Page No.# 1/7 GAHC010250112025 2025:GAU-AS:17263 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : AB/2751/2025 INGJOY TISSO ENJOY TISSO S/O MOJA SING TISSO R/O MENTILLA,P.O. AND P.S. DIPHU, KARBI ANGLONG, ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY THE PP, ASSAM Advocate for the Petitioner : OTOLI KITS, V K CHISHI,MR ARINDAM BARUAH,MS. A Y SUMI Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS O R D E R 12.12.2025 Heard Mr. A. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K. Baishya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. Page No.# 2/7 2. This is a subsequent bail petition filed under section 482 of the BNSS, 2023, for granting pre-arrest bail to the accused petitioners in connection with Diphu P.S. Case No. 79/2025, registered under Sections 61(2)/308(5)/351(3) of BNS, 2023, read with Section 67 (A) of the IT Act, 2000. 3. The prosecution case as has been narrated in the bail application is that one Rukasen Englang (Informant), lodged an FIR against the accused petitioners on 15.09.2025, alleging that in the month of August, 2023, his father came to Diphu (their hometown) from Guwahati and intimated the family members that he had been honey trapped by one Smti Mirdalin Teronpi at their flat in Guwahati. It was further intimated to the family members that the aforesaid Smti Mirdalin Teronpi had secretly video-graphed the whole incident in a mobile phone and his father is scared that if the video is published or made viral by the aforesaid Smti Mirdalin Teronpi, then the image of his father shall be tarnished, as he is the MLA of Diphu constituency. It was further stated in the complaint that due to the aforesaid apprehension, neither the informant nor his father immediately filed any complaint/FIR before the Police. However, later on, the accused petitioner No. 1, who is an ex-militant involved in many cases of extortion and unlawful activities got in touch with his father and intimated his father that the video is under their possession. It was alleged that the aforesaid accused petitioners demanded Rs. 30 Lakhs from his father and without any option left, his father paid the aforesaid money to the accused petitioner No. 1. It was further alleged that after a threat from aforesaid Smti Mirdalin Teronpi, his father also paid Rs. 28 Lakhs in three instalments to her due to the fear that the video would be publicized by her. It was alleged that out of fear, his father had to pay a total amount of Rs. 50 Lakhs to the accused petitioners and the aforesaid Smti Mirdalin Teronpi. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR dated Page No.# 3/7 15.09.2025, the Police registered the Diphu P.S. Case No. 79/2025, under Sections 61(2)/308(5)/351(3) of BNS, 2023, read with Section 67 (A) of the IT Act, 2000. 4. Mr. A. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the main allegation in the case was against the co-accused namely, Augustin Karmsasri and Ingjoy Tisso and that any statement of co-accused made before the police would be barred even though for the adjudication of the bail petition. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Krishna Mohan Reddy Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2025 INSC 725 drawing attention to the principles laid in para-53. Referring to the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs State of Assam, reported in (2017) 15 SCC 67, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in terms of said categorization the alleged offence against the present petitioner would not fall within the category of serious offence. Drawing attention to the annexed medical documents, It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the wife of the petitioner is in pregnancy with expected due date in January, 2026, though he fairly submits that the exact due date has not been clearly stated. 5. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that whether the aspect of the pregnancy would constitute sufficient ground is to be decided by the Court. However, the petitioner is involved in the nexus with prime accused and his such involvement in the alleged offence of extortion through black mail, has been revealed by the investigation. It is also submitted that allowing this subsequent bail petition would adversely affect the investigation. Page No.# 4/7 6. In the order dated 24.10.2025 passed in the earlier bail petition, it was stated inter alia in para-19 that - more importantly, the necessity of custodial examination for the purpose of the remaining investigation cannot be ruled out at all and it may not be prudent or justified at this stage to put any such restrictions on the investigation. Lastly, in view of the materials indicating the previous antecedents, granting of pre-arrest bail at this stage, apart from pre-empting custodial examination, could also be otherwise detrimental to the investigation. 7. The relevant para-53 of P. Krishna Mohan Reddy (supra) may be reproduced herein below:- “53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges: - (i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra). (ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature. (iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession. (iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since, such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and Page No.# 5/7 no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused. (v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co-accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence. (vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not “evidence” in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled. (vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever. (viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr.PC., and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re- examination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to Page No.# 6/7 an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‘when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement’. (ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra). (x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person, or Page No.# 7/7 likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C may not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, a person who was originally a witness may happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner.” 8. The updated case diary was called for again and received. Upon perusal of the same, I find that investigation is not yet completed and still going on. 9. The investigation has also indicated involvement of the present petitioner as well in the conspiracy with the other co- accused and in the act of being involved with the other co- accused in blackmailing the informant and extorting large sums of money from him. 10. Considering the implicating materials, which have already been noticed and the continuance of the investigation, I do not find sufficient new grounds to put restrictions, on the continuing investigation by way of granting anticipatory bail in this subsequent bail application. Accordingly, the same stands rejected. 11. Send back the case diary. JUDGE Comparing Assistant