2025:HHC:21194 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 559 of 2024 Reserved on: 18.06.2025 Date of Decision: 04.07.2025 Kehar Singh ....Appellant Versus Ranjeet Singh & others. ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr. Mahesh Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr. Panku Chaudhary, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Kunal Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No.1 Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.08.2024 passed by learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:21194 charged offences. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the informant Kehar Singh (PW-1) is a resident of Tikka Jatlahar, Post Office Fakloh, Tehsil Jawalamukhi. He belongs to the scheduled caste. The land adjacent to his land is owned by the accused, Ranjeet Singh, and other persons who are not belonging to the scheduled caste community. They started harassing the informant by blocking his passage, filing false complaints against him before the Panchayat, abusing him in the name of his caste and threatening to kill him and his family members. Ranjeet Singh has encroached upon the government land, and he does not allow the informant to visit the Government land. He filed an application (Ext.P-1/PW1) before the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala, when the same was forwarded to the police. The Police registered the F.I.R. (P30/PW10). Kuldeep Kumar (PW-13) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.P-40/PW-13). He took photographs of the spot (Ext.P-2/PW-1 to Ext.P9/PW1). Informant Kehar Singh (PW-1) produced a roll of plastic pipe 3 2025:HHC:21194 and two other pieces of plastic pipe (Ext.MO-1), which were burnt on one side. The roll of the plastic pipe was handed over to the informant on Sapurdari. The pipes were seized vide memo (Ext.P-10/PW1). Kuldeep Kumar (PW-13) filed an application for obtaining the caste certificate of the parties. Caste Certificate of the informant(Ext.P-12/PW6) and the accused(Ext.P-13/PW6) were obtained. Karam Chand Sharma (PW-6) sent the pedigree tables (Ext.PW-14/PW6) to the police vide letter (Ext.PW-11/PW6). The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version. It was found after the completion of the investigation that Section 3(1) (s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short ‘SC&ST Act’) and 506 of Indian Penal Code ( for short IPC) were not made out, however, it was found that the accused had obstructed the passage and flow of water to the informant’s house by cutting water pipe. Hence, the charge-sheet was filed for the commission of offences punishable under Section 3(1)(za) of the SC&ST Act and Sections 430 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code(IPC) before the learned Trial Court. 4 2025:HHC:21194 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 430 and 504 of IPC and Section 3(1)(za) (A) of the SC&ST Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to prove its case.Kehar Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Soma Devi (PW-2) is the informant’s wife. Sandeep Kumar (PW-3), Kultar Chand (PW-4), and Sudesh Patiyal(PW-5) did not support the prosecution's case. Karam Chand Sharma (PW-6) issued the caste certificate and pedigree tables of the parties. Anupama (PW-7) produced the attested copies of the Panchayat proceedings. Pyare Lal (PW-8) submitted a report to the police. Avtar Singh (PW-9) carried the rukka to the police station. ASI Raj Kumar (PW-10) entered the F.I.R. in the computer, and deposited the case property in the malkhana. ASI Sanjeev Singh (PW-11) proved the order regarding the investigation. Devi Ram (PW-12) supplied the list of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and certified copies of Aks Latha and Jamabandi. Kuldeep Kumar (PW-13) conducted the investigation. 5 2025:HHC:21194 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that the witnesses deposed against him falsely and that he was innocent. He did not lead any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Pyare Lal (PW-8) stated that the I&PH department had laid a water pipe till the road, and no pipeline was laid afterwards due to a land dispute. The informant and his wife admitted that they were using the land of the accused as an approach to their house. Therefore, the prosecution's case regarding the obstruction to the passage and water was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused were acquitted of the commission of charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the appellant/informant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The learned Trial Court did not appreciate the evidence from its right perspective. The evidence was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond 6 2025:HHC:21194 a reasonable doubt. The statements of witnesses were consistent, and there was no infirmity in them. Therefore, it was prayed that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned counsel representing the appellant, Mr. Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.2. 9. Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The prosecution's case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.1, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the water pipe was not laid to the house of the complainant. The informant was using the land of the accused as a passage to his house. Therefore, the plea that the accused had obstructed the passage and the flow of water was not 7 2025:HHC:21194 proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while deciding the matter, and this Court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding the appeal against acquittal. 11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, supported the submissions of Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned counsel representing the appellant. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a 8 2025:HHC:21194 Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. 9 2025:HHC:21194 (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 10 2025:HHC:21194 “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on 11 2025:HHC:21194 record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Kehar Singh (PW-1) stated that a water pipe was laid to his house by the I&PH Department in the beginning of the year 2016 with the permission of the accused. The accused subsequently burnt and cut the water pipe. 16. Soma Devi (PW-2) also asserted that the I&PH Department had laid the water pipe to her house, and this water pipe was cut by the accused 17 Pyare Lal (PW-8), Assistant Engineer, I&PH Department, Jawalamukhi, District Kangra, H.P., stated in his cross-examination that the I&PH department had laid a water pipe up to the road, and thereafter the department had not laid any pipe. He is an official witness and has been put-forward as a witness of truth by the prosecution. His testimony falsifies the statement of the informant and his wife that the I&PH Department had laid the water pipe to the house of the informant. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the obstruction to the flow of water was not proved on record. 12 2025:HHC:21194 18. Informant Kehar Singh (PW-1) stated that the accused had blocked the path leading to his house by putting bushes, etc. He admitted in his cross-examination that the private land of the accused is located adjacent to the road. He admitted that he had used the land of the accused to carry the construction material to his house. 19. Soma Devi (PW-2) also stated in her cross- examination that she and the informant were using the land of the accused to go to their house from the PWD road. Thus, the statement of Soma Devi makes the informant’s statement doubtful that the accused had obstructed the passage to his house. Further, the land is owned by the accused and being an owner, he has a right to prevent the informant from using his land, and such an act will not amount to the unlawful obstruction of the informant’s right. 20. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that an eviction order was passed against him under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and he had preferred an appeal against the same. 13 2025:HHC:21194 21. Soma Devi (PW-2) admitted in her cross- examination that she had a suspicion that the accused had made the complaint regarding the encroachment. Thus, it was duly established by the statement of Soma Devi that the complaint was filed because of the suspicion harboured by her and the informant that the accused had made a complaint against the informant regarding the encroachment on the government land. 22. Significantly, the accused had not made any complaint regarding the obstruction to passage or the flow of water in the complaint made by him. These allegations were added during the investigation. Thus, the allegations were improvements and could not have been relied upon. 23. The informant had asserted in the complaint that false complaints were being filed against him; however, Surdesh Patiyal (PW-5), Ward Member of Gram Panchayat Haroli, specifically stated that no complaint was made during her tenure. Thus, this part of the prosecution's case was not established. 14 2025:HHC:21194 24. The informant complained that the accused used to abuse him in the name of his caste; however, this was not found to be correct after the investigation, and no charge sheet was filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act. 25. No other point was urged. 26. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused of the charged offences. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 28. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (RakeshKainthla) Judge 04th July, 2025 (ravinder)