APHC010357092024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No.2118 of 2024 Between: Chippagiri Narayana Swamy and Bathini Lakshimi Devi Counsel for the petitioners: 1. Hanumantha Rao Vellalacher 2. Sushma.Yaganti Counsel for the respondent: 1. M. Chalapati Rao The Court made the following: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi I.A.No.1 of 2024 In / & Civil Revision Petition No.2118 of 2024 Chippagiri Narayana Swamy (died) and others ...Petitioners ...Respondent Counsel for the petitioners: Hanumantha Rao Vellalacheruvu for the respondent: The Court made the following: [3311] Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five ...Petitioners ...Respondent APHC010357502024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No.754 of 2025 Between: Chippagiri Narayana Swamy (died) and o and Bathini Lakshimi Devi Counsel for the petitioners: 1. Hanumantha Rao Vellalacher 2. Sushma. Yaganti Counsel for the respondent: 1. M. Chalapati Rao The Court made the following: 2 I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi I.A.No.1 of 2025 In / & Civil Revision Petition No.754 of 2025 giri Narayana Swamy (died) and others ...Petitioners ...Respondent petitioners: Hanumantha Rao Vellalacheruvu Counsel for the respondent: The Court made the following: BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 [3311] Saturday, the thirtieth day of August, two thousand and twenty five ...Petitioners ...Respondent 3 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 COMMON ORDER: C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 was filed under Section 115 C.P.C. against the order and decree, dated 17.12.2022, dismissing I.A.No.662 of 2022 in O.S.No.91 of 2017 on the file of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Pattikonda, filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 151 of C.P.C. to condone delay of 1517 days in impleading legal representatives of the deceased sole plaintiff, and C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 was filed under Section 115 C.P.C. against the consequent judgment and decree, dated 17.12.2022, dismissing the above suit as abated. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: a. Chippagiri Narayana Swamy, the plaintiff, filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale and to grant a decree of permanent injunction. The suit was resisted by the defendant. When the suit was coming up for settlement of issues, the learned counsel for the defendant filed a memo on 07.09.2022, along with the death certificate of the sole plaintiff, intimating the death of the plaintiff on 04.04.2018. When the counsel for the plaintiff gave the information, the wife, sons and daughters of the plaintiff came to know about the pendency of the suit and filed I.A.No.662 of 2022. It is contended that they had gone for livelihood to some other places and on account of covid pandemic, they were unable to approach the Court immediately and therefore, prayed to condone the delay. b. Per contra, it is contended by the respondent / defendant that the plaintiff died long ago and the counsel for the plaintiff and the petitioners knew the facts, but they kept quiet all these days and now came up with the petition and therefore prayed to dismiss the petition. 4 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 c. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court dismissed the petition in I.A.No.662 of 2022 observing it is settled legal position that the law protects only those who are vigilant but not dormant and that on the mere ground that no injustice will be caused to the other side, a petition cannot be allowed when a petitioner is at fault. The trail Court further observed that the petitioners remained silent for more than 4 years after the death of the plaintiff and now claimed that they had not known about the suit previously and come to know about it recently. Hence, the Court found no sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. d. Aggrieved thereby, the proposed plaintiffs preferred C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 before this Court. 3. It was further noticed that there was a delay of 500 days even in filing the revision in C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 to condone the delay of 500 days, it was contended as follows: a. On 17.12.2022, the trial Court dismissed I.A.No.662 of 2022 in O.S.No.91 of 2017 and on 20.12.2022, a copy application was filed for issuance of certified copy of the said order. On 27.02.2023, stamps were called for and on the same day, stamps were deposited. On 27.02.2023 itself, certified copy of the order was made ready and delivered to the counsel before the trial Court. Thereafter, on legal advice, the petitioners decided to challenge the order of the trial Court in revision before this Court. In the meanwhile, due to sudden ill-health of the advocate’s clerk and for preparing the grounds of revision, a delay of 500 days occurred. 5 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 b. The respondent / defendant filed counter opposing the petition and stating that the petitioners failed to make out ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay of about 500 days and no valid reason has been assigned by the petitioners to condone the long delay; that the petitioners are well versed in the Court proceedings and in fact, the counsel for the defendant filed the memo on 07.09.2022 before the trial Court intimating the death of the plaintiff on 04.04.2018; that the conduct of the petitioners in approaching the Court with abnormal delay speaks about their latches; and that the petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. Consequent upon dismissal of the petition in I.A.No.662 of 2022 on 17.12.2022, the trial Court dismissed the suit in O.S.No.91 of 2017 on the same day by holding that the suit was abated. 5. Aggrieved by the above judgment and decree, dated 17.12.2022, the proposed plaintiffs preferred C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 on 14.08.2024, again with a delay of 447 days in filing this revision petition. Hence, the petitioners filed I.A.No.1 of 2025 to condone the delay of 447 days in filing revision against the decree and judgment, dated 17.12.2022. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.1 of 2025, it was contended as follows: a. They are not aware of the suit proceedings until their counsel on record informed them of the same. Immediately, they got filed a petition in I.A.No.662 of 2022 to implead them as plaintiffs No.2 to 6 as they are the legal heirs. However, as there is a delay of 1517 days in filing the said petition, another petition to condone the delay was filed, along with the petition seeking to set aside the abatement. The trial Court 6 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 dismissed I.A.No.662 of 2022 and thereafter, the suit was also dismissed as abated on 17.12.2022 on the ground of delay. b. Thereafter, on legal advice, the petitioners decided to challenge the decree and judgment of the trial Court in revision before this Court. In the meanwhile, due to sudden ill-health of the advocate’s clerk and for preparing the grounds of revision, a delay of 447 days occurred. c. The respondent / defendant filed counter opposing the petition in I.A.No.1 of 2025 and alleging that the petitioners failed to make out ‘sufficient cause’ to condone the delay of 447 days and no valid reason has been assigned to condone such a long delay and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted as in the affidavits in respect of the cause of the delay in filing the revision petitions. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent, while vehemently opposing the petitions, submitted that the delay cannot be leniently condoned in the present case as there has been negligence of the parties throughout the proceedings, while accepting the general principle that the length of the delay is not material but the cause for the delay has to be independently examined. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Tejpal and others 1 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sea Coast 1 (2024) 7 Supreme Court Cases 433 7 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 Logistics and Marine and others Vs. M/s. TGV SRAAC Ltd. 2 regarding the guidelines for exercising discretion to condone the delay. 8. In Delhi Development Authority (1 supra), it was held at paragraphs No.22 to 29 as follows: "22. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay, it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 ("the Limitation Act") is a statute of repose founded on considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of such period, no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e. the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights. 2 2025 (2) ALT 1 (DB) (AP) 8 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 23. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody (Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody: [AIR 1985 Bom 320], aptly exposited the philosophical pillars supporting the concept of limitation: (i) the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to the passage of time. 24. Section 3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every suit or appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed, notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side. However, this does not imply that the Limitation Act destroys the right itself. Instead, it only extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either creating or destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself. 25. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there are exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows for admitting an action provided "sufficient cause" is shown. This vests courts with the discretion to extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period. Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients: first, an examination of whether "sufficient cause" has 9 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 been made out; and second, whether such cause has been shown for not filing the appeal/application "within the prescribed period". 26. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does not provide more guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case. 27. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant (Basawaraj v. LAO: INSC: 551 : [(2013) 14 SCC 81]. Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor. (Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, 2008: INSC:807 : [(2008) 8 SCC 321)] 28. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities (Raheem Shah v. Govind Singh, 2023 : INSC:651 : [(2023) 18 SCC 764)], 10 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 as one motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore sometimes necessary despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice [Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi, MANU/SC/0226/1967]. 29. In addition to "sufficient cause", Section 5 also requires that such cause must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy the latter condition, the applicant must show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal/application on the last day of the prescribed period and explain the delay made thereafter (Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961: INSC:213). Causes arising after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being sufficient in substance, would not suffice for condonation given this second prong of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the applicant shall not be required to prove each day's delay till the date of filing such appeal/application [Ummer v. Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127].” b. In Sea Coast Logistics and Marine and Ors., (2nd supra), it was held at paragraphs No.34, 36, 38 & 39 as follows: “34. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in Ameena Begum Vs. Kaushik Cooperative Housing Society & Another [2021(3) ALT 82 (TS)], delay of 5767 days to set aside the ex parte decree, was condoned. 11 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 We are also of the view that the law is well settled, that it is not the length of delay, but what matters is the case shown. If the cause shown is sufficient, the delay of any period can be condoned. But, if the cause shown is not sufficient, even a single day's delay may be fatal. The decision in Ameena Begum (referred supra) is of no help to the petitioners. 36. In Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through L.Rs and others Vs. Union of India and others [ 2023 ALT (Rev.) 183 (SC)] the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to Courts the exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown, and the degree of acceptability of the explanation. The length of delay being immaterial. It was further observed that, sometimes due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being offered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned, whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned, if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. The Courts must distinguish between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse'. It was observed that, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. It was further reiterated that a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay. 12 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 38. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and others [(2014 (1) ABR 235], the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. This statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. Paragraph 13 reads as under : "13. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour the statue so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stand attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statue. "A result flowing from a statutory in considers a distress resulting from its operation". 39. In Lingeswaran and others Vs. Thirunagalingam [2022 (2) RCR (Civil) 319], the Hon'ble Apex Court, held that once it is found, that the delay was not properly 13 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 explained and there was no merit in the application for condonation of delay, the matter should have rested there and the application for condonation of delay was required to be dismissed. Para 5 and 5.1 are as under: "5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013: INSC: 554: [(2013) 10 SCC 765] is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. 14 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 5.1. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, [(2012) 5 SCC 157], in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under: "The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation." 9. There is no dispute as to the propositions of law cited above. While applying the above principles to the present case, it is clear that the reasons stated by the petitioners are general, routine and not supported by any material to believe veracity and thereby no sufficient cause is established to condone the delay in filing the revision petitions. The reason assigned for the delay in filing the petitions before the trail court is the same reason assigned for the delay in filing two separate revision petitions on different dates, that too, with different spells of long delay in filing both the revision petitions. Having no knowledge of pendency of the suit cannot be a reason for the delay in filing the revision petitions as they filed the petitions knowing it. So, it cannot be the reason for any delay in filing the subsequent petition(s). As such, there is no merit in the petitions. 15 BSB, J I.A.No.1 of 2024 in & C.R.P.No.2118 of 2024 I.A.No.1 of 2025 in & C.R.P.No.754 of 2025 10. In the result, I.A.No.1 of 2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2025 which are filed to condone the delay in filing these revisions are dismissed. 11. Consequently, both the revision petitions are rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. ___________________ B.S. BHANUMATHI, J Date: 30.08.2025 RAR