1 2025:CGHC:4583 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 2073 of 2014  Shri Radhe Enterprises Coal And Transport Division, Agrawal Government Higher Secondary School Dayalband Road Bilaspur Through Its Proprietor Arun Agrawal S/o Narayan Das Agrawal Age 50 Yrs R/o Opposite Govt. High School Dayalband Road Bilaspur P.S. City Kotwali Distt. Bilaspur C.G., Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Commerce And Industry, P.S. Rakhi Tahsil And Thana Arang, New Raipur Distt. Raipur C.G., Chhattisgarh 2. Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation Through Its Managing Director, First Floor, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No. 1, Telibandha, Raipur C.G., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. The Chief General Manager Chhattisgarh State Industrical Development Corporation Limited First Floor Udyog Bhawan Telibandha Ring Road No. 1, Raipur C.G. , District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4. M/s Satnam Pulses Through Its Proprietor Smt. Pooja Sidara W/o Sunil Kumar Sidara R/o Dhan Mandi Road Torwa Distt. Bilaspur C.G. , District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5. M/s Satya Automobiles Through Its Proprietor Shri Pramod Khedia, Aged About 55 Years, S/o Shri Chunnilal Khediya, R/o Q. No. C-7, Minocha Colony Bilaspur, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For State/Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Dy. Advocate General For Respondents No. 2 & 3 : Mr. Kashif Shakeel, Advocate For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Ishan Sharma, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Anup Majumdar, Advocate For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate along with Ms. Shristi Upadhya, Advocate 2 Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 24. 01.2025 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside the impugned letter dated 02.09.2014 (Annexure P/1) & impugned letter of intent dated 19.08.2014 (Annexure P/2) and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to allot the land in question in favour of petitioner. 10(1)(A) That his Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the letter dated 16.10.2014 and set aside the lease agreement dated 19.11.2014 executed between the respondent no.4 and Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited. 10.2 That any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award the cost of the petition may be given. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be please to direct the respondent no. 1 to 3 to cancel the lease deed executed in favour of the respondent no. 5 in the respect of the land in question, is in the interest of justice.” 2. The facts of the present case are that initially, a lease of the land bearing survey No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq. feet situated at Sirgitti Industrial Area, Bilaspur was granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals in the year 1996 under the M.P./C.G. Industries (Shed, Plot and Land Allotment), Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1974”). The petitioner entered into an agreement for the purchase with M/s Anurag Chemicals on 12.12.2005, and thereafter, moved an application before respondent No. 2/Chhattisgarh State Industrial Development Corporation (CSIDC) to grant the lease of that land and the application of the petitioner remained pending. Meanwhile, the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals got cancelled vide Order dated 29.05.2012. A letter of intent was issued on 19.08.2014 in 3 favour of respondent No. 4, the order of allotment was issued on 16.10.2014 and the agreement was executed on 19.11.2014. Respondent No. 4 sought permission to alienate the property in favour of respondent No. 5. Such permission was granted by the State Government and after completing the formalities, the lease was granted in favour of respondent No. 5 by respondent No. 2 on 25.03.2019. The petitioner has challenged the lease granted in favour of respondent No. 4 as well as respondent No. 5 along with the order Annexure P/1 dated 02.09.2014, whereby the application moved by the petitioner was rejected. 3. Mr. Ratnesh Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that an application was moved by the petitioner for the grant of lease pursuant to an agreement entered into between the petitioner and M/s Anurag Chemicals in the year 2005 and it was rejected by respondent No. 2 on 02.09.2014 and prior to it, the lease was granted to respondent No. 4 and the application of the petitioner was not considered at that time. He would further submit that again a lease was granted in favour of respondent No. 5, and this time again, the application of the petitioner was not considered; therefore, the entire exercise of respondent No. 2 appears to be malafide, arbitrary and suffers from nepotism and favouritism. It is further stated that according to Rules 5 & 8 of the Rules, 1974, respondent No. 2/CSIDC was under the obligation to decide the application for the grant of the lease within a period of 15 days and to decide all pending applications when the application of respondents No. 4 or 5 was considered. He would pray to set aside the lease granted in favour of respondents No. 4 & 5 as well as the order dated 02.09.2014 (Annexure P/1). 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 would 4 oppose the submissions made by Mr. Agrawal. He would submit that the application was moved by the petitioner in the year 2005 to record his name against the land bearing survey No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq. feet on the strength of the agreement entered into between the petitioner and M/s Anurag Chemicals. He would further submit that no permission was sought by the petitioner from the State Government according to Rule 19 of the Rules, 1974; therefore, the claim of the petitioner was not considered and the application was rejected. He would also submit that respondent No. 2 after following the due procedure granted a lease to respondent No. 4, and thereafter, a lease was granted to respondent No. 5. It is contended that M/s Anurag Chemicals is not a party in the present writ petition and that Industry never challenged the order of cancellation of its lease. 5. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 5 would submit that in the year 2014, a lease was granted to respondent No. 4 after following the due procedure of law, and thereafter, an agreement was entered into between respondents No. 4 & 5 with regard to the transfer of the lease. He would further submit that respondent No. 5 moved an application before the CSIDC seeking therein permission for the transfer of the lease. He would also submit that respondent No. 5 paid the required transfer fee, and thereafter, a decision was taken by respondent No. 2 to transfer the lease and allotment of land in favour of respondent No. 5. It is contended that the application was moved by the petitioner for the grant of lease in the year 2005, whereas this petition was filed in the year 2014 without explaining the delay. It is further contended that the order of cancellation of lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals was challenged by the petitioner in the year 2014, and thus, the instant petition suffers from 5 delay and laches. It is stated that the petitioner is claiming his right by virtue of an agreement to purchase which does not confer any right in favour of the petitioner. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Munishamappa vs. M. Rama Reddy, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine 1701. 6. Mr. Vinay Pandey, learned Dy. Advocate General appearing for the State and Mr. Ishan Sharma, Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 would support the contention made by Mr. Sinha and Mr. Shakeel. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 8. Initially, a lease was granted in favour of M/s Anurag Chemicals in the year 1996 pertaining to plot No. 45A admeasuring 40,000 sq. feet situated at Sirgitti Industrial Area, Bilaspur. The lease granted in favour of M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled by CSIDC vide Order dated 29.04.2012, but in between, the petitioner and the proprietor of M/s Anurag Chemicals entered into a private agreement. An agreement to purchase was executed between the parties. 9. Rule 19 of the Rules, 1974, states that there shall be a ban on partial transfer of the land and the lease cannot be transferred without prior permission of the State Government or prescribed authority. There was a condition No. 15 in the agreement entered into between respondent No. 2 and M/s Anurag Chemicals, which reads as under:- “15. The lessee shall not sublet, assign or other wise transfer the said premises/land or any part thereof or any building constructed thereon for any purpose, whatsoever, except as provided in rule 20 of the said rule.” 10. A bare reading of Rule 19 of the Rules, 1974 and condition No. 15 of the 6 agreement makes it clear that the lease was not transferable without prior permission of the State Government or respondent No. 2 and the lessee was not authorized to sublet, assign or otherwise transfer the said premises/land contrary to provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules, 1974. 11. In the present case, the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled by respondent No. 2 on 29.05.2012. Though the application of the petitioner was pending, but it was not in consonance with Rule 19 of the Rules, 1974 and condition No. 15 of the agreement entered into between M/s Anurag Chemicals and respondent No. 2; therefore, there was no occasion for respondent No. 2 to consider the application moved by the petitioner for the grant of the lease. 12. The lease was granted in accordance with the law to respondent No. 4, and thereafter, it was granted in favour of respondent No. 5. The petitioner and M/s Anurag Chemicals entered into a private agreement and respondent No. 2 cancelled the lease-deed of M/s Anurag Chemicals on 29.05.2012 and the petitioner or M/s Anurag Chemicals had to approach this Court in the year 2012, but in para 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that there is no delay in filing the instant petition and thus, the delay has not been explained in the instant petition. 13. The lease was granted in favour of respondents No. 4 and 5 strictly in accordance with the Rules, 1974 and the petitioner failed to challenge the grant of lease within the prescribed period of limitation whereas respondent No. 5 is running the industry since 2019; therefore, at this stage, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the decision taken by respondent No. 2. 14. The application moved by the petitioner was rejected vide order dated 7 02.09.2014 (Annexure P/1) and that was also not challenged by the petitioner within the stipulated time. Though in the writ jurisdiction, no limitation period is provided, but the litigants should approach the Court within a reasonable time. The term “reasonable time” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551. Relevant para 11 is reproduced herein-below:- “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: ‘56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 ог 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.’ 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ indeed be a 8 good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 (1992) 21 ATC 675 (1992) 2 SCR 9691). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi. [(1969) 1 SCC 110]. Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India. [(1970) 1 SCC 841). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose." 15. There was an agreement between M/s Anurag Chemicals and the petitioner. It is well a settled principle of law that the agreement to sell or purchase does not confer any right in favour of such person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Munishamappa (supra), in para 10 held as under:- “10. The Agreement to Sell is not a conveyance; it does not transfer ownership rights or confers any title. What is prohibited or barred under the Fragmentation Act was the lease/sale/conveyance or transfer of rights. Therefore, the Agreement to Sell cannot be said to be barred under the Fragmentation Act. The appellant filed the suit for specific performance after the repeal of the Fragmentation Act. The suit could have been decreed without there being any violation to the law once the Fragmentation Act itself had been repealed in February 1991. Further, the High Court did not hold that the suit was barred by Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The First Appeal Court had considered this aspect and having decided the said issue in favour of the appellant, we need not go into that question at this stage. What is further noticeable is that the respondents received the 9 full consideration and had also transferred the possession of the property in question, as such other defences may not be available to them. Even the issue of readiness and willingness on the part of the appellant would not be relevant.” 16. The petitioner is claiming right pursuant to the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals whereas the lease granted to M/s Anurag Chemicals was cancelled on 29.05.2012; therefore, the petitioner has no individual right to claim right on the basis of the lease which has already been cancelled by respondent No. 2. 17. Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). 18. However, the petitioner would be at liberty to make a fresh application for the grant of lease for the allotment of a different land. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant