APHC010362832022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] TUESDAY,THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 578/2022 Between: MADALA VIJAYA KUMAR,, S/O. LATE VENKAIAH, HINDU, AGED 58 YEARS, DEPENDENT, R/O. FLAT NO.404, PRAVALLIKA RESIDENCY, SRI PARTHASARADHI NAGAR, RAMACHANDRA MISSION (ASHRAMAM), MANGAMUR ROAD, ONGOLE CITY AND MANDAL, PRAKASAM DISTRICT - 523 002, ANDHRA PRADESH, AADHAR NO.3655 0395 7053. ...PETITIONER AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF AP. AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 2.SALE KRUPA RAO, S/O. YANADI, HINDU, AGED 38 YEARS, BUSINESS, RESIDENT OF ALLURU VILLAGE, KOTHAPATNAM MANDAL, PRAKASAM DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.A RADHAKRISHNA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: 2 ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) challenging the interlocutory order filed under Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to send the Ex.P1 i.e., original promissory note dated 04.11.2013 to expert for furnishing a report. The learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ongole dismissed the petition. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Legal Aid Counsel. 3. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 4. Ex-facie the order passed by the learned Magistrate is interlocutory in nature, against which revision is not maintainable under Section 397(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra1, wherein at para No.10 it is held as under: “10. As pointed out in Amar Nath case the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, “shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court”, But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of 1 (1977) 4 SCC 551 3 the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second trial, after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.” 5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd.2, wherein at paragraph Nos.8 to 10 held as under: “8. The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage. 2 (2001) 7 SCC 401 4 9. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1978 SC 47] laid down the following test: (SCC p. 560, para 15) “[A]n order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2).” This was upheld by the four-Judge Bench of this Court in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : AIR 1980 SC 962] . 10. The above position was reiterated in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [(1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393] . Again in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat [(2000) 6 SCC 195 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 200] this Court stated thus: (SCC p. 201, para 11) “It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1978 SC 47] , V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : AIR 1980 SC 962] and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [(1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393] ). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.”” 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam3, wherein at paragraph No.5 held as under: “5. Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders i.e. one on the application under Section 91 CrPC for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such 3 (2009) 5 SCC 153 5 circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.” 7. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the revision is not maintainable. 8. In view of the above the Criminal Revisional Case is dismissed as not maintainable. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 22.07.2025 VTS