2025:UHC:725 SL. No. Date Office Notes, reports, orders or proceedings or directions and Registrar’s order with Signatures COURT’S OR JUDGE’S ORDERS WPMS No. 2880 of 2013 Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J 1. Mr. Sandeep Kothari, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. Mr. Kundan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2. 3. This writ petition is directed against the award dated 22.05.2013 rendered by learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Haldwani in Adjudication Case No. 87 of 2005. By the said award, reference was answered in favour of respondent no. 2 and it was held that termination of service of respondent no. 2 is unjust and illegal; therefore, he is entitled to reinstatement in service, but without any back wages. 4. It is not in dispute that respondent no. 2 was appointed on 10.03.1981 as Assistant Grade-I in Parvat Wires Factory, which was a unit of a Government Company known as “Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd.” and his services was terminated vide order dated 02.04.1987. 5. Respondent no. 2 raised a dispute against termination of his service, which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court by Deputy Labour Commissioner vide order dated 08.12.2005. English Translation of the question, referred for adjudication, is as follows:- “Whether termination of service of Jeevan Chandra Pant S/o Late Sri Mathura Datt Pant as Senior Assistant, by the employer w.e.f. 02.04.1987 is just and/or legal? If 2025:UHC:725 not, then to what reliefs the concerned workman is entitled to? And with which other particulars.” 6. Based on the evidence led by employer/petitioner, learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion that termination of service of respondent no. 2 is by way of punishment, even though the order of termination appears to be a case of discharge simpliciter. Consequently, learned Labour Court held the termination to be unjust and illegal. Learned Labour Court further held that provision contained in Section 6N of UP Industrial Dispute Act was also not followed while terminating services of respondent no. 2 - workman. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the finding returned by learned Labour Court that the order of termination passed against respondent no. 2 is punitive in nature, as there was serious complaint against workman of manhandling and misbehaving with his Seniors. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that learned Labour Court erred in granting continuity in service to respondent no. 2 by the impugned award, as respondent no. 2 had served for only about six years in the employment of the petitioner, and by virtue of the direction issued by learned Labour Court, a huge financial burden would fall upon the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel for respondent no. 2, however, submits that learned Labour Court has denied back wages to the petitioner, and if continuity in service is also denied, then his client will not get 2025:UHC:725 any benefit after a litigation which has extended to more than two decades. He submits that respondent no. 2 was not employed anywhere during this period and any interference with the award passed by learned Labour Court would be unwarranted. 10. Mr. Kundan Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2 submits that in cases where discharge from service is based on some adverse material or discharge is by way of punishment, then holding of formal disciplinary enquiry is a must. He has relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India & another reported in 1984 (2) SCC 369. Para 11 of the said judgment is extracted below:- “11. On behalf of the Union of India reliance has been placed on State of Punjab v. Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur; Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba; State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra; R.S. Sial v. State of U.P.; State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi and I.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. . We have gone through these decisions. Except the case of Ram Chandra Trivedi all other cases referred to above were decided prior to the decision in Shamsher Singh case which is a judgment delivered by a Bench of seven Judges. As pointed out by us in all these cases including the case of Ram Chandra Trivedi the principle applied is the one enunciated by Parshotam Lal Dhingra case which we have referred to earlier. It is urged relying upon the observation in Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur case that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution i.e. an enquiry officer is appointed, a charge-sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2). It is significant that in the very same decision it is stated that the circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. As observed by Ray, C.J., in Samsher Singh case, the form of the order 2025:UHC:725 is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the fact and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision of Article 311(2).” 11. This Court finds substance in the submission made on behalf of respondent no. 2. Since petitioner was terminated from service, based on allegations of misconduct, therefore, as per the settled law on the point, opportunity of hearing was to be given to respondent no. 2 before passing any adverse order. Since respondent no. 2 was not heard at any stage, while terminating his service, although termination was based on charge, therefore, learned Labour Court was right in holding that termination order passed against him is unjust and illegal. 12. Even otherwise also, Section 6N of UP Industrial Disputes Act ordains that before terminating service of an employer, who has completed 240 days in a calendar year, a proper notice or wages in lieu thereof, besides retrenchment compensation, is precedent condition. 13. Thus, there is no scope of interference with the impugned award. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J) 11.02.2025 Aswal 2025:UHC:725