2025:HHC:29197 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.   : 1059 of 2024 Reserved on   :  0 4  th   June, 2025 Decided on  : 29 th   August, 202 5 Dheeraj Kumar …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Ajay   Kochhar,   Senior Advocate   with   Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Dheeraj Kumar has filed the present petition,   under   Section   528   of   the   Bharatiya   Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing and setting aside the order dated 6.8.2024, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.V, Shimla (hereinafter referred to as the learned   trial   Court’),   with   a   prayer   to   issue   necessary direction to the learned trial Court, in case Police Challan No.135/2024,   arising   out   of   FIR   No.43   of   2022,   dated 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:29197 31.03.2022, registered, under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the IPC’) with Police Station Sadar, Shimla, H.P. 2. The factual position giving rise to the filing of the present petition, as borne out from the pleadings, may be summed up, as under:­ 2.1. Petitioner was named as accused in FIR No.43 of 2022, dated 31.03.2022, registered, under Section 306 IPC   with   Police   Station   Sadar,   Shimla,   H.P.     It   is   his further case that he was released on bail, by this Court, vide order dated 15.06.2022, passed in Cr.MP (M) No.924 of   2022. Thereafter,   the   police   has   completed   the investigation   and  submitted  the  charge­sheet   before  the learned trial Court. 2.2. Subsequently, notices were issued against the petitioner and he has put appearance before the learned trial   Court. Thereafter,   copy   of   the   charge­sheet   was supplied to him and the case was fixed for 6.8.2024, for checking of the copies. 2.3. Petitioner   has   further   pleaded   that   he   is working   in   the   High   Court   and   he   has   intimated   his 3 2025:HHC:29197 counsel   to   move   appropriate   application,   seeking exemption from personal appearance, before the learned trial Court, however, despite specific instructions to move application for exemption, the counsel for the petitioner not only failed to file requisite application, but, also failed to   put   appearance. Due   to   his   non­appearance,   the learned   trial   Court   has   issued   non­bailable   warrants against   the   petitioner,   by   cancelling   his   personal   and surety bonds. 2.4. It   is   the   further   case   of   the   petitioner   that before   the   non­bailable   warrants   could   be   served,   the petitioner   appeared   before   the   learned   trial   Court   by moving application under Section 72(2) read with Section 480 of the BNSS, for cancellation and recalling of the non­ bailable   warrants,   issued   vide   order   dated   06.08.2024. However, the learned trial Court has not entertained the application and directed the petitioner to surrender before the learned trial Court before entertaining the application, on the ground that condition No.2, imposed by this Court, while deciding Cr.MP(M) No.924 of 2022, has been violated. 4 2025:HHC:29197 2.5. The said order of the learned trial Court has been assailed by the petitioner before this Court, on the ground that the procedure, being adopted by the learned trial   Court,   is   against   the   basic   provisions   of   law   and tenets of criminal law. 2.6. It   has   been   contended   on   behalf   of   the petitioner that his absence, before the learned trial Court, was neither intentional nor willful, but, due to the reasons as submitted as above. 3. Along with the present petition, an application, bearing Cr.MP No. 4395 of 2024, has also been filed, in which,   the   following   order   has   been   passed   on 28.10.2024:­ Till the next date  of  hearing, the  operation of the   order   dated   06.08.2024,   passed   by   the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.5, Shimla, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as   the   ‘trial   Court’),   in   Police   Challan No.135/2024,   titled   as   ‘State   Vs. Dheeraj Kumar’ is ordered to be stayed, subject to the condition that the applicant/petitioner will move the   appropriate   application   i.e.   application, under Section 72(2) read with Section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, before the learned trial Court. Learned   trial   Court   is   directed   to   decide   the application, within a period of five days, from the   date   of   filing   of   the   application   by   the applicant/petitioner.” 5 2025:HHC:29197 4. In pursuance of the said order, the petitioner had filed application before the learned trial Court, which was also dismissed vide order dated 5.11.2024, by passing the following orders:­ 5. It is pertinent to state that the applicant has placed on record the downloaded copy of order dated   28.10.2024   wherein   the   Hon'ble   High Court   of   H.P.   has   specifically   stayed   the operation   of   order   dated   06.08.2024   till   next date of hearing i.e. 08.11.2024 subject to the condition   that   the   applicant   will   move appropriate   application   i.e   application   under Section 72(2) read with Section 480 of BNSS, 2023 before the trial Court. The Hon’ble Court has also made it clear that the present Court shall   be   referred   as   the   “trial   court”   for   the purpose   of   this   application. Therefore   the present application has been moved before this Court. Coming to the merits of the application, it is   worth   mentioning   here   that   the   perusal   of record shows that  the applicant/accused was bailed out by the order of the Hon’ble High Court of H.P. vide order dated 15.6.2022 subject to furnishing of personal and surety bonds in the sum   of   Rs. 50,000   each   but   despite   that   he violated the conditions of such release on bail and did not put his appearance before the Court. Such   conduct   of   the   accused   has   shook   the confidence of this Court. Showing any leniency to   the   applicant   who   had   jumped   the   bail granted   by   the   Hon’ble   High   Court,   in   the present   case   registered   under   Section   306   of IPC, would adversely affect the integrity of the judicial   process. Therefore,   the   present application is dismissed. 6 2025:HHC:29197 6. Thereafter, by moving Cr.MP No. 4568 of 2024, in this case, a prayer has also been made to set aside the afore­stated order dated 5.11.2024. 7. In   such   situation,   learned   Senior   Counsel appearing   for   the   petitioner   has   contended   that   the procedure adopted by the learned trial Court is unknown to the law, as, the primary purpose of issuance of bailable/ non­bailable   warrants   is   to   secure   the   presence   of   the accused. When the petitioner has approached the Court, by   moving   application   under   Section   72(2)   read   with Section 480 of the BNSS, then, the same should have been decided by taking into consideration the reasons for non­ appearance of the petitioner on 06.08.2024. 8. Per   contra,   Mr. Tejasvi   Sharma,   learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondent­ State   has   prayed   that   the   procedure,   which   has   been adopted by the learned trial Court is  consistent  with the provisions of law. 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Kewal Krishan versus Suraj   Bhan   &   Another,   AIR   1980   Supreme   Court 1780, has elaborately discussed the provisions of Section 7 2025:HHC:29197 209 of the Cr.PC. Relevant paragraph 10, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ “10. The proposition that in cases instituted on complaint in regard to an of fence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the standard for ascertaining   whether   or   not   the   evidence collected   in   the   preliminary   inquiry   discloses sufficient   grounds   for   proceeding   against   the accused is lower than the one to be adopted at the stage of framing charges in a warrant case triable by the Magistrate, is now evident from the scheme of the new Code of 1973. Section 209   of   the   Code   of   1973   dispenses   with   the inquiry   preliminary   to   commitment   in   cases triable   exclusively   by   a   Court   of   Session, irrespective of whether such a case is instituted on   a   criminal   complaint   or   a   police   report. Section 209 says: "When a case instituted on a police report or otherwise the accused appears or   is   brought   before   the   Magistrate   and   it appears   to   the   Magistrate   that   the   offence   is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall commit the case to the Court of Session". If the Committing Magistrate thinks that it is not necessary­ to commit the accused who may be on bail to custody, he may not cancel the bail. This has been made clear by the words "subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail" occurring in Clause (b) of Section 209. Therefore, if the accused is already on bail, his bail should not be arbitrarily cancelled. Section 227 of the Code   of   1973   has   made   another   beneficent provision   to   save   the   accused   from   prolonged harassment which is a necessary concomitant of a protracted trial. This Section provides that if upon   considering   the   record   of   the   case,   the documents   submitted   with   it   and   the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the Judge is not convinced that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he has to discharge the accused under this Section and record his reasons for so doing.” 8 2025:HHC:29197 10. In   the   present   case,   when   the   personal   and surety   bonds   of   the   petitioner   were   cancelled   by   the learned trial Court, on 6.8.2024, he has approached this Court under Section 72(2) read with Section 480 of the BNSS, for recalling the non­bailable warrants issued on 6.8.2024. The primary purpose of issuance of the non­ bailable warrants is to secure the presence of the accused and when the petitioner voluntarily put appearance before the Court, his application should have been allowed by the learned trial Court. 11. As per the case set up by the petitioner, the learned   trial   Court   has   directly   issued   the   non­bailable warrants,   on   the   absence   of   the   petitioner,   before   the learned   trial   Court,   on   6.8.2024,   without   recording   the satisfaction   that   his   presence   could   not   be   secured   by issuing the bailable warrants. 12. In the absence of any findings, with regard to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, to issue non­ bailable   warrants,   the   impugned   order   is   liable   to   be interfered with. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in 9 2025:HHC:29197 Raghuvansh   Dewanchand   Bhasin  versus  State   of Maharashtra & Another (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 791. Relevant paragraph 10 and 11 of the judgment are reproduced as under:­ “10. It   needs   little   emphasis   that   since   the execution   of   a   non­bailable   warrant   directly involves   curtailment   of   liberty   of   a   person, warrant   of   arrest   cannot   be   issued mechanically,   but   only   after   recording satisfaction that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is warranted. The Courts have to be   extra­cautious   and   careful   while   directing issue of non­bailable warrant, else a wrongful detention   would   amount   to   denial   of constitutional mandate envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, there is   no   gainsaying   that   the   welfare   of   an individual must yield to that of the community. Therefore, in order to maintain rule of law and to keep   the   society   in   functional   harmony,   it   is necessary   to   strike   a   balance   between   an individual's rights, liberties and privileges on the one hand, and the State on the other. Indeed, it is a complex exercise. As Justice Cardozo puts it "on the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice." 11. Be that as it may, it is for the court, which is   clothed   with   the   discretion   to   determine whether   the   presence   of   an   accused   can   be secured by a bailable or non­bailable warrant, to strike   the   balance   between   the   need   of   law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of the citizen from highhandedness at the hands of the law enforcement agencies on the other. The power and jurisdiction of the court to issue appropriate warrant against an accused on his 10 2025:HHC:29197 failure to attend the court on the date of hearing of the matter cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, such power has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, having regard, inter­alia, to the nature and seriousness of the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused; his age and the possibility of his absconding.” (self emphasis supplied) 13. The   approach   of   the   learned   trial   Court,   by directly issuing the non­bailable warrants, is against the verdict of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satinder Kumar Antil  versus  Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   and Another (2022) 10 Supreme Court Cases 51,   Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment is reproduced as under:­ 35. Considering the aforesaid two provisions, courts   will   have   to   adopt   the   procedure   in issuing   summons   first,   thereafter   a   bailable warrant, and then a non­bailable warrant may be issued, if so warranted, as held by this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal , (2007)   12  SCC  1. Despite  the  aforesaid   clear dictum, we notice that non­bailable warrants are issued   as   a   matter   of   course   without   due application of mind and against the tenor of the provision, which merely facilitates a discretion, which is obviously to be exercised in favour of the   person   whose   attendance   is   sought   for, particularly   in   the   light   of   liberty   enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, valid reasons have to be given for not exercising discretion in favour of the said person. (self emphasis supplied) 11 2025:HHC:29197 14. Even   otherwise,   this   Court,   considering   the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, passed the order   dated   28.10.2024   in   Cr.MP   No.4395   of   2024,   in terms of which, a direction was issued to the learned trial Court.  Despite, the said direction, the learned trial Court has   not   bothered   to   adhere   to   the   provisions   of   law, according to which, summons or warrant is to secure the presence and the same should not be punitive. 15. Thereafter,   the   learned   trial   Court   has   again dismissed the application moved by the petitioner under Section   72(2)   read   with   Section   480   of   the   BNSS,   on 5.11.2024. 16. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the case,   in   the   light   of   the   case   law,   as   observed   above, orders dated 6.8.2024, as well as, order dated 5.11.2024, do not sustain in the judicial scrutiny by this Court.   As such, the same are set aside and the petitioner is deemed to be on bail and his bail bonds, so furnished, which have been ordered to be cancelled, are ordered to be revived, by intimating  the same to the surety of the petitioner.   In case, the surety of the petitioner is no longer interested to 12 2025:HHC:29197 be his surety, in that eventuality, the petitioner will furnish fresh surety bond, within a period of seven days, from the date of appearance of the surety before the learned trial Court. 18. With these observations, the petition is allowed. Pending application(s), shall also stand disposed of. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 29, 2025 (ps)