1 2025:CGHC:22844-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 48 of 2022 M/s Air India Air Transport Service Limited Through Representative And Authorized Officer Bhanupratap Pathoriya, S/o Shri G.L. Pathoriya, Aged About 42 Years, Former In Charge At S.V. Airport, Mana, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Currently Posted As Senior C.A. At Bhopal Airport, Bhopal (M.P.). ... Petitioner versus 1 - Union Of India Through The Secretary, Ministry Of Civil Aviation, Government Of India, Mantralaya New Delhi. 2 - Labour Inforcement Officer Under Contract Labour Act, 2018, Central Government, Office Of The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Center), D - 6, Sector 1, Awanti Vihar, Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Captain A.K. Sharma ex - COO, AIATSL, GSD Building, IGI Airport, Terminal 2, Near ATC Tower, New Delhi. 110037. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr.T.K.Tiwari, Advocate For Respondents No.1 and 2 : Mr.Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.06.12 10:09:09 +0530 2 10/06/2025 1. Heard Mr.T.K.Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr.Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing for respondents No.1 and 2. 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus so as to quash the proceedings and complaint (Annexure P-1) pending before the Labour Court, Raipur, against the Petitioner(s). 10.2 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be awarded to the petitioner including the cost and expenses of this petition.” 3. The facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioner are that the petitioner is the service providing company at Raipur Airport and other Airports across the country. The petitioner is an authorized representative and an officer of the service provider Company and is currently posted as Senior CA., Bhopal Airport, Bhopal (M.P.). AIATSL is a wholly owned subsidiary of Air India Limited. Air India and AIATSL entered into an MOU which was executed on 17.04.2013 by which AIATSL has been authorized to carry out ground operations/activities at airports. With respect to the ground operations/handling, the circular, i.e., DGCA Circular AIC- 3 3/2010 dated 02.06.2010 was issued. As per the Government of India's Ministry of Civil Aviation's extra ordinary Gazette Notification No. AV-24011/8/2017AAI-MOCA dated 15.12.2017, it was made clear that the persons engaged in ground operations/activities are bona fide employees of the Company as a relevant aspect of security protocol. 4. As per the effective circulars and after execution of the MOU, the Petitioner's company is providing ground handling service at the Raipur Airport. Respondent No. 2 suddenly inspected Raipur Airport and commenced an investigation regarding the employees of AIATSL. The employees as well as the authorized officers of AIATSL informed respondent No. 2 that they were the employees of AIATSL which is a subsidiary of Air India Ltd. AIATSL is authorized to carry out ground handling activities/operations at Raipur Airport. Neither of the employees were deputed by any contractor nor the Contract Labour Act is applicable against AIATEL. ALATBL is wholly owned subsidiary of Air India Ltd., and the Companies Act would be applicable. In spite of that, respondent No. 2 submitted a complaint under Section 23 & 24 of the Contract Labour Act, 1970 (hereinafter called as ‘Act of 1970’). The complaint was registered by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and issued a notice to the petitioner for appearance and further proceedings. 5. The Petitioner submitted the reply annexing the Employment Rules, copy of the MOU executed between Air India and AIATSL, 4 circulars of the Central Government contending that the Contractual Employees Rules were not applicable against the Petitioner. On the other hand, it is submitted that the services of the Petitioner's Company is governed by the Employment Rules of Air India. Even after receiving the reply, the Labour Court had proceeded against the Petitioner and the case has been fixed for appearance of the Petitioner on 20.01.2022. Hence, this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 2 is illegal and beyond jurisdiction, hence it deserves to be quashed. He further submits that the provisions contained in the Act of 1970 are not applicable in the Petitioner's case as the employees of AIATSL are wholly owned subsidiary of Air India Limited. The Petitioner is governed by the Companies Act. He also submits that the employees of the Petitioner's Company are those employees who are engaged by the Company and not by any contractor or any private sector entity, hence the Contract Labour Act is not applicable. He contended that respondent No.2 without taking into consideration the powers conferred on the Petitioner by statutory regulations filed complaint for violations of the provisions contained in Sections 23 & 24 of the Act of 1970 and the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 (for short ‘Rules of 1971’). He further contended that so far as ground handling activities are concerned, the provisions of the Act of 1970 and the 5 Rules of 1971 are not applicable. Therefore, impugned order of issuance of process and the complaint filed against the petitioner, are liable to be quashed and set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the matter of AIR India Ltd. and another v. S. Gunahari and others (Writ Petition No.277 of 2003), decided on 8.6.2015. 7. On the other hand, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the then Labour Enforcement Officer (Central)-2, Raipur was allotted inspection of the establishment of M/s Air India Air Transport Services Limited engaged for Ground Handling of Air India Flights at S.V. Airport, Raipur. The then Labour Enforcement Officer inspected the establishment on 04.05.2018 under the applicable labour laws including Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and the irregularities noticed therein were incorporated in the Inspection Report-cum-Show Cause Notice No. RP- 34(60)/2018-LEO-2 dated 29.05.2018 which was then issued to M/s Air India Air Transport Services Limited represented through (i) Shri Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya, In-charge & (ii) Captain A.K. Sharma, COO for compliance. The petitioner after receiving the Inspection Report-cum-Show Cause Notice No. RP-34(60)/2018- LEO-2 dated 29.05.2018 submitted their reply vide his letter No. AIATSL/IR/436 dated 28.06.2019 admitting the irregularities reflected in the Inspection Report and accordingly submitted the 6 compliance report which was found incomplete. He further submits that respondent No. 2 after receiving the incomplete compliance report filed prosecution complaint under Sections 23 & 24 of the Act of 1970 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class cum Labour Court, Raipur (CG) on 31.07.2018, which was registered as Case No. 20/Contract Labour Act/2018. Respondent No. 2 denies the averment of the Petitioner that it is not a contractor. AIATSL, a company registered under Indian Companies Act, 1956 & is very well a contractor under Section 2(1) (c) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 & its Central Rules, 1971 which defines the term "Contractor" in relation to an establishment means a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work of the establishment and includes a sub- contractor. Since the petitioner was engaged to produce given result in "Ground Handling for Air India Flights tie. Air India being the Principal Employer at S.V. Airport through engagement of workmen & hence Air India Air Transport Service Limited is a contractor as defined under Section 2 (1) (c) of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. He also submits that the instant case relates to the engagement of workmen through a contractor in order to get the proven result by the Principal Employer. He contended that the petitioner Air India Air Transport 7 Service Limited (ALATSL), who is an independent legal person as per the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and is a contractor as laid down under Section 2 (1) (c) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 had employed the workmen for undertaking activity of ground handling for the Principal Employer's flights at S.V. Airport, Raipur. The assertion of the petitioner that the workmen engaged by it are regular employees has got no relevance in the instant case as because the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Barsi Light Railway Co. Ltd. Vs. K.N. Joglekar and Others reported in AIR 1957 SC 121 has observed that there is no doubt that when the Act itself provides dictionary for the words used, we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation of works used in the statute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature; our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute". Therefore, the engagement of workmen irrespective of its status in the specified work at S.V. Airport, Raipur justified the provisions enshrined under the Act of 1970 & its Central Rules, 1971. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the complaint, the documents appended with writ petition and ordersheet dated 11.12.2021 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class cum Labour Court, Raipur. 9. It is admitted position on record that respondent No.2 filed a complaint under Sections 23 & 24 of the Act of 1970 before the 8 Judicial Magistrate First Class cum Labour Court, Raipur against Shri Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya, Incharge S.V.Airport, Mana, Raipur (accused No.1) and Capt.A.K.Sharma, COO, GSD Building, IGI Airport, Terminal-2 (accused No.2) and from the ordersheet dated 11.12.2021 it transpires that accused No.2-Capt. A.K.Sharma has accepted his guilt and paid the fine amount of Rs.11,000/- and the proceedings against accused No.2-Capt. A.K.Sharma were closed, whereas accused No.1-Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya has not accepted his guilt. According to learned counsel for the parties, accused No.1-Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya (present petitioner) was subordinate to accused No.2-A.K.Sharma and he has accepted his guilt and paid fine amount of Rs.11,000/- and as such, proceeding against A.K.Sharma was closed and at the relevant point of time, accused No.1-Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya was subordinate to accused-A.K.Sharma. 10. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 the Supreme Court has held that no doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of criminal trial. 11. The Supreme Court in the mater of State of Haryana and others 9 v. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of 10 the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 12.Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, also considering the fact that for the same incident, accused No.2-Capt. A.K.Sharma has accepted his guilt and paid the fine amount of Rs.11,000/- and the proceedings against him were closed, whereas accused No.1-Bhanu Pratap Pathoriya is subordinate to accused No.2-Capt. A.K.Sharma and has not 11 accepted his guilt, also considering the contents of the complaint and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra) and Bhajanlal (supra), we are of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offence is made out for prosecuting the present petitioner. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated before the Judicial Magistrate First Class cum Labour Court, Raipur in Criminal Case No.20/C.L. Act/2018 against the petitioner and the complaint so far as it relates to the petitioner are hereby quashed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Bablu