smt. Amisha for correction in the birth certificate of her child and after preliminary enquiry, the complaint was found correct. The conduct of the petitioner is found as misconduct as provided under Rule 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and she has been suspended, which is under challenge in the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was initially posted as Rural Health Organizer (Female) at Sub-Health Centre, Madai vide order dated 17.02.2017. There is no complaint in her service tenure. She corrected the birth certificate of the daughter of the complainant Smt. Amisha through online mode and when she demanded a physical copy of birth certificate, she was unable to give the same, as there was no printer available in the Health Centre and then she made a false complaint about demand of bribe. No any show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner before passing the impugned order, and therefore, the impugned order of suspension is liable to be set-aside. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner is having an alternative remedy of appeal provided under Rule 23 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short “CCA Rules, 1966”) and the writ petition is not maintainable challenging the suspension order. The allegation against the petitioner includes various factual aspects, which cannot be determined in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court cannot examine the correctness of the allegations against the petitioner in the writ petition. He would further submit that the judicial review against a suspension order is very limited, as the suspension does not cast any stigma upon the employee. After considering the entire material, the authorities concerned have considered for suspension of the petitioner and there is sufficient material available before the authorities to consider the same, and therefore, there is no merit in the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. In the matter of “State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty” 1994 (4) SCC 126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 13 that:- “13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483: 1994 SCC (L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.” 7. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that, whether charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, cannot be gone into at the stage of examining the validity of suspension order. At the stage of suspension, the correctness of allegations is not required to be looked into. The public interest is also an element on the consideration of which an employee can be placed under suspension. This is within the province of the Disciplinary Authority to decide, whether an employee is required to be suspended or not, because suspension is a step towards ultimate result of an investigation or an inquiry. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “M. Paul Anthoni v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited” 1999 (3) SCC 679 has held in para 26 that:- “26. To place an employee under suspension is an unqualified right of the employer. This right is conceded to the employer in service jurisprudence everywhere. It has even received statutory recognition under service rules framed by various authorities, including Govt. of India and the State Governments. (See: for example, Rule 10 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. Even under the General Clauses Act, this right is conceded to the employer by Section 16 which, inter alia, provides that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss.” 9. Further, in the matter of “Union of India and another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal” 2013 (16) SCC 147, in para 22 and 27, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- “22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank etc. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as which version is true when there are claims and counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review.” 10. Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966 provides for a departmental appeal against the order of suspension of the employee to the State Government, which reads as under:- “23. Orders against which appeal lies.- Subject to the provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely- ( i ) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 whether made by the disciplinary authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority; (ii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under Rule 10; (iii) [an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9;] Explanation. - In this rule the expression "Government servant" includes a person who has ceased to be in Government service.” 11. It is settled law that the order of suspension is not that of punishment. The requirement of the law is that the reason should be there in the order of suspension. In the present case, the reason for the suspension of the petitioner is mentioned that, she demanded Rs. 500/- as bribe from the complainant Smt. Amisha for correction of birth certificate of her daughter, which was found prima facie correct in preliminary enquiry, which amounts to misconduct under the CCA Rules, 1966 and Conduct Rules, 1965. The petitioner is having specific remedy of appeal before the State Government as provided under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules. 12. In view of the foregoing analysis and also in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court does not find any mala fide or arbitrariness in passing the suspension order and further is of the opinion that the petitioner does not make out any exceptional case to interfere with his suspension orders dated 26.05.2025 and 27.05.2025 (Annexure P/1 and P/2) invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge his suspension order before the State Government as provided under Rule 23 of CCA Rules, if so advised. 13. In the result, the petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved