Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2025:HHC:34147 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2235 of 2025 Reserved on: 25.9.2025 Date of Decision: 09.10.2025. Vidya Devi ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Arun Sehgal, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 89 of 2025, dated 9.7.2025, registered at Police Station, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act). 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police apprehended Kishori Lal (petitioner’s son) and 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:34147 co-accused Vinay Kumar with 2.84 kgs. of charas. They revealed during the inquiry that they were transporting the charas at the instance of the petitioner and co-accused Chaman Lal (petitioner’s husband). The investigation also showed that Kishori Lal and Vinay Kumar were in constant touch with the petitioner and Chaman Lal. The petitioner was arrested based on the call detail records, which showed that she had called her husband and her son, which is quite normal. No recovery was effected from the petitioner. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the present petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
8.7.2025. They received a secret information at 1.20 AM that Kishori Lal and Vinay Kumar were waiting for someone in a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-08-CC-4977 with charas, and in case of search, a huge quantity of charas could be recovered. The police reduced the information into writing and sent it to the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Jawalaji. The police associated Shyam Lal and Pawan Kumar and went to 32 Mile near Gaurav Hotel, where a vehicle bearing registration No.
3 2025:HHC:34147 PB-08-CC-4977 was found parked. The driver identified himself as Vinay Kumar, and the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Kishori Lal. The police searched the vehicle and recovered 2.84 kilograms of charas.
The police seized the charas and arrested Vinay Kumar and Kishori Lal, who revealed on inquiry that they had brought the charas for the petitioner and Chaman Lal. They were also in touch with the petitioner and Chaman Lal. This fact confirmed the statements made by the co-accused. Charas was sent to FSL, and as per the result of
analysis, it was found to be an abstract of cannabis and a sample of charas. No FIR was registered against the petitioner, whereas five FIRs are pending against Chaman Lal. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Arun Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Arun Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and she was falsely implicated based on the statement made by the co-accused. The petitioner was stated to be in touch with the co-accused, who
4 2025:HHC:34147 are her husband and son. The conversation between the petitioner and the co-accused is normal. No recovery was effected from the petitioner. She would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was found to be in regular touch with the co-accused. Kishori Lal revealed during the inquiry that he was bringing the charas for the petitioner. He is the son of the petitioner and has no reason to make a false statement against her. There is sufficient material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -
5 2025:HHC:34147 (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elabo- rating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid- ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent.
The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant juris- diction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex- tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
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“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the cir- cumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations.
It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the con- textual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be con- sidered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for
7 2025:HHC:34147 the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, how- ever, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59.
In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justi- fying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or reject- ing bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic prin- ciples laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circum- stances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of convic- tion; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if re- leased on bail;
8 2025:HHC:34147 (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xx
62.
One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual
order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, ob- served as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexa- tious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na- ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an ac- cused.” (emphasis supplied)
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9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report shows that the co-accused Kishori Lal and Vinay Kumar revealed during interrogation that they were asked by the petitioner and Chaman Lal to bring charas. Kishori Lal made a disclosure statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, and he showed the houses of the petitioner and Chaman Lal to the police. It is undisputed that no recovery was effected by the police pursuant to the disclosure statement made by Kishori Lal. Therefore, the statement does not fall within the purview of the proviso to Section 23(2) of Bharatiya Sakshay Adhiniyam (BSA) and prima facie its admissibility is doubtful. 11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by co-accused during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 181 of BNSS) and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. Further, the confession made by the co-accused is inadmissible because of Section 25 of
10 2025:HHC:34147 the Indian Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 23 of BSA). It was observed at page 568:-
“44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47 and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC.
Therefore, even if a statement contains an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.”
12. Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC 271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by
11 2025:HHC:34147 the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the co-accused to implicate the petitioner. 13. The police have also relied upon the call detail record of the petitioner and the co-accused Kishori Lal to connect her to the commission of the crime. There is a force in the submission of Mr Arun Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner, that co-accused Kishori Lal is the son of the petitioner, and there is nothing suspicious if a son is talking to his mother or the mother talking to her son. In the absence of the details of the conversation, the petitioner cannot be detained in custody because she had talked to her son. Therefore, the submission that, prima facie, there is insufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime has to be accepted as correct, and the further detention of the petitioner is not justified. 14. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to her furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
12 2025:HHC:34147 While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will she influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever; (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments; (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court; (IV) The petitioner will surrender her passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish her mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 15. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 16. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai
13 2025:HHC:34147 Correctional Homes, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 17. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. 18. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 9th October, 2025 (Chander) CHANDER SHEKHAR Digitally signed by CHANDER SHEKHAR Date: 2025.10.09 14:19:35 +0530