APHC010348462019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3333] TUESDAY ,THE FOURTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 6361/2019 Between: 1. SHAIK ABDUL SHAFI, S/O SHAIK MOULALI, AGED 44 YEARS, OCC BUSINESS, R/O HNO 22-2-7/B, ITIKAMPADU ROAD, PONNUR, GUNTUR-522124. 2. M.A. BAKSHI, S/O HASSAN AHMED, AGED 86 YEARS, OCC BUSINESS, R/O HNO 22-7-4, 27TH WARD, SHARAFF BAZAR, PONNUR, GUNTUR-522124 ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S) AND 1. STATE OF AP, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, NELAPADU, GUNTUR. 2. SHAIK JARINA BEGUM, D/O SHAIK SINGAMPALLI KHAJA HUSSAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCC HOUSEWIFE, R/O PAMURU VILLAGE AND MANDAL, PRAKASAM DISTRICT ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S): 1. M SOLOMON RAJU Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: 2 ORDER: This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioners/A2 and A3 seeking to quash the proceedings in Cr.No.134 of 2019, dated 10.09.2019 of Pamuru Police Station, Prakasham District registered for the offence punishable under Section 4 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. 2. Respondent No.2 is the defacto complainant. The petitioners, who are A2 and A3, are relatives of A1, who is the husband of the defacto complainant. The defacto complainant is a resident of Pamuru Village. It is alleged in the complaint that while the defacto complainant was pursuing her M.Sc. at Nagarjuna University, she became acquainted with Mohammed Badrud Duza (A1), and their relationship developed into love. With their consent, on 22.03.2009, their marriage was performed in Pamuru Village in the presence of their elders, according to Muslim rites and traditions, at Pamuru Pedda Masjid. At the time of the marriage, in accordance with the demand of A1 and his parents, the complainant and her family gave Rs. 5,00,000/- along with 35 Tulas of gold, household articles worth Rs. 2,00,000/-, and a motorcycle worth Rs. 1,00,000/- as dowry. After the marriage, the complainant went to her marital home. On 08.08.2013, she was blessed with a male child. Initially, A1 and her in-laws treated her well, but later, they began 3 harassing her for additional dowry. They lived in various places including Bhimavaram, Vijayawada, and Tirupati. She also informed her parents about the physical and mental harassment. On 30.04.2019, A1 left her at Chandragiri and did not return home, prompting her to go to her parents‟ house. After lodging a complaint against A1 and his parents at Pamuru Police Station regarding the physical and mental harassment, the SI of police attempted counseling and tried to convince A1 for reconciliation. Subsequently, A1 filed a writ petition bearing W.P. No. 10331 of 2019 in the Hon'ble High Court on false grounds. On 27.08.2019, she received a registered post from A1 containing the first, second, and third Talaqnama notices bearing A1‟s signature. The first and second Talaqnama notices were Xerox copies, and Andhra Bank DD No. 312470 for Rs. 5,000/- was enclosed in the envelope. According to the letter, A1 had sent the first Talaqnama on 28.05.2019, the second on 03.07.2019, and the third on 21.08.2019. She did not receive the first and second Talaqnama notices and was unaware of them. A1 sent these notices based on false allegations, intending to leave her. The Talaqnama is illegal and against the law. A case in Crime No.134 of 2019 has been registered for the offence punishable under Section 4 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 on the file of Pamuru Police Station, Prakasham District. The present 4 petitioners/A2 and A3 filed the present petition seeking to quash the proceedings against them in the said crime. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners/A2 and A3 are in no way connected with the Talaqnama issued by A1. The petitioners herein have not committed any offence under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, and therefore, they cannot be prosecuted and implicated in the present crime. The petitioners are relatives of A1, and for this reason alone, they should not be implicated in the Triple Talaq case. The petitioners had no role in the entire matter, except for signing as witnesses. The police, without verifying the incident or the petitioners‟ involvement, have falsely implicated them in this crime solely to harass them. Therefore, petitioners/A2 and A3 pray for the petition to be allowed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent contended that the petitioners were fully aware of the facts surrounding the three Talaqnama and colluded with A1 to send those notices to the defacto complainant. The petitioners, therefore, committed an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. 5 5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor too concurred with the submission made by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 6. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: “Whether the proceedings against the petitioners in Crime No.134 of 2019 of Pamur Police Station, Prakasham District are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” 7. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the 6 administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 8. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: In “R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 1 AIR 1960 SC 866 7 9. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar2” 10. In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal3” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court 2 AIR 1990 SC 494 3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8 summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 9 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 11. The offence alleged against the petitioners/A2 and A3 in the present crime is under Section 4 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 (for short, „the Act‟). The same reads as under: “Punishment for pronouncing talaq. Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that only a Muslim husband is punishable for pronouncing talaq upon his wife as referred to in Section 3 of the Act, which provides that any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal. Thus, the offence under Section 4 of the Act is attributable only against the Muslim husband and not others. It is to be noted that the petitioners herein are the relatives of accused No.1/husband of the defacto complainant. Thus, they cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Though it is 10 alleged that accused No.1 has prepared the Talaqnama notices with the assistance of A2 and A3, there is no material to substantiate as to how they assisted A1 and even otherwise, since the offence is attractable only against the husband and not others, the petitioners cannot be prosecuted to the alleged offence. In that view of the matter, this Court feels that continuation of proceedings against the petitioners is nothing but abuse of process of law. 13. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed by quashing the proceedings in FIR No.134 of 2019 of Pamur Police Station, Prakasham District dated 10.09.2019 against the petitioners/accused No.2 and 3. However, the police are directed to proceed as against A1 in Cr.No.134 of 2019 of Pamur Police Station, Prakasham District and file charge sheet as against A1 as already directed by this Court on 23.10.2011, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of three months. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall also stand closed. ___________________ JUSTICE V.SUJATHA Dated: 04.02.2025 S D P 11 163 THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 6361/2019 Dated: 04.02.2025 S D P