1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.1595 of 2025 Date of Decision : 08.09.2025 State of Himachal Pradesh and another …… Applicants Versus Mohan Lal (deceased) through LRs. and others ……Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicants : Mr. R. P. Singh, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Nemo. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) By way of present application, delay of 01 day in filing the present appeal is being sought to be condoned. 2. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter for the purpose of brevity referred to “the Act), came into force w.e.f 14.09.2015 and the award was passed in the present case on 02.01.2017 by Land Acquisition Collector. Thus, the award came to be passed subsequent to the 2013 Act came into force, thereby automatically the provisions of Section 24 (1)(a)of the 2013 Act are applicable. Once the SLAO determines the compensation under the 2013 Act, the aggrieved party may request the authority to make reference to the authority as 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 contemplated under Section 64 of the 2013 Act for determination of market value for the acquired land. Once the reference authority determines the compensation under section 69, then the aggrieved party has to file an appeal under section 74 of the 2013 Act within the time stipulated. 3. Admittedly, in the case at hand, appeal against the impugned award dated 21.03.2025 is to be filed under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Section 74 of the Act reads as under:- “(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated.” 4. In terms of the provisions of Section 74 of the Act, appeal has to be preferred within 60 days from the date of award. However, in terms of proviso to Section 74(1) of the Act, on showing sufficient cause, appeal can be filed within further period not exceeding 60 days. Since, in the case at hand, delay beyond the prescribed period of 120 days in terms 3 of Section 74 of the Act is being sought to be condoned, therefore, sustenance is being sought of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The same is being reproduced herein below:- “29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 5. On an analysis of the Section, it is clear that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 will apply when: (i) there is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) the special or local law does not expressly exclude those sections. 6. There is no dispute that the Act is a "special law" and that Section 74 provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is - is such exclusion expressed in Section 74 of the Act? 7. It is not essential for the special or local law to, in terms, exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act. It is sufficient if on a consideration of the language of its provisions relating to limitation, the intention to exclude can be necessarily implied. 8. Another very important aspect of the case is that 60 days is the period of limitation, and a further period not exceeding 60 days is 4 provided only if sufficient cause is made out for filing the appeal within the extended period. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would render otiose the second time-limit of 60 days, which, in my considered view is peremptory in nature. 9. For the aforesaid view being taken, reference can be made to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, passed in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar and Ors., on 07.01.2025, in Interim Application No.13254 of 2024 in First Appeal(St.) No.24058 of 2024 and decision dated 21.10.2022, passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Review Petititon No.328 of 2021, title Deputy Commissioner and Special Land…..Vs. M/s S V Global Mill Limited. 10. Besides the aforesaid, reference can also be gainfully made to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited v. Electricity Department, (2016) 16 SCC 152 and in Chattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, wherein it has been categorically held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for entertaining an appeal filed after 120 days as the same would defeat the object of the legislation, namely to provide special limitation for filing an appeal. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 74(1) [read with its proviso] of the 2013 Act, this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since, admittedly in the facts of the present case, the 5 application [seeking condonation of delay] filed by the appellants is beyond the total period of 120 days, the application seeking a condonation of delay is hereby dismissed. (Bipin Chander Negi) September 08, 2025 (KS) Judge