( 2025:HHC:16377 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1103 of 2024 Reserved on: 02.04.2025 Date of Decision: 28.05.2025. Rajesh Parashar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents Nos. 1 & 2- State. None for respondents Nos. 3 & 4. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing and setting aside the proceedings pending before learned Sub Divisional Magistrate Gagret, District Una (H.P) (learned Trial Court), titled as Rajeev Parashar Vs. Rajesh Parashar, filed under Sections 107 & 1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. …2… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“in short Cr.PC”). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner, Rajesh Parashar, parks his vehicle in front of the informant Rajeev Parashar’s house, which causes inconvenience to the informant and his family members. The Panchayat also instructed the petitioner to remove his vehicle from the location. The petitioner refused to remove the vehicle. He picks up a quarrel as and when he is asked to remove the vehicle. He could cause injuries to Rajeev Parashar and his family members. Hence, the complaint was made before the Court. 3. Learned Sub Divisional Magistrate issued a notice to the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why he should not be directed to furnish bonds of ₹5,000/- to maintain the peace. The petitioner appeared before the learned SDM and asserted that he …3… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) had never caused any breach of peace. The allegations in the complaint were false and meant to wreak vengeance. The civil litigation was pending between the parties in the Civil Court, Amb. Hence, it was prayed that the present complaint be dismissed. 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the proceedings. It was asserted that the dispute between the parties was civil. The petitioner parks his vehicle on his land. The complainant wants to encroach upon the petitioner’s land. The petitioner runs a newspaper that used to unveil mismanagement and Corruption of the Administration. The learned SDM has a personal enmity with the petitioner. The police filed the report at the instance of the SDM. The SDM had exceeded his jurisdiction while issuing the notice. The allegation against the petitioner has no legal basis. A civil dispute is pending between the parties. The petitioner is not keeping good health. The allegations are false and made with an ulterior purpose. Therefore, …4… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned SDM be quashed. 5. Learned SDM, submitted a status report that the proceedings were initiated on 07.06.2024, and would expire on 07.12.2024. The proceedings could not be concluded due to the continuous absence of the petitioner. 6. I have heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 & 2-State. 7. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a false complaint was made against the petitioner in connivance with the SDM to wreak vengeance upon him. The learned SDM has a conflict of interest, as the petitioner had exposed his misdeeds in the newspapers. The petitioner parks his vehicle on his land, and false allegations were made that he was parking the vehicle on the complainant’s …5… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) land. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned SDM be quashed. 8. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2-State, submitted that the specific allegation of breach of peace was made in the complaint. Learned SDM issued a notice to the petitioner, but the petitioner did not appear before learned SDM, therefore, the proceedings could not be concluded by learned SDM. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations is not to be seen in these proceedings. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The law relating to quashing of criminal proceedings was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - …6… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the …7… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. …8… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: …9… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 12. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. …10… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 13. It was submitted that the allegations in the complaint are false. Reliance was placed upon the Certificate issued by Pradhan Gram Panchayat Ghanari, Tehsil Ghanari, District Una (H.P). This is a photocopy, and its authenticity is not established. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 15. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or …11… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C.” 16. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement …12… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 17. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” …13… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 18. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 19. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to do real and …14… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the documents filed along with the petition whose authenticity is not established. 21. In any case, the Court does not conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - …15… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the …16… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the contents of the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process …17… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available …18… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 24. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. 25. It was submitted that the petitioner had exposed the misdeeds of the SDM, and the proceedings were initiated to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. The photocopies of some documents have also been placed on record. If it is so, the remedy of the petitioner is to seek the transfer of the proceedings and not the quashing of the proceedings. The mere fact that the petitioner had filed complaints against the SDM will not mean that the complaint made against the petitioner will not be investigated. 26. The police specifically stated in the report that the petitioner picks up a quarrel in a State of intoxication. He also threatened Pradhan. These allegations, prima facie, show that the petitioner is likely to commit the breach of peace, and the initiation …19… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) of the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr. P.C. cannot be faulted. 27. It was submitted that there is no material to prove the case against the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC …20… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two- judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.” …21… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 28. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 29. The evidence is yet to be led. The prosecution has cited four witnesses, and it cannot be said that there is insufficient evidence in support of the complaint. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the proceedings on this ground. 30. It was submitted that the learned SDM wrongly mentioned Section 141 of the Cr.PC in the notice issued to the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah, (2019) 9 SCC 533: (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 638: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1308 that mere mentioning of an incorrect provision of law is not fatal if the power to pass an order is available with the Court. It was observed: 8. It is well-settled law that mere non- mentioning of an incorrect provision is not fatal to the application if the power to pass such an order is available with the court. …22… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 31. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Vijay Kumar Nagpal v. Parveen Kumar Nagpal, (2022) 1 HCC (Del) 25: 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4, wherein it was observed: 11. Regarding the objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendant that the present application is filed under Section 151 CPC instead of under Order 9 CPC. However, under Section 151 CPC, this Court has inherent power to consider an application wherein a wrong provision is mentioned. It cannot be an obstacle for granting the relief as made out from the contents of the application as held in Gotham Entertainment Group LLC case [Gotham Entertainment Group LLC v. Diamond Comics (P) Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4009]. 12. It is trite that quoting a wrong statutory provision does not create a bar and stand in the way of considering the application, as held in Nitish Arora case [Nitish Arora v. State of Delhi, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 142: (2007) 141 DLT 21]. Thus, on this aspect, this Court is not convinced by the contention of learned counsel for the defendant. 13. Undisputedly, the applicant plaintiff filed the present suit for partition in which he is claiming a 60% share in the suit property and recovery of Rs 86,50,000 with interest thereon, which is the subject matter of trial. However, at this stage, the claim cannot be considered as false and based on a concocted story. …23… ( 2025:HHC:16377 ) 32. Learned SDM had the authority under Section 107 of the Cr.PC and this authority will not be taken away by a wrong mention of the provision. 33. It was submitted that the petitioner is physically challenged and the proceedings should be quashed on this ground. This submission is not acceptable. The petitioner can always seek an exemption if he is unable to attend the Court due to personal difficulty. However, the proceedings cannot be quashed due to the personal difficulty of the petitioner. 34. No other point was urged. 35. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same stands dismissed. 36. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) 28th May 2025 Judge (Shamsh Tabrez)