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2025 DAILYLAW 24718 (CHH)

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT RAIPUR v. DR. PARIKSHIT CHARAN

REVP/142/2025 · 2025-07-10

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

Review Petitionbody2025

Judgment text

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1 REVP No. 142 of 2025 2025:CGHC:32345 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR REVP No. 142 of 2025 1 - Indian Institute Of Management Raipur Through Chief Executive Officer, Po Kuru, Tehsil Abhanpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1) 2 - Dr. Ram Kalani Director, IIM Raipur, Office Address At IIM Raipur, Tehsil Abhnpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 4) ...Applicants versus 1 - Dr. Parikshit Charan S/o Mool Singh Charan Aged About 49 Years R/o Flat No. 5, Block 1, Faculty R/o IIM Raipur Campus, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Petitioner) 2 - Board Of Governor Through The Chairman Shri Puneet Dalmia Dalmia Bharat Limited, R/o 11 And 12 Floor, Hansalaya Building, 15 Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 110001 (Respondent No. 2) 3 - Department Of Personnel And Training Through The Secretary Government Of India, Ministry Of Personnel, Public Grievance And Pensions, Room No. 222d, North Block, New Delhi (Respondent No. 3) 4 - Shri P.R. Devi Prasad Enquiry Officer C/o Director Indian Institute Of Management, Atal Nagar, New Raipur (CG) (Respondent No. 5) Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Applicant : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate along with Dr. Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.1 (Writ Petitioner) : Mr. Sudeep Johri, Advocate RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2025.07.14 17:04:39 +0530 2 REVP No. 142 of 2025 Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Order on Board 11/07/2025 1. By way of this Review Petition, the review petitioners seek review of the order dated 24/04/2025 passed by this Court in WPS No. 2832/2024 & WPS No. 218/2025. 2. It is noteworthy to mention here that against the order dated 24/04/2025 passed by this Court in WPS No. 2832/2024 & WPS No. 218/202, the IIM filed WA No. 330/2025, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court as withdrawn by order dated 22/05/2025 reserving liberty in favour of the IIM to take recourse to law before the Single Bench. Thus, this Review Petition. 3. The main ground urged in the review petition is that Section 5 (d) provides an exception of the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017 (henceforth ‘the Act, 2017’) and therefore, service conditions of the petitioner shall not be governed under the Act, 2017, and as such, the HR Policy shall still be effective on the service condition of the petitioner. He would submit that while deciding the aforesaid writ petitions, due to inadvertence, the said fact has not been brought before this Court. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/Writ Petitioner would submit that after the order under review passed by this Court, within a period of four days, the Writ Petitioner has been placed under suspension i.e. by order dated 28/04/2025. The said suspension order was challenged by the Review Petitioner in WPS No. 3 REVP No. 142 of 2025 3209/2025, which was allowed by this Court on 09/05/2025. Against the said order, the Review Petitioner/IIM preferred Writ Appeal No. 342/2025, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court and affirmed passed by this Court. Thus, no relief can be granted in favour of the Review Petitioner. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. 6. For the sake of convenience, it would be appropriate to quote Section 5(d), 11 (1) & (2) (i), 35 (1)(2)(a) and 39 (1)(c) of the Act, 2017 for ready reference, which reads thus:- 5. On and from the commencement of this Act,- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx d) every person employed by every existing Institute immediately before such commencement shall hold his office or service in the corresponding Institute, with the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as to pension, leave, gratuity, provident fund and other matters as he would have held had this Act not been enacted and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment is terminated or until such tenure, remuneration and terms and conditions are duly altered by regulations: Provided that if the alteration so made is not acceptable to such employee, his employment may be terminated by the Institute in accordance with the terms of the contract with the employee, or, if no provision is made therein in this behalf, on payment, to him by the Institute, of a compensation equivalent to three months' remuneration in 4 REVP No. 142 of 2025 case of permanent employee and one months' remuneration in the case of other employee: Provided further that any reference, by whatever form of words, to the Director, and other officers of an existing Institute under any law for the time being in force, or in any instrument or other document, shall be construed as a reference to the Director, and other officers of the corresponding Institutes; xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 11. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board of every Institute shall be responsible for the general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the Institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or modify or rescind the regulations governing the affairs of the Institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified in section 6. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the Board shall have the following powers, namely:- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (i) to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 35. (1) The Board may, by notification, make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to carry out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- 5 REVP No. 142 of 2025 (a) tenure, remuneration and terms and conditions of employees of existing Institute under clause (d) of section 5; xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 39.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act:- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (c) until the first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 7. The order under review was passed by this Court on 24/04/2025 in WPS Nos. 2832/2024 & 218/2025, wherein this Court held thus:- “7. From the pleadings, it is apparent that the petitioner is an Associate Professor in the IIM, Raipur. On account of some complaints received against the petitioner, he has been placed under suspension; charge-sheet has been issued; and the Departmental Enquiry has been contemplated by the Director of the IIM. 8. Section 11 of the Act, 2017 speaks about ‘Powers and Function of the Board’, subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board of every institute shall be responsible for the general superintendence, directions and control of the affairs of the institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or modified or rescind the regulation governing the affairs of the institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified in Section 6. Section 11 (2) (i) of the Act, 2017 provides that the Board shall have the power to create academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is crystal clear that the BOG is the appointing authority of the 6 REVP No. 142 of 2025 petitioner. Thus, the charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval of the BOG, but the same has not been followed in the case in hand. Even, the respondents failed to show that the powers delegated by the BOG upon the Director. The charge-sheet issued by the other authority than the specified authority was wholly without jurisdiction and vitiated the whole disciplinary proceedings. 9. Such procedure adopted by the Director would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311 (2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge sheet. Such a charge sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority, in the case at hand, it is BOG, not the Director. (See: Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath & Others1. 10. It is well settled proposition of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. (See: Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Others2). 11. As far as the HR Policy is concerned, the same is nothing but internal arrangement of the establishment. Even otherwise, the policy/guidelines cannot supersede the statutes i.e. the Act, 2017. Even the respondents failed to show that the provisions of the Act, 2017 will not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 12. Guidelines/policy per se do not partake to the character of statute. Such guidelines/policy in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. This is because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the 1 (2014) 1 SCC 351 2 (2008) 9 SCC 177 7 REVP No. 142 of 2025 category of legislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the same. Judicial control takes over only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under which they are issued are intended to achieve. (See: Poonam Verma & Others v. Delhi Development Authority3 13. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case with regards to contents of the charge-sheet, the impugned suspension order; the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner; and the charge-sheet are hereby quashed. 14. In the result, both the Writ Petitions are allowed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the respondent/IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised. 8. After four days of the passing of the aforesaid order, by order dated 28/04/2025, the Writ petitioner was placed under suspension, which was challenged by him in WPS No. 3209/2025, which was allowed by this Court on 09/05/2025 holding thus:- “6. On going through the pleadings and documents, it is manifest that the respondents completely placed reliance upon the HR Policy of the IIM whereas Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first 3 2007 (13) SCC 154 8 REVP No. 142 of 2025 regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 7. 7. Bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as per Section 11(2) (i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the respondent is inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective. By applying the provisions of the Act, 2017, the earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner were allowed and granted liberty to the IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised. Despite granting the said liberty, again without following the provisions of the Act, 2017 on the strength of the HR Policy the impugned suspension order has been passed by the respondent No.2. 8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition is allowed and the order dated 28-4-2025 (Annexure-P/1) is hereby quashed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the IIM to proceed against the petitioner as per the provisions of the Act, 2017, if so advised.” 9. The Review Petitioner/IIM challenged the order dated 09/05/2025 passed in WPS No. 3209/2025 before the Division Bench of this Court 9 REVP No. 142 of 2025 in WA No. 342/2025. The said appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 27/05/2025 and affirmed order of this Court. The Division Bench held thus:- “8. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that learned Single Judge held that on going through the pleadings and documents, it is manifest that the respondents completely placed reliance upon the HR Policy of the IIM whereas Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Learned Single Judge further held that bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the respondent is inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective. By applying the provisions of the Act, 2017, the earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner were allowed and granted liberty to the IIM to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised. Despite granting the said liberty, again without following the provisions of the Act, 2017 on the strength of the HR 10 REVP No. 142 of 2025 Policy the impugned suspension order has been passed by the respondent No.2 and allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and quashed the order dated 28/04/2025. However, liberty was reserved in favour fo the IIM to proceed against the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) as per the provisions of the Act, 2027, if so advised. Even otherwise, writ appeal filed against the order dated 24/04/2025 was withdrawn by the appellants with liberty to take recourse to law before learned Single Judge and thereafter no review was filed. 9. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the parties, perusing the order dated 24/04/2025 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in WPS Nos.2832 of 2024 and 218 of 2025, further perusing the order dated 22/05/2025 passed in writ appeal and also considering the findings recorded by learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein, we are of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court. 10. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).” 10. Now reverting to the grounds raised by the Review Petitioner that the provisions of Section 5 (d) of the Act, 2017 provides an exception and therefore, shall not be governed under the Act, 2017, and as such, the HR Policy shall still be effective on the service condition of the Writ Petitioner. The ground taken by the Review Petitioner has been considered by this Court while deciding WPS No. 3209/2025 and it was observed by order dated 09/05/2025 that though there is an exception 11 REVP No. 142 of 2025 under Section 5 (d) of the Act, 2017, Section 39(1)(c) provides that until the first regulation are made under this Act, the Rules and bye-laws of each institute are enforced, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Hence, as the provisions regarding power of the BoG regarding the status of the appointing Authority was not inconsistent with the Act, 2017, that’s why the provisions of Section 11(2) would be applicable. 11. On going through the provisions of the Act, 2017, it is evident that Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye- laws of each Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 12. As per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of the writ petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the review Petitioner is inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective. 13. Though in the order under review, the aforesaid issue has not been dealt with by this Court owing to the fact that the same has not been brought 12 REVP No. 142 of 2025 before this Court by either of the parties, the same has been duly deliberated in the subsequent Writ Petition i.e. WPS No. 3209/2025 and held that the Authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 and hence, while allowing the said Writ petitions, this Court granted liberty to the IIM to proceed against the Writ Petitioner as per the Act, 2017, if so advised. Even, the Appellate Court has also affirmed the said finding of this Court in WA No. 342/2025. However, without availing the remedy as has been granted earlier by this Court, the IIM filed the present Review Petition. 14. The Scope of the review jurisdiction is narrow confined to errors apparent on the face of the record or if a relevant provision of law had been overlooked. In other words, it is only a patent error which is amenable to review and not an error which may have to be discovered by a process of reasoning and what may be called a virtual re-hearing of the matter. In the garb of a Review Petition, this Court cannot sit in judgment over its own order. Therefore I am not satisfied that the Review application is maintainable, if the petitioner is aggrieved, the remedy is different. 15. It is well settled that scope of review jurisdiction is extremely limited and only an error apparent on face of record can be corrected in the said jurisdiction and re-appraisal/re-appreciation cannot be done in exercise of said jurisdiction as that would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction which is impermissible in law as has been held in catena of judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court, such as Devaraju Pillai v. 13 REVP No. 142 of 2025 Sellayya Pillai, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 61, Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt), reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170, Avijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. and others, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 174, Lily Thomas etc. v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1650, Akhilesh Yavad v. Vishwanath Chaturvedi and others, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 1 and Sasi (D) through LRS. v. Aravindakshan Nair and others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 692). 16. The ground raised by the review petitioner in this review petition cannot be permitted to be raised in review petition. Even otherwise, there is no error apparent on the face of record in the order under review warranting invocation of review jurisdiction. 17. As an upshot, the review petition is dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Rahul/Gowri