- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 12376 OF 2022 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. SRI. NAGARAJ K. C S/O. LATE CHIKKEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, NO.9/53, 2ND FLOOR, 'B' BLOCK, BDA (MIG) FLAT, 2ND STAGE, DOMMALURU, BENGALURU-560 071. 2. SMT. SHANTHA NAGARAJ W/O. SRI. K. C. NAGARAJ, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, NO.9/53, 2ND FLOOR, 'B' BLOCK, BDA (MIG) FLAT, 2ND STAGE, DOMMALURU, BENGALURU-560 071. 3. MS. JANANI SMITHA NAGARAJ D/O. SRI. K. C. NAGARAJ, AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, PRESENTLY RESIDING IN DALSTEINDREEF 61018 1112XJ DIEMEN THE NETHERLANDS, REPRESENTED BY HER GPA HOLDER SMT. SHANTHA NAGARAJ, NO.9/53, 2ND FLOOR, 'B' BLOCK, Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 BDA (MIG) FLAT, 2ND STAGE, DOMMALURU, BENGALURU-560 071. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. B.V. SHANKARA NARAYANA RAO, SR. ADV. FOR SRI. AMIT M. HEGDE, ADV.) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT BENGALURU ZONAL OFFICE, 3RD FLOOR, B BLOCK, BMTC, SHANTHINAGAR-TTMC, BENGALURU-560 027. 2. THE ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY REP. BY ITS CHAIRPERSON UNDER PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002, ROOM NO.26, 4TH FLOOR, JEEVAN DEEP BUILDING, PARLIAMENT STREET, NEW DELHI-110 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. UNNIKRISHNAN M., CGC FOR R1; R2 - SERVED) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORD; DECLARING THAT THE PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT ORDER BEARING NO.13/2021 DATED 02.11.2021 (ANNEXURE-J) ISSUED BY THE R1 PASSED IN THE MATTER OF F.NO.ECIR/BGZO/26/2020/2341 AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS EMANATING THEREFROM HAS LPASED AND CEASED TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON HAND FROM THE EXPIRY OF 180 DAYS PERIOD PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE ACT AND ETC. - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN B GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER Heard Sri.B.V. Shankara Narayana Rao, learned Senior counsel for Sri.Amit M. Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri. Unnikrishnan M., the learned Central Government Counsel appearing for respondent No.1. 2. The petitioners are before this Court seeking the following prayer: "a) To call for records. b) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ/direction/order declaring that the Provisional Attachment Order bearing No.13/2021 dated 02.11.2021 (ANNEXURE - J) issued by the Respondent No.1 passed in the matter of F.No.ECIR/BGZO/26/2020/2341 and all the proceedings emanating therefrom has lapsed and ceased to have any effect on and from the expiry of 180 days period provided under Section 5 of the Act. c) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to grant, in the circumstances of the case, including an order as to costs, in the interest of justice and equity." - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the issue in the case at hand stands covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in W.P.No.12413/2022 and connected matters, disposed of on 18.03.2025, wherein this Court has held as follows: “3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: A complaint is registered by certain investors against Vikram Investments, alleging that Vikram Investments have not returned the amount so invested by the investors. Based upon the said complaint, a crime in Crime No.73/2018, is registered for the offences punishable under Sections 34, 403, 406 and 420 of the IPC. The issue in the lis does not pertain to the crime so registered under the IPC. On the basis of the registration of the crime, the Enforcement Directorate registers a case, in Enforcement Case Information Report as ECIR No.BGZO/26/2020, under the provisions of the Act. 4. After the registration of the ECIR, on 02.11.2021, an order comes to be passed under Section 5(1) of the Act, attaching the properties of all these petitioners. On the order of attachment, a show cause notice comes to be issued by the second respondent and the petitioners submit their reply. The reply was submitted way back in the year 2022, till date, there is no order passed by the competent authority confirming the provisional attachment so made under Sub-section (1) of the Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, the petitioners are before this Court in the subject petitions. 5. Smt. Monica Patil, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the action of the respondents in not passing any order of confirmation as obtaining under Sub-section (3) of Section 5 and Section 8 of the Act would render the order of provisional attachment a nullity as the confirmation of such attachment had to be made within - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 an outer limit of 180 days. She would submit that any order that the respondents are now wanting to pass would become violative of law as the officer is now functus officio to pass any order. She would seek to place reliance upon the judgements of two High Courts to buttress her submissions, that the orders of provisional attachment today, have become a nullity. 6. Per contra, Sri H. Jayakara Shetty H., learned Central Government Counsel representing the respondents would seek to refute the submissions taking recourse to the orders passed by the Apex Court during COVID – 19. The Apex Court from 24.03.2020 to 21.10.2021, has protected limitation under every statute, by several orders, intermittently passed. The learned counsel seeks to take shelter under those orders to contend that the period of 180 days for validation should be extended. He would further contend that the petitioners have a remedy of filing appeal against the order of provisional attachment. He would, but, admit the fact that even as on date, there is no order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act confirming the provisional attachment that was passed on 02.11.2021. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The respondents - Enforcement Directorate is empowered to pass an order of provisional attachment of all the properties on registration of the case in ECIR, on the basis of the complaint. Investigation would ensue after the registration of the ECIR. In terms of an order dated 02.11.2021, the properties of the petitioners are provisionally attached, invoking Sub- section (1) of Section 5 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act reads as under: “5. Attachment of property involved in money- laundering.—(1)Where the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that— (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money-laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act. Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted.; - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 (2) The Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director, shall, immediately after attachment under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed. (3) Every order of attachment made under sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub- section or on the date of an order made under sub-section (3) of section 8, whichever is earlier. (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of the immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such enjoyment. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub- section, “person interested”, in relation to any immovable property, includes all persons claiming or entitled to claim any interest in the property. (5) The Director or any other officer who provisionally attaches any property under sub-section (1) shall, within a period of thirty days from such attachment, file a complaint stating the facts of such attachment before the Adjudicating Authority.” (Emphasis supplied) Every order of attachment made under Subsection (1) of Section 5 would cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in Subsection (1) or the date on which an order is made under Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the Act, whichever is earlier. Clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Act itself mandates that the provisional attachment would be effective only for a period of 180 days from the date of the order. Therefore, an order under Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the Act is imperative. It therefore becomes necessary to notice Subsection (3) of section 8 of the Act. It reads as follows: - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 8. Adjudication.— Xxxx (3) Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money-laundering, he shall, by an order in writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under sub-section (1) of section 5 or retention of property or record seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall— (Emphasis supplied) As observed hereinabove, Section 5 of the Act itself mandates that the life of an order of provisional attachment to be 180 days. Section 8 (3) of the Act casts a duty upon an officer to pass an order, once the attachment order is passed under Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Act. If Subsection (1) of Section 5 and Subsection (3) of Section 8 of the Act are read in tandem, it casts a statutory duty of validation. The validation of the order of attachment should be made within 180 days. It is an admitted fact that even as on date, there is no order passed confirming the attachments. Therefore, the orders of attachment is rendered invalid on the failure of the respondents to pass any order within 180 days. 9. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgments of the High Court of Delhi and that of the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court of Delhi in the case of VIKAS WSP LTD. AND OTHERS VS. DIRECTORATE ENFORCEMENT AND ANOTHER reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1732, answering an identical question has held as follows: “…. …. …. REASONING AND FINDING: 18. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act empowers the Director or any other officer not below the rank of the Deputy Director authorized by the - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 Director of Enforcement in this regard, to pass an order provisionally attaching property of a person ‘for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of the order’. In terms of the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5, this period is extended by 30 days from the date of the order vacating any stay order granted by the High Court on such Provisional Attachment Order or proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority. Sub-section (3) of Section 5 to the Act provides that every Provisional Attachment Order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act, shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days or on the date of the order made under sub-section (3) of Section 8, “whichever is earlier”. Therefore, one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order passed under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act, is the outer limit of the validity/life of such order and the same ceases to remain in effect, by efflux of time, beyond that date, in case no order confirming the Provisional Attachment Order is passed by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act prior thereto. 19. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 5 of the Act are reproduced herein below: “5. Attachment of property involved in money- laundering. - (1) Where the Director, or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by the Director for the purposes of this section, has reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that (a) any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime; and (b) such proceeds of crime are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under this Chapter, he may, by order in writing, provisionally attach such property for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of the order, in such manner as may be prescribed: - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 Provided that no such order of attachment shall be made unless, in relation to the scheduled offence, a report has been forwarded to a Magistrate under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or a complaint has been filed by a person authorised to investigate the offence mentioned in that Schedule, before a Magistrate or court for taking cognizance of the scheduled offence, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint has been made or filed under the corresponding law of any other country: Provided further that, notwithstanding anything contained in first proviso, any property of any person may be attached under this section if the Director or any other officer not below the rank of Deputy Director authorised by him for the purposes of this section has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing), on the basis of material in his possession, that if such property involved in money- laundering is not attached immediately under this Chapter, the non-attachment of the property is likely to frustrate any proceeding under this Act. Provided also that for the purposes of computing the period of one hundred and eighty days, the period during which the proceedings under this section is stayed by the High Court, shall be excluded and a further period not exceeding thirty days from the date of order of vacation of such stay order shall be counted. xxxxx (3) Every order of attachment made under sub- section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section or on the date of an order made under sub-section (3) of section 8, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis supplied) 20. A reading of the above provisions would clearly show that one hundred and eighty days from the passing of the Provisional Attachment Order is not prescribed as a period of limitation to do a particular act, but as the outer period of validity of the Provisional Attachment Order itself. On expiry of the said period, in absence of an order passed by the Adjudicating Authority under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, the Provisional Attachment Order ceases to have effect or lapses on its own. Such lapsing does not require any confirmation from the Authority or any Court of law; it is automatic; it is preemptory in nature. - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 21. It is also to be noted that the Act, except in the third Proviso to Section 5(1) of the Act, does not provide for any extension of validity of the period of the Provisional Attachment Order. There are no exceptions; there is no provision for extension. 22. “Attachment” is defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act to mean as under: “2(1)(d) “attachment” means prohibition of transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property by an order issued under Chapter III ….. …. …. 33. The reliance of the learned counsel for the respondents on Section 8(1) of the Act to contend that the orders of Supreme Court would apply to extend the validity of the Provisional Attachment Order, is also unfounded and is liable to be rejected. Section 8(1) does not again, provide for any period of limitation but for a period of notice. It reads as under:— 8. Adjudication.— (1) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section (5) of section 5, or applications made under sub-section (4) of section 17 or under sub-section (10) of section 18, if the Adjudicating Authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under section 3 or is in possession of proceeds of crime, it may serve a notice of not less than thirty days on such person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earning or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired the property attached under sub-section (1) of section 5, or, seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money-laundering and confiscated by the Central Government: Provided that where a notice under this sub-section specifies any property as being held by a person on behalf of any other person, a copy of such notice shall also be served upon such other person: - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 Provided further that where such property is held jointly by more than one person, such notice shall be served to all persons holding such property.” (Emphasis supplied) 34. At this stage reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Kasi (supra) would also be apposite. The Supreme Court while considering the effect of the order dated 23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No. 3/2020 on the right of the accused under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be released on bail on non-submission of charge sheet within the prescribed period by the prosecution, held as under:— “16. The reason for passing the aforesaid order for extending the period of limitation w.e.f. 15.03.2020 for filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings are indicated in the order itself. Two reasons, which are decipherable from the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 for passing the order are:— i) The situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 virus and resultant difficulties that are being faced by the litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed. ii) To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court. 17. The limitation for filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings was extended to obviate lawyers/litigants to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals. The order was passed to protect the litigants/lawyers whose petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings would become time barred they being not able to physically come to file such proceedings. The order was for the benefit of the litigants who have to take remedy in law as per the applicable statute for a right. The law of limitation bars the remedy but not the right. When this Court passed the above order for extending the limitation for filing petitions/applications/suits/ appeals/all other proceedings, the order was for the benefit of those who have to take remedy, whose remedy may be barred by time because they were - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 unable to come physically to file such proceedings. The order dated 23.03.2020 cannot be read to mean that it ever intended to extend the period of filing charge sheet by police as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Investigating Officer could have submitted/filed the charge sheet before the (Incharge) Magistrate. Therefore, even during the lockdown and as has been done in so many cases the charge-sheet could have been filed/submitted before the Magistrate (Incharge) and the Investigating officer was not precluded from filing/submitting the charge-sheet even within the stipulated period before the Magistrate (Incharge). 18. If the interpretation by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment is taken to its logical end, due to difficulties and due to present pandemic, Police may also not produce an accused within 24 hours before the Magistrate's Court as contemplated by Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As noted above, the provision of Section 57 as well as Section 167 are supplementary to each other and are the provisions which recognizes the Right of Personal Liberty of a person as enshrined in the Constitution of India. The order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 never meant to curtail any provision of Code of Criminal Procedure or any other statute which was enacted to protect the Personal Liberty of a person. The right of prosecution to file a charge sheet even after a period of 60 days/90 days is not barred. The prosecution can very well file a charge sheet after 60 days/90 days but without filing a charge sheet they cannot detain an accused beyond a said period when the accused prays to the court to set him at liberty due to non-filing of the charge sheet within the period prescribed. The right of prosecution to carry on investigation and submit a charge sheet is not akin to right of liberty of a person enshrined under Article 21 and reflected in other statutes including Section 167, Cr. P.C. Following observations of Madras High Court in the impugned judgment are clearly contrary to the order dated 23.03.2020 of this Court:— “….The Supreme Court order eclipses all provisions prescribing period of limitation until further orders. Undoubtedly, it eclipses the time prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also….”” …. …. …. 36. I may also usefully refer to the order of the Calcutta High Court in Knight Riders Sports Pvt. Ltd. v. Adjudicating Authority (PMLA), 2020 SCC OnLine Cal 1311, wherein - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 allowing the petitioner therein to withdraw his petition, the High Court observed as under:— “5. On hearing learned counsel, this Court is of the view that under Section 5(1)(b) of the PMLA, an order of provisional attachment remains in force only for a period of 180 days from the date of the order passed by the Director with regard to the proceeds of crime which the concerned Director has reasons to believe are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a manner which may frustrate any proceedings relating to confiscation of such proceeds of crime under Chapter III of the PMLA. Section 5(3) further provides that every order of attachment made under Section 5(1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of 180 days or on the date of an order made under Section 8(3) or whichever is earlier. Section 8(3) deals with a situation where the Adjudicating Authority makes an order in writing confirming the attachment of the property made under Section 5(1) or for retention of the property etc. Admittedly, no such order has been passed by the Adjudicating Authority against the petitioner under Section 8(3). It should be mentioned that the Adjudicating Authority has been served with copies of the petition. 6. If the concerned Act provides certain windows to a party in relation to a provisional order of attachment expressed in the clear language of Section 5(1)(b), this Court cannot come in the way of the petitioner taking advantage of the said exit route. Needless to say, allowing withdrawal of this petition will not prejudice any of the rights or contentions of the parties in the event of future proceedings before this Court or any other forum.” …. …. …. 38. In the present case I have intentionally refrained myself from making any comment on whether the period of total lockdown declared by the Central Government, that is from 24.03.2020 to 20.04.2020, can be excluded for computation of the 180 days, as it is not disputed that even on exclusion of this period, the 180 days would have expired on 16.06.2020, the returnable date of the notice issued by the Adjudicating Authority.” (Emphasis supplied) - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 The High Court of Calcutta in the case of HIREN PANCHAL VS. UNION OF INDIA reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 4618, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 15. It is further relevant to state that the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the Suo Motu writ petition mention specific provisions in specific statutes such as Sections 23(4) and Section 29A of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and Section 138 provisos (b) and (c) of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. On an examination of the specific statutes mentioned by the Supreme Court, it will be seen that all these statutes prescribed provide for specific time frame for instituting a suit, filing a claim/counter claim or an application in furtherance of a remedy provided under the statute. The intention was hence to preserve the right of a litigant to seek a remedy under the Act and not to deprive a litigant of such right of remedy where the litigant has not been able to physically come to the Court or to the Tribunal to file the proceeding in aid of the right. 16. The right thus conferred by the Supreme Court is in relation to the prescribed period of limitation in instituting a proceeding. 17. The statutory time frame of 180 days has been prescribed under Section 5(1)(b) of the PMLA where the designated Authority may by order in writing, provisionally attach a property being proceeds of crime for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of the order. The third proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA is an aid to the computation of the 180 days window. Section 5(3) is set out below- “5. Attachment of property involved in money- laundering.- (1)………. (3) Every order of attachment made under sub- section (1) shall cease to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in that subsection or on the date of an order made under sub-section (3) of section 8, whichever is earlier.” 18. Section 5(3) is a clear embargo on the order of attachment continuing to have effect after the expiry of 180 days. Section 5(1) designates the - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 authority and the steps to be taken for proceeding against any person who is in possession of any proceeds of crime. The section is hence concerned with the procedure to be undertaken for provisional attachment of a property subject to the fulfillment of the other conditions in Section 5. A prescribed procedure after the same has been initiated cannot be equated to institution of a suit or filing of a petition/application which is a starting point of litigation for a person who seeks relief under a statute. The 180 days window in Section 5 contemplates an end-point whereas the Supreme Court in the Suo Motu writ petition sought to protect the starting-point, which was at the risk of being defeated by reason of the pandemic. 19. In other words, what was being protected by the orders of the Supreme Court was the right to remedy, not the right to take away a remedy under a given statute. The respondents before this Court seek to do the latter. The only step taken by the ED is the order of the provisional attachment dated 30th September, 2021. No other steps were taken by the ED before the petitioners reply on 3rd January, 2022 or before the expiry of 180 days period on 31st March, 2022. By its inaction and failure to act in terms of Section 5(1)(b) or the other conditions of the said section, the ED has made itself vulnerable to Section 5(3) of the PMLA. The petitioner in turn has been given the breather of exhaustion of the 180 days window from 1st April, 2022 and the ED cannot now revive the proceedings after more than 80 days have passed from the end point of the 180 days period. 20. In Rajendra Kumar Murarka, the Court noted that the writ petitioner had not only participated in the adjudication but the hearing had also been concluded and final orders were awaited. In the appeal from this order, the Division Bench declined to interfere taking into account that the Single Bench had expressed its wish to finally adjudicate the issue on the strength of affidavits directed to be exchanged by the parties. The Division Bench also took note of the fact that the Single Bench had directed that any decision taken by the Adjudicating Authority would abide by the result of the writ petition. In the present facts, the petitioner has only replied to the ECIR case, - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 which cannot be equated to participating in the proceedings. In Rajendra Kumar Murarka, the hearing was complete and final orders remained to be passed. 21. In Gobindo Das, the Appeal Court disagreed with the view of the Adjudicating Authority being a “non-litigant”. The Division Bench was also disturbed by the fact that the bank accounts of the writ petitioners have been debited leaving the balance at zero despite the order of attachment. Prakash Corporates dealt with the prescribed statutory time period for filing of the written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act. Prakash Corporates also recognised the fact that the decision in S. Kasi was concerned with filing of the chargesheet under Section 167(2) of The Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and hence would not apply to filing of written statements beyond the prescribed time-limit. 22. The reasoning in S. Kasi would apply to the present case. The Supreme Court recognised that the 23rd March, 2020 order in the Suo Motu writ petition was for the benefit of those whose remedy may be barred by time because of not being able to physically come to Court to file proceedings. The Supreme Court made a distinction between the benefit given to litigants and extension of time for filing of a chargesheet by the police as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the Cr. P.C. The Court also noted the element of personal liberty of a person which was required to be protected. Although, the right of the petitioners before the Court is more to do with the right not to be deprived of property save by authority of law-Article 300A, the petitioners have established a case where such right is under threat by the action of the ED. The litigants have been conferred a benefit under Section 5(1)(b) and 5(3) of the PMLA on the failure of the Authority to take action within the specified time frame. If the Authority does fail to take requisite steps, the right to relief arises immediately after exhaustion of the 180 days window and once such right is given to a litigant, it cannot be taken away.” (Emphasis supplied) - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 The High Court of Delhi and the High Court of Calcutta in the afore-quoted judgments consider the purport of the statute and holds that if the order of confirmation is not passed within 180 days of the order of provisional attachment, the order of provisional attachment would itself become a nullity. Therefore, the impugned action on the orders of provisional attachment has, as on date, become a nullity in law, on the failure of the Enforcement Directorate to pass an orders of confirmation within 180 days. 10. The respondents submit that the benefit of the orders of the Apex Court, passed intermittently during COVID – 19, in extending limitation as obtaining in every statute should be extended to them as well. The submission is noted only to be rejected as, this is not limitation for filing of a case, or otherwise to a litigant, it is the period of validation. If the order is not passed within 180 days, the statute itself would mandate that the order would be a nullity and the order which is in nullity cannot be given a breather by extending the limitation period, as it is done by the Apex Court during COVID – 19. This very plea is putforth before the High Court of Delhi and answering the same plea at para Nos.34 to 38 supra has clearly held that such plea would not become applicable to the validating orders. 11. A further submission is made that since the writ petitions are pending, the Enforcement Directorate thought it fit not to pass any orders. The submission is unacceptable as no interim orders were granted in any of the writ petitions for the last three years. It is granted only in the month of March, 2025. Therefore, there was no impediment for the Enforcement Directorate to pass any order notwithstanding the pendency of the writ petitions. In the light of the mandate of the statute and its non-compliance, the petitions deserve to succeed. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER a. The writ petitions are allowed. - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC:11512 WP No. 12376 of 2022 b. All the provisional attachment orders No.13/2021 dated 02.11.2021, impugned in all these petitions, stand quashed. c. The show cause notices so issued as a consequence thereof, stand obliterated. d. The petitioners shall become entitled to all consequential benefits that would flow from the quashment of the orders of provisional attachment.” 5. In the light of the order passed by this Court (supra) and for the reasons aforementioned, the following: ORDER a). The writ petition is allowed; b). The impugned Provisional Attachment order No.13/2021 dated 02.11.2021 stands quashed. c). The show cause notices so issued as a consequence thereof, stand obliterated. d). The petitioners shall become entitled to all consequential benefits that would flow from the quashment of the order of provisional attachment.” Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE KG List No.: 2 Sl No.: 13