1 2025:CGHC:9541-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 917 of 2021 1 - Raju Kumar Dhurve S/o Bedram Dhurve, Aged About 21 Years R/o Samnapur, Chowki Damapur, Police Station- Kunda, District - Kabirdham Chhattisgarh, District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Station House Officer, Police Station - Pipariya, District - Kabirdham Chhattisgarh, District : Kawardha (Kabirdham), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Ms. Aditi Singhvi, Advocate. For State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 25-02-2025 1. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. aginst the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 24-07-2021 passed by the learned Special Judge {Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’)}, FTC, Kabirdham in Special Sessions Case No.40/2019 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 in the following manner with a direction to run all the jail sentences concurrently:- Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of the IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month, U/s 366 of the IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month, Under Section 376(3) of the IPC R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 3 months. Conviction of the appellant is also under Section 6 of POCSO Act. Since the appellant has been sentenced R.I. for twenty years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 3 months for his conviction under Section 376(3) of the IPC, no separate sentence has been awarded to him under Section 6 of POCSO Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are that father of the victim PW-1 lodged a missing report to the police that his minor daughter is missing since 19- 04-2019 and her whereabouts could not be traced out despite her search in nearby places and relatives’ house. He suspected that someone kidnapped his minor daughter. The police has registered FIR Ex.-P/1 against unknown person for the offence under Section 313 of the IPC and started investigation. During investigation the victim was recovered on 25-04-2019 from the possession of the appellant and recovery panchnama Ex.-P/4 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District 3 Hospital Kawardha where PW-10 doctor Sushila Kindo medically examined her and gave report Ex.-P/15A. While examining the victim the doctor has not found any external injury on her body. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for its chemical examination. With respect to the date of birth of the victim the police has seized Class Vth mark sheet of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.-P/2. School register has also been seized from the Primary School Dhanora vide seizure memo Ex.-P/4 and after retaining attested true copy of the school register Ex.-P/12C the original school register Ex.-P/12 was returned back to the school. Spot map Ex.-P/3 was prepared by the police and Ex.-P/14 was prepared by the Patwari. The underwear of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/5. The appellant was arrested on 25-04-2019 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Community Health Center, Pipariya, where he was medically examined by the doctor who found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. The vaginal slides, pubic hair and the underwear of the victim as well as pubic hair and underwear of the appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL, Raipur where report Ex.-P/24 was received and semen and sperms were found in vaginal slide and underwear of the victim, however, no semen and sperms were found on other articles. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. of the victim have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and Section 3 and 4 4 of POCSO Act. The learned trial Court has framed the charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 3. In order to prove charge against the appellant the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 4. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence laid by the prosecution the learned trial Court has convicted and sentence the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict the appellant in offence in question. There is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to age of the victim that she was minor on the date of incident. The school register produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law and there is no other evidence available in the record which proves that the victim was minor on the date of incident. There no birth certificate or ossification test report of the victim produced by the prosecution and in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence her age cannot be determined that she was minor or 5 less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. She would further submit that the victim was having love affair with the appellant and she herself has made physical relation with him on her own will without raising any objection. She engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant and has not made any complaint to anyone and when their relation came into knowledge of their parents they lodged the report by pressurizing the victim for the same. She being major girl having engaged in making consensual physical relation no offence of rape is made out against the appellant and he is entitled for acquittal. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are sufficient evidence against the appellant in the case to convict him for the alleged offence. The victim was found to be minor on the date of incident and the school record has been proved by PW-5 who is In-charge Head Master of the school and she is author of the entries made therein with respect to date of birth of the victim. The minor victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant. The victim being minor was not competent to give her consent and therefore, making physical relation with a minor girl itself amounts to offence of rape for which the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the victim as well as other evidences and convicted him for the alleged offence. He would further submit that even if no injuries have been found on the body of the victim it does not makes the 6 prosecution case doubtful as injury in every case is not required to be found on body of the victim and it depends upon the facts of each case. In the present case there are overwhelming evidence against the appellant and his appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 8. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be age of the victim as to whether she was minor on the date of incident or not. 9. The prosecution has mainly relied upon school register Ex.-P/12C which is sought to be proved by PW-5 who is In-charge Head Master of the school. He stated in his evidence that he is In-charge Head Master of Govt. Primary School Dhanora since 2003. The police has seized school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo Ex.-P/11. After retaining its attested true copy Ex.-P/12C the original school register was returned back to the school and she brought the same with her. According to the school register the date of birth of the victim is 12-07-2005. She stated that she is author of the school register. In cross-examination she admitted that in school register, name of person is not mentioned who has taken the victim for her admission in the school and disclosed her date of birth. She voluntarily stated that there is another register in the school named Tatima Panji in which all the details of the student are mentioned. She has not brought Tatima Panji with her. She admitted that the date of birth of the victim is not recorded on the basis of Kotwari panji or birth register. She further 7 voluntarily stated that the date of birth of the victim is recorded on the basis of the information supplied by anganbadi karyakarta, but there is no mention of the name of anganbadi karyakarta who has given the information. The pagination of the school register has not been done by her. She also admitted that earlier the children were given admission in the school after reducing their age, but the from the time when she is posted in the school the children of 6 years of age are given admission in the school. From the evidence of this witness it is quite vivid that though she is the author of the school register, but the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register have not been produced by the prosecution, even the list supplied by the anganbadi karyakarta or any document from anganbadi center have not been produced by the prosecution. 10. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 8 11. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional 9 right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the 10 determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 11 13. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the 12 matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 13 14. The victim PW-4 has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 12-07-2005. In cross-examination though she denied that she disclosed her date of birth at the instance of her parents, but she admitted that she has not disclosed her date of birth on the basis of kotwari panji or birth register and she has not brought any kotwari panji or birth register with her. 15. PW-1 father of the victim has not disclosed any date of her birth, but has stated that his daughter was aged about 13 years on the date of incident. The police has seized Class Vth mark sheet of his daughter vide seizure memo Ex.-P/2. In cross-examination he admitted that he is having 6 children and he did not know the date of birth of his daughter/victim. He denied that he has not got recorded the birth of his children with kotwari panji. He also denied that he has not given kotwari panji to the police and he also denied that he is not having kotwari panji with him with respect to the birth of his children. Though he was having the date of birth of his children in writing, but he has not brought the said document with him. 16. PW-2 who is grand father in relation of the victim has disclosed the age of the victim as 13 years and 9 months. But, in cross- examination he did not give any concrete evidence with respect to her age. He too has admitted that he has not got it write down the date of birth of the victim, but has denied that the date of birth of the victim is not recorded in the kotwari register. 17. PW-3 mother of the victim has stated that the victim was aged 14 about 13 years and she could not remember her date of birth. In cross- examination she stated that she did not know about the date of birth of any of her children. She too has denied that the birth of her children have not recorded in the kotwari register. 18. From all these evidence particularly in absence of any documentary evidence when the kotwari register is available with the witnesses, it would not be safe for this Court to hold that the prosecution has proved the fact that the victim was minor on the date of incident. Only on the basis of oral evidence without any support of the documentary evidence it cannot be determined that the victim was minor, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 19. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape are concerned, we again examine the evidence of victim PW-4. 20. The victim PW-4 has stated in her evidence that the appellant was working with her father and she was acquainted with him and used to talk with him. On 19-04-2019 she called him by mobile phone and she by saying that she is going to washroom came out from her house and accompanied with the appellant upto Indori and they had gone by walking. At about 5:00 a.m. they had gone to Raipur by bus and they were residing at Siltara, Raipur in a brick kiln and on 25-04-2019 her parents and police persons came and took her back. They stayed at Siltara for about 4 days in a hutment. The appellant had performed marriage with her by applying vermilion on her head and made physical relation with him. When the leading question was asked from this 15 witness, she admitted that when she started talking with the appellant they started making physical relation with each other and she did not disclose the said incident to anyone. She further admitted that the appellant proposed her that he will marry with her. In para 8 of her cross-examination she admitted that at the time when the appellant made physical relation with her she has not raised any objection. She denied the suggestion that before going to Raipur the appellant has not made physical relation with her, meaning thereby before they proceeded to Raipur they were having physical relation, but she has not made any complaint to anyone. She further admitted that she has not disclosed her physical relation with the appellant to her parents and both of them were having trust upon each other. She further admitted that she insisted the appellant to go outside and they came to village Indori by walking in the night. When they were waiting for bus at village Indori other persons were also there, but she has not made any complaint to anyone that the appellant was kidnapping her even in the bus she has not disclosed any of the co-passenger about the incident. She further admitted that while staying at Siltara with the appellant she has not made any complaint and has not raised any alarm. She also admitted that she on her own will had gone with the appellant. She also admitted that she insisted the appellant to take her with him by saying that if he will not take her with him she will die. She was in love affair with the appellant and still she is loving him. She further stated that she is feeling pain that the appellant is detained in jail. She does not want that appellant stands convicted. 16 21. From evidence of the victim it is quite vivid that it is she who pressurized the appellant to go with her and threatened him that if he will not take her with him she will die. There was love affair between them. They made physical relation even prior to proceeding towards Raipur. She left her house on her own will and there is no evidence that the appellant has allured her or induced her to go to Raipur. As she was found to be major on the date of incident and she herself had gone with the appellant, she appears to be consenting party in eloping with the appellant and making physical relation with him. 22. In the matter of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 9 and 10 of the judgment as follows:- “9. It must however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between “taking” and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 17 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 23. Recently in the matter of Tilaku alias Tilak Singh Vs. the State of Uttrakhand, the judgment passed in the matter of S. Varadarajan (supra) has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.183 of 2014 decided on 06-02-2025. 24. PW-1 father of the victim has stated in his evidence that when the victim was recovered from Raipur she disclosed the incident that the appellant kidnapped her on the pretext of marriage, performed marriage with her by applying vermilion on her head and made physical relation with her. 25. PW-3 mother of the victim is also the witness to the same fact that when the victim was recovered she disclosed about the incident that the appellant kidnapped her on the pretext of marriage and committed rape upon her. But, in view of the evidence of the victim herself, that she on 18 her own will had gone to Raipur along with the appellant and engaged in making consensual physical relation, their relationship was continued even prior to the date of incident and there is no allegation that she protested or objected in any act of the appellant, evidence of parents of the victim does not help the prosecution for conviction of the appellant. 26. PW-10 Doctor Sushila Kindo who medically examined the victim has not found any external injury on her body and no sign of any protest or struggle was there. 27. In view of the evidence of the victim even if the semen and sperms were found on the vaginal slide and underwear of the victim, but that itself is not having any consequence in the facts that the victim was consenting party in making consensual physical relation with the appellant. 28. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the 19 charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 29. From the foregoing reasons it is very difficult for this Court to uphold the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the offences. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 24-07-2021, he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 30 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Raju Kumar Dhruve is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil