1 2025:CGHC:5901 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4594 of 2018 Ramsagar Sinha S/o Late Shiv Lal Sinha Aged About 58 Years Retired Constable (G.D.) (Batch No. 821) O/o The Commandant, 2nd Battalion, Chhattisgarh, Armed Force, Sankri, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Home And Police Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Director General Of Police, State Of Chhattisgarh, P.H.Q. Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Deputy Inspector General Of Police, Chhattisgarh Armed Force, North Area, Sarguja, District Sarguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 4. The Commandant, 2nd Battalion, Chhattisgarh, Armed Force, Sankri, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Ms. Shrijita Kesharwani, Adv. on behalf of Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, Adv. For State/ Respondents : Mr. Lav Sharma, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment On Board 31/01/2025 1) By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the departmental appellate authority dated 09.06.2018 (Anenxure P/2) whereby the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 31.01.2018 (Annexure P/1) has been affirmed and the punishment of Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.02.03 14:54:13 +0530 2 compulsory retirement has been inflicted on the petitioner. 2) Facts of the present case are that the petitioner was posted at O/o Commandant, 2nd Battalion, Sakri, Bilaspur on the post of Constable. The article of charges was issued by the disciplinary authority on 31.08.2017 making allegations against the petitioner to the effect that on 24.07.2017, the petitioner refused to perform his duties and he flouted the orders issued by the superior authorities which reflects indiscipline and arbitrariness in his behavior. It was also submitted that the act of the petitioner was contrary to Sub-Rule (2)(4)(5) of the Police Regulation No. 64 and Sections 16 (छ)-1 and 17(ड.)(च) of the Chhattisgarh Armed Forces Act, 1968. The petitioner was provided with the relevant documents and a list of witnesses along with the article of charges. The petitioner filed a reply to the article of charges. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority appointed the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer and a full-fledged departmental inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer and thereafter, punishment of compulsory retirement was inflicted by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 31.01.2018. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal and the same was dismissed vide order dated 09.06.2018. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order impugned was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the punishment inflicted is disproportionate looking to the allegations made against the petitioner. She further submits that the petitioner was posted in a hard-core naxal area whereas at that time his age was 58 years and he was not keeping well, therefore, he could not resume his duties on 24.07.2017. In support thereof, she placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ms. 3 G. Vallikumari Versus Andhra Education Society and others reported in 2010 (2) SCC 497. 4) On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner was afforded the sufficient opportunity in the departmental inquiry; relevant documents were provided; the witnesses were examined and cross-examined and thereafter, the Inquiry Officer submitted its report before the disciplinary authority and the final order of compulsory retirement was passed on 31.01.2018. He contends that the petitioner deliberately flouted the orders of the superior authorities whereas being a member of the armed forces, high discipline was expected from the petitioner. He argues that the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct; therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 5) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on the record. 6) Now, coming to the facts of the present case, though the petitioner was on duty as a Constable in an armed force, he refused to perform his duties on 24.07.2017 and thus flouted the order of the superior authorities. 7) Police Regulation No. 64 reads as under:- पुलिस नि युनि से पू्ብ ्ቚत्येक पुलिस में भቔኍ हो े ्ብाे उम्मीद्ብार को नि म् सामान्य से्ብा शቔኍ# से अ्ብगቔኍ करा दे ा आ्ብश्यक हैं- 1. नि युनि के बाद ्ቚत्येक पुलिस अधि+कारी के ्ብ पुलिस की से्ብा में ही अप ा पूरा समय गाएगा ए्ብं ्ብह निकसी व्यापार, व्य्ብसाय में निब ा अ ुमधिቔኍ के भाग हीं ेगा। 2. ्ብह पुलिस अधि+कारी के रूप में अप े समस्ቔኍ कቔኍव्यों को नि ्቗ापू्ብक ए्ብं ईमा दारी, अप ी स्ብ7ቔኍम योग्यቔኍा से पूरा करेगा। 3. ्ብह समस्ቔኍ नि यमों को उ्ቌेश्यों के अ ुरूप रखेगा ए्ብं पद की ्ቚधिቔኍ्቗ा में ध्या दे े की आदቔኍ डाेगा। 4 4. ्ብह अ ुशास के ही अ+ी रहेगा ए्ብं नि्ብधि+ संगቔኍ आदेशों का झटपट पा करेगा। 5. ्ብह ्ብही से्ብा- नि ्ብास करेगा जहाँ उसे से्ብा ए्ብं नि ्ብास कर े के लिए नि यु निकया गया है। 6. ्ብह कायभार के समय ऐसी साज- स्ሸा ्ብद +ारण करेगा जैसा उसे नि दDशिशቔኍ निकया जाएगा। 7. ्ብह अप े ्ብेቔኍ , भ्ቈों में हो े ्ብाी कटौधिቔኍयों की अ ुमधिቔኍ देगा जो नि यमों के अंቔኍगቔኍ अपेधिHቔኍ होगी। 8. ्ብह निब ा जिजा अ+ीHक की स््ብीकृ धिቔኍ के निकसी अन्य पुलिस अधि+कारी से + संबं+ी व्य्ብहार हीं करेगा ए्ብं ही उस जिजे के निकसी नि ्ብासी से ऋण ्ቚा्቎ करेगा जहाँ ्ብह से्ብारቔኍ है अቕኋाቔኍ निब ा SP की इजाजቔኍ के पुलिस अधि+कारी ए्ብं कमचारी निकसी से भी पैसे उ+ार हीं े सकቔኍे। 9. निब ा लिलिखቔኍ अ ुमधिቔኍ के से्ብा हीं छोड़ेगा ए्ብं छु ्ሾी हीं ेगा। 10. ्ብह निकसी अ्ብसर या काय्ቅम में ्ቚत्यH अ्ቚत्यH रूप से कोई भेंट अቕኋ्ብा पुरूस्कार, या निRर निकसी भी अन्य ्ቚकार का शुल्क निब ा जिजा अ+ीHक की अ ुमधिቔኍ के हीं ेगा। 11. ्ብह सभी अधि+कारिरयों के साቕኋ आदर- सम्मा ए्ብं सभी ्ቦेशिणयों (्ብग#) के नि जी व्यनियों के साቕኋ सह शीቔኍा, दयाुቔኍा, शिश्ቖቔኍा से काय करेगा। नि जी जी्ብ में भी ्ብह शांधिቔኍपूण व्य्ብहार का आदश ्ቚस्ቔኍुቔኍ करेगा ए्ብं सभी ्ቚकार के पHपाቔኍ से दूर रहेगा। 12. अगर ्ብह पुलिस द से हटाया जाቔኍा है ቔኍब ्ብह ्ብद, स्ሸा ्ቚाधि+कृ ቔኍ अधि+कारी को सौंप देगा ए्ብं ्ብह नि ्ብास गृह को जो उसे से्ብा के रूप में सौपा गया उसे रिर कर देगा। A bare reading of this provision would make it clear that if a member of armed forces flouts or disobeys the order passed by superior authorities, he can be punished. 8) In the matter of G. Vallikumari (supra), it was held that the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee is vitiated due to violation of statutory rules and principles of natural justice and matter was remitted back to the Tribunal to consider whether or not the penalty of removal was disproportionate to the misconduct. Relevant para 15 reads as under:- 5 15. Since the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice, we may have remitted the matter to the Tribunal with a direction to consider whether or not the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the appellant was disproportionate to the misconduct found against her or the action taken by the management was wholly arbitrary or unjust but keeping in view the fact that the appellant was removed from service more than 13 years ago, we do not consider it proper to adopt that course. In Superintendent (Tech.1) Central Excise 1.D.D. Jabalpur and others v. Pratap Rai, 1978 (3) SCC 113, this Court held that if an order passed by the disciplinary authority is annulled on a technical ground, the concerned authority is free to pass fresh order but, at the same time, the Court declined to give such liberty to the administration on the ground that a period of 15 years had elapsed since the framing of charge. In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya's case, a somewhat similar approach was adopted by this Court by recording the following observations: "Thus, the present one is a case wherein we are satisfied that the punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant is not only highly excessive and disproportionate but is also one which was not permissible to be imposed as per the Service Rules. Ordinarily we would have set aside the punishment and sent the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing the order of punishment afresh in accordance with law and consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. However, that would further lengthen the life of litigation. In view of the time already lost, we deem it proper to set aside the punishment of removal from service and instead direct the appellant to be reinstated in service subject to the condition that the period during which the appellant remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which the appellant reports back to duty pursuant to this judgment shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. The appellant shall not be entitled to any service benefits for this period. Looking at the nature of partial relief allowed hereby to the appellant, it is 6 now not necessary to pass any order of punishment in the departmental proceedings in lieu of the punishment of removal from service which has been set aside. The appellant must report on duty within a period of six weeks from today to take benefit of this judgment." In the aforementioned case, the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of Managing Committee was held to be vitiated due to violation of statutory rules and the principles of natural justice whereas in the present case, no such finding has been recorded, therefore, the judgment cited above is of no help to petitioner. 9) The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S.Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315] wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- "10. The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of 7 misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- 8 delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 10) Evidently, the petitioner was posted in a highly sensitive area; he was asked to perform his duties but he refused, therefore, the article of charges was issued; all documents along with a list of witnesses were provided to the petitioner; the petitioner filed a reply and denied the allegations made in the article of charges. The disciplinary authority appointed the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry strictly in accordance with service rules and the petitioner was provided the sufficient opportunity to lead evidence and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The Inquiry Officer after completion of the inquiry submitted its report before the disciplinary authority wherein charges with regard to the guilt of the petitioner were found proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed on the petitioner. A departmental appeal was 9 preferred by the petitioner wherein the order of the disciplinary authority was affirmed. 11) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of S. Vasanthi (supra), I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya