Page No.# 1/9 GAHC010235422025 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/6308/2025 BIJETA DEY D/O.- LATE BIJAY KRISHNA DEY, R/O.- DOBOKA TOWN, WARD NO. 2, P.S. DOBOKA, DIST- HOJAI, ASSAM VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 06. 2:THE DIRECTOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ASSAM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI-19. 3:THE DISTRICT LEVEL COMMITTEE (DLC) FOR APPOINTMENT ON COMPASSIONATE GROUND REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN I.E. THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782001. 4:THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782001. 5:THE BLOCK ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER KHATIATOLI Page No.# 2/9 DIST. NAGAON ASSAM PIN- 782001 Advocate for the Petitioner : MS S S ZIA, Advocate for the Respondent : SC, ELEM. EDU, GA, ASSAM BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER Date : 25.02.2026 Heard Ms. S.S Zia, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B Talukdar, learned standing counsel, Department of Secondary Education, Assam and Ms. S Konwar, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, in the present proceeding, has prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities to consider her case for appointment on compassionate grounds, in pursuance to the death of her mother in harness. 3. The mother of the petitioner, while working as Assistant Teacher at Doboka Bidyaniketan LP School, died in harness on 18.11.2013. Prior to the death of the mother of the petitioner, the father of the petitioner, who was also working as an Assistant Teacher at Vidya Mandir ME School, had died in harness on 26.11.2006. The petitioner, at the time of death of her father, was a minor and accordingly, an application on her behalf, for appointment on compassionate ground, was not filed. However, pursuant to the death of her mother, the petitioner submitted an application on 19.08.2014 for consideration of her case for appointment on compassionate grounds. It is projected that the case of the petitioner was placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) in its meeting held on 24.03.2016. The case of the petitioner was considered, however, no recommendation came to be Page No.# 3/9 made in her case, on the ground that there was no vacancy available within the 5% quota mandated for appointment on compassionate grounds. 4. The case of the petitioner was, thereafter, again considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) on various dates. However, in the meeting of the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) held on 26.09.2016, the case of the petitioner was closed with the remark “Time Lapsed”. It is submitted that the minutes of the meeting of the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC), wherein, the case of the petitioner was also forwarded to the Government in the Elementary Education Department, Assam, for further consideration. The petitioner’s case, not being considered in the manner required and a recommendation in her favour, not having been made, in terms of the policy holding the field, the petitioner has instituted the present proceedings. 5. Ms. S.S Zia, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after the death of her parents, she being the only child, is living alone and has got no one to support her. She further submits that the petitioner, herein, not being married, was also entitled to be authorized the family pension on account of the services rendered by her parents, however, the same was also not authorized to the petitioner, herein. She submits that the petitioner’s case was placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) on various occasions, however, on the plea that there was no vacancy available for appointment on compassionate grounds, the petitioner’s case finally came to be rejected. Ms. S.S Zia, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner, being alone and not being in receipt of any assistance including family pension from the Government, is in a very precarious financial condition and the same is also known to the respondent authorities. However, the respondents have not considered the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds, in its proper perspective. Page No.# 4/9 6. Mr. B Talukdar and Ms. S Konwar, learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that the petitioner’s mother had passed away on 18.11.2013 and since then, more than 12 years have elapsed in the matter. They submit that the case of the petitioner, not being considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) in its meeting held on 24.03.2016, it is found that the petitioner had not assailed such conclusions reached in her matter by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC). They submit that the petitioner has instituted the present proceedings praying for appointment on compassionate grounds after much delay and there is no explanation brought on record to justify the delay in approaching this Court. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. The mother of the petitioner, admittedly, had died in harness on 18.11.2013. An application is found to have been submitted by the petitioner on 19.08.2014 for consideration of her case for appointment on compassionate grounds. The said application was duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) in its meeting held 24.03.2016. However, no recommendation was made in favour of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds in view of the fact that there was no vacancy available, for the purpose, within the 5% quota, mandated for appointment on compassionate grounds. The case of the petitioner was again considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) on various dates, thereafter. In the meeting of the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) held on 26.09.2016, the case of the petitioner came to be closed with the remark “Time Lapsed”, in as much as 2 (Two) years had lapsed since the date of submission of the said application and no recommendation was made, thereon, in view of the fact that there was no vacant posts available for the purpose. 9. This Court, in the case of Achyut Ranjan Das & Ors. vs. State of Page No.# 5/9 Assam & Ors. reported in 2006 (4) GLT 674, while laying down the principles required to be followed for consideration of claims relating to compassionate appointment, had laid down that if the application of eligible candidates remained pending and cannot be considered due to want of vacancies for a period of 2 (Two) years from the date of making of such application, all such applications would require no further consideration. 10. The jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC), in its meeting held on 04.12.2013, having not recommended the case of the petitioner, admittedly on the ground of non-availability of vacant posts for appointment of the petitioner on compassionate grounds, the application submitted by the petitioner is to be deemed to have lost its force after 2 (Two) years, thereafter, that is w.e.f 2016. The said prescription, as made in the case of Achyut Ranjan Das (Supra), was reiterated by this Court in the case of Fazirul Nessa & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2010 (4) GLT 340. Accordingly, it is to be held that the application of the petitioner after 2016 had lost its force and would not mandate any further consideration. 11. Having drawn the above conclusions, this Court would now consider, as to whether, even after the application submitted by the petitioner had lost its force, it would be permissible for this Court to issue a direction upon the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds after a lapse of around 12 (Twelve) years of the death of the mother of the petitioner in harness. 12. For the purpose of consideration of the said issue, this Court would notice the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the in the case of a State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. reported in 2025 (5) SCC 712. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the said decision had drawn the following conclusions:- "32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: Page No.# 6/9 i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependents of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source. 33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependents of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a breadwinner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependents of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities' decision in the matter. 35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is Page No.# 7/9 diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing some gainful employment from other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, [1874] 3 P.C. 221 as under: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most be just is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: "9. the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained Page No.# 8/9 delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction." 39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278. 40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were made: 19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time." 13. Applying the said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Debabrata Tiwari (Supra) to the facts of the present case, it is seen that the mother of the petitioner had expired on 18.11.2013. The consideration that is now sought to be made in respect of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate grounds is a consideration so required to be made after a lapse of around 12 years. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment, in respect of the petitioner, has been lost. The petitioner’s case is found to have been duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee (DLC) regular intervals, however, in absence of a vacancy available, her case could not be recommended for appointment on compassionate grounds. Accordingly, considering the long lapse of time occasioning in the matter since the date of death of her mother, it would be of no avail to direct for consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds, in view of the fact that the crisis occasioning on the date of death of the mother has long lapsed and, admittedly, has been able to eke out a living even though, she was not favored with an appointment on compassionate grounds. In view of the above conclusion, this Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds. Page No.# 9/9 Further, as noticed, hereinabove, the petitioner was also not diligent in pursuing her claim for appointment on compassionate grounds and the same would also be a ground for denying issuance of any direction to the respondent authorities for consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds. 14. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached, herein, above by this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in the present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for this Court to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds in pursuance to death of her mother, in harness, occasioning in the year 2013. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition is found to be devoid of any merit and the same stands dismissed. However, there would be no order as to cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant