2025:HHC:33349 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 878 of 2025 Reserved on: 12.9.2025 Date of Decision: 25.9.2025. Sahil Sharma ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Vijay Bir Singh, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 124 of 2024, dated 13.8.2024, registered at Police Station Indora, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property (PDP) Act. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33349 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that the Gram Panchayat, Indora, spent ₹3.00 lacs for the construction of a passage over the land belonging to the Panchayat leading to the house of Pankaj Sharma. The petitioner, Sahil Sharma, damaged the passage on 8.7.2024 by employing an excavator. A complaint was made to the Police Station regarding this fact on 29.7.2024. The Gram Panchayat gave time to the petitioner/ accused to repair the passage, but he failed to do so. Hence, it was prayed that the action be taken against the petitioner. 3. The police registered an FIR, investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has filed the present petition for its quashing. It is asserted that the land was gifted to the Gram Panchayat for the construction of the road by the petitioner’s family member. The informant was running an illegal Ahata, and the petitioner complained about it to the police. The petitioner and his mother, 3 2025:HHC:33349 Veena Devi, were clearing their land on 18.6.2022. The informant came to the spot and abused them. When the petitioner protested, the complainant gave beatings with kicks and fist blows. The petitioner filed an application against the informant in the Police Station on 18.6.2022. The police filed a complaint under Sections 107 and 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The petitioner filed a private complaint against the informant before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indora, and the same is pending before the Court. The informant filed a false complaint against the petitioner with an ulterior motive. The criminal proceedings are manifestly instituted with mala fides. The police asserted in the charge sheet that the petitioner had committed mischief by damaging the passage. The ingredients of mischief are not satisfied. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State. 4 2025:HHC:33349 6. Mr Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated by the informant to wreak vengeance. No damage was caused to the path. The petitioner had made a complaint against the informant, but the police did not take any action. The petitioner had to approach the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class for the redressal of his grievances. The continuation of the proceedings in the present case amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had deliberately damaged the public passage by using the excavator. This constitutes an offence punishable under Section 3 of the PDP Act and mischief. The learned Trial Court had rightly summoned the accused. No interference is required with the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2025:HHC:33349 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 6 2025:HHC:33349 (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 7 2025:HHC:33349 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and 8 2025:HHC:33349 guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The petitioner asserted in the present petition that his relative had donated the land to the Gram Panchayat for the construction of the passage, which shows that the existence of the passage and its construction by the Gram Panchayat are not disputed. 13. The contents of the FIR show that the petitioner employed an excavator (JCB) and damaged the public passage. Section 326(b) of Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) reads that whoever commits mischief by doing an act which renders any public road impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property shall be punished with imprisonment. The term mischief is defined in Section 324 of BNS as the destruction of 9 2025:HHC:33349 property with the intent to cause wrongful loss or damage to any person. The term wrongful loss has been defined in Section 237 as the loss by unlawful means of the property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner had employed an excavator to damage the public path, and this deprived the public of using the path. Therefore, the act of the petitioner would fall within the definition of mischief, and since the damage was caused to the path being used by the public, the ingredients of Section 326(b) of BNS were duly satisfied. 14. Section 3 of the PDP Act provides that a person committing the mischief by doing any act in respect of the public property shall be punished. The term public property is defined in Section 2(b) as the property owned by or in possession of the local authority, inter alia. In the present case, the Panchayat was a local authority. It had constructed the road and was in its possession; therefore, the road falls within the definition of public property, and damage caused to it by the petitioner would attract the provisions of Section 3 of the PDP Act. 10 2025:HHC:33349 15. Hence, the allegations in the FIR prima facie constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, and it cannot be quashed. 16. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and were made as a counterblast to the complaint made by the petitioner against the informant. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 17. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to 11 2025:HHC:33349 the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single 12 2025:HHC:33349 Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner has filed an application against the informant, and the present FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the complaint filed by the petitioner to wreak vengeance. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 13 2025:HHC:33349 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 19. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that it was mala fide. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged 14 2025:HHC:33349 offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. In the present case, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and it should be left to adjudicate it. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 24. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th September, 2025 (Chander)