1 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 975 of 2019 Judgment Reserved on: 20.8.2025 Judgment Delivered on: 16.9.2025 • Amol Raypurey S/o Domaji Raypurey Aged About 28 Years Permanent R/o Gram Dobgaon, Bhoshi Th. Savali District Chandrapur Maharashtra , At Presently R/o Makadi District North Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus • The State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Kanker, District North Bastar Kanker Chhattisgarh., District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. D. K. Gwalre, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer. RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 Division Bench Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. C A V Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present criminal appeal under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant herein calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.12.2018, passed by the Court of Additional Session Judge, (F.T.C.) and Special Judge of POCSO, District- North Bastar, Kanker, in Special Criminal Case (POCSO Act) No. 24/2018, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted as under:- Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs. 1,000/- and. in default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for three months. U/s 366 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for ten years with fine of Rs 1,000/-and in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for six months. U/s 342 of Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs: 500/- and, in 3 default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I for one month. U/s 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 Rigorous Imprisonment for twenty years with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for one year. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, on 24.03.2018 at about 10:00 pm in the rented house located near village Makli Dhaba under the ambit of Police Station-Kanker knowing the minor daughter/prosecutrix of applicant Mukesh Shori, aged about 16 years, to be a minor, without the consent and agreement her guardian father Mukesh Shori and mother Shrigati Galti Shori, by luring her with marriage under lawful guardianship, took her to Chandrapur and abducted her and the said abduction was done with the intention of having illicit sexual intercourse with her and with the intention to rape her, caused wrongful confinement by detaining her for two days (from 24.03.2018 to 25.03.2018) and committed forcible rape having sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will repeatedly and knowing that the complainant is a minor, committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on her. Mukesh Kumar Shori (PW-2) lodged a written complaint in Police Station-Kanker vide Ex. P/4 to the effect that he does the business of selling utensils by going from village to 4 village. On 24.03 2018, he came to village Makdi from Antagarh to sell utensils. His wife Shrigati Malti Shori, the prosecutrix and her nephew Raj Shori had come with him and were staying at Rasmay near Makdi Dhaba. After that, he went to Dhamtari to sold get the goods sold and at about 12:00 noon, he came to Makdi. Then his wife Shrimati Malti told him that at about 10:00- 11:00, his daughter has gone somewhere without informing anyone. Some person might have taken the complainant away by luring her. On the basis of the applicant's report, a crime was registered against an unknown accused in Police Station Kanker under Section 363 IPC under Crime No. 123/2018 and the case was taken up for investigation. During the investigation, on the basis of the recovery of the belongings and the statement of the prosecutrix in addition to the above mentioned offence against the accused, the offences under Sections 366, 376, 343 of IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 2012 were also added and the case was investigated. During the investigation, consent was obtained from the mother of the accused for genital examination of the accused and genital examination of the accused was conducted vide Ex.P/8. The police prepared the spot map of the incident vide Ex. P/3 and P/6 and the Patwari prepared the Nazri-Naksha and Panchnama respectively vide Exs. P/12 and P/13 and sent it to the Tehsildar 5 The statement of the accused was recorded in the Magistrate Court under Section 164 CrPC. The seizure vide Ex. P/9 and Ex. P/18 respectively. The arrest of the accused vide Ex. P/19 and his family members were informed about it vide Ex.P/20 and the accused's virility test was conducted vide Ex.P/11. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. The vaginal slide of the accused seized in the case was sent to the FSL vide Ex. P/24 and as per FSL report vide Ex. P/26 the semen stains and human sperms were found. 3. Statements under Section 161 of CrPC of the victim as well as the witnesses have been recorded and after completion of Investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act. The learned trial Court has framed charges against the appellant for the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant abjured the guilt and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses and 26 Exhibits Statements of the appellant under Section 313 CrPC have also been recorded in which he denied the material appearing against him and pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the case. 6 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para-1 of this judgment and the present appellant being aggrieved by the said order preferred instant appeal, hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the conviction of the appellant is wholly unsustainable in law, in as much as the prosecution has failed to discharge its primary burden of proving that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date and time of the alleged incident. He further submits that the essential ingredients of abduction, whether for the purpose of marriage or for illicit intercourse have not been established. Despite the absence of cogent and reliable evidence, the appellant has been convicted He further submits that the prosecutrix, in her testimony before the trial court, has been declared hostile on several aspects and in fact, has improved her version in material particulars, which is in direct contradiction to her earlier statements Such improvements, it is urged, strike at the very root of her credibility. He further submits that the medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution The examining doctor categorically opined that there were no internal or external injuries found on the body of the prosecutrix. The hymen was noted to be old and ruptured, and the doctor specifically recorded that the prosecutrix 7 was habituated to sexual intercourse. This medical evidence, it is submitted, demolishes the prosecution story of forcible sexual assault. He further submits that the First Information Report was lodged with considerable delay Although the alleged incident is said to have taken place on 24.03.2018, the FIR was lodged on 28.3.2018. The delay, it is submitted, has not been explained satisfactorily, and this lapse renders the prosecution case doubtful It is also significant according to counsel, that the prosecutrix admittedly stayed with the appellant for about five days, during which period no alarm was raised by her The absence of any resistance or complaint during this period further supports the inference that the prosecutrix was a consenting party, both in accompanying the appellant and in establishing a physical relationship with him. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the minority of the prosecutrix by any reliable documentary evidence Though an ossification test was conducted, it is well-settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such a test is not conclusive and that there exists an error margin of two years on either side. Therefore, the benefit of doubt must ensure to the appellant in support of his submissions, counsel has placed reliance upon authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely Alamelu v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385, 8 Manoj v. State of Haryana (2022) 6 SCC 187 and Vinod Katara v. State of U.P. (2023) 15 SCC 210, wherein it has been consistently held that when the prosecution fails to prove the minority of the prosecutrix beyond reasonable doubt and when material contradictions and infirmities appear in the evidence, the conviction cannot be sustained. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions advanced by the counsel for the appellant and has submitted that on the date of incident the victim was minor and below 18 years of age which is proved by the (PW-9) Bhagtin Sinha who was posted as Headmistress in Government Girls Primary School, Kannewada, District- Balod. The Dakhil Khanij register vide Ex. P/16 was duly proved by the witnesses in which the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 16.3.2003. She being the minor girl, was taken by the appellant and also committed sexual intercourse with her, thereby committed offence of rape defined under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act. Considering the entire evidence the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant which is justified and the appeal of the present appellant is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9 9. In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix/victim we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution The prosecution has mainly relied upon the Dakhil Kharij register vide Ex. P/16 which is sought to be proved by the (PW-9) Bhagtin Sinha who was posted as Headmistress in Government Girls Primary School, Kannewada, District- Balod in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix/victim is recorded as 16.3.2003. 10. From the evidence, it appears that only the Dakhil Kharij register is available in support of date of birth of the prosecutrix/victim. 11. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs State of UP and Others reported in 2006 (5) SCC 584 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the following in Para 26: “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a 10 person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 12. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 11 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or 12 the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:- 13 "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a 14 minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2022) 8 SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:- “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of 15 the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 16 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 14. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer 17 certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C- 1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; 18 (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 19 15. In case of Manoj vs. State of Haryana, (2022) 6 SCC 187, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “18. Hence, it cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a unifrom standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on factors affecting the people of the different States of India. 19. Furthermore, this Court in a judgment in Jyoti Prakash Rai v a person has never been considered by courts of law as also by the medical scientist to be conclusive in nature… 20. The Court held as under (Jyoti Prakash Rai case. SCC pp. 228-29, paras 12-13) “12………………………… 13. A medical report determining the age of a person has never been considered by the courts of law as also by the medical scientists to be conclusive in nature. After a certain age it is difficult to determine the exact age of the person concerned on the basis of ossification test or other tests. This Court in Vishnu v State of Maharashtras opined (SCC p. 290 para 20) 20 20.It is urged before us by Mr Lalit that the determination of the age of the prosecutrix by conducting ossification test is scientifically proved and, therefore, the opinion of the doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of age should be accepted We are unable to accept this contention for the reasons that the expert medical evidence is not binding on the ocular evidence The opinion of the Medical Officer is to assist the court as he is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the Medical Officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact.' In the aforementioned situation, this Court in a number of judgments has held that the age determined by the doctors should be given flexibility of two years on either side.” 16. In case of Vinod Katara vs. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 210, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- 64. The bone ossification test is not an exact science that can provide us with the exact age of the person. As discussed above, the individual characteristics such as the growth rate of bones and skeletal structures can affect the accuracy of this method. This Court has 21 observed in Ram Suresh Singh v Prabhat Singh, and Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar. that the ossification test is not conclusive for age determination because it does not reveal the exact age of the person. but the radiological examination leaves a margin of two years on either side of the age range as prescribed by the test irrespective of whether the ossification test of multiple joints is conducted. The courts in India have accepted the fact that after the age of thirty years the ossification test cannot be relied upon for age determination. It is trite that the standard of proof for the determination of age is the degree of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt." 17. From a careful perusal and appreciation of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, including the testimonies of prosecution witnesses namely, PW-1 (the victim), PW-2 (the father), PW-3 (the mother) and PW-9 (the Head Mistress of the concerned school from whose custody the admission register was seized), it is evident that the prosecution has not been able to establish any conclusive proof with regard to the age of the prosecutrix/victim as the evidence so adduced does not sufficiently discharge the burden of proving the same beyond reasonable doubt. 22 18. From a meticulous examination of the evidence adduced before this Court it emerges that (PW-11), Dr. KK Shori, who conducted the ossification test of the prosecutrix/victim, has opined that the age of the prosecutrix/victim at the relevant time was approximately between 14 to 16 years. This expert testimony, based on scientific and medical evaluation, provides a crucial indication regarding the age of the prosecutrix/victim, thereby holding significant evidentiary value in the present proceedings. 19. If the margin of error of two years in determining the age of the prosecutrix/victim, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the authontative pronouncements of Manoj (supra) and Vinod Katara (supra), is applied to the present case, then the age of the prosecutrix/victim cannot be conclusively ascertained to be below 18 years, and as such, the benefit of doubt in respect of her minority necessarily goes in favour of the accused. 20. In light of the foregoing considerations and upon careful examination of the evidence on record, it must be concluded that the prosecutrix/victim cannot, with certainty, be regarded as a minor at the relevant date and time of the incident. 21. Now, with regard to the allegations of restraint, abduction and sexual intercourse, a careful perusal of the evidence reveals that the prosecutrix/victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant and 23 remained in his company for approximately 5 days it is apparent from the record that the prosecutrix/victim, without offering any resistance, accompanied the appellant to Chandrapur, Maharashtra where she stayed with the family of her uncle. Upon a close examination, the evidence furnished by the prosecutrix/victim cannot be regarded as of impeccable or sterling quality, it contains certain variations, omissions and apparent improvements over time. These inconsistencies, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances, suggest that the prosecutrix/victim acted as a consenting party. Moreover, having already determined that the prosecutrix/victim was not below the age of 18 years at the relevant time, it follows that her actions cannot be construed as non-consensual Consequently the conclusion that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant is supported by the material on record. 22. Upon careful examination of the materials on record including the medical evidence provided by the doctor who examined the prosecutrix/victim, it emerges that no visible injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix/victim. Further, the doctor's observations indicate that the hymenal tissue was not recent, and the medical findings suggest that the prosecutrix/victim had prior experience with sexual intercourse. 24 23. Considering the foregoing aspects it appears that the prosecutrix/victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant and, during this period traveled to several locations Ultimately, she reached Chandrapur, Maharashtra, where she remained for a duration of approximately 4 to 5 days. 24. In the circumstances of the case, it cannot be safely concluded that the appellant committed any offence against the will of the prosecutrix/victim On the contrary, the material on record indicates that the prosecutrix/victim voluntarily accompanied the appellant of her own accord and further consented to engage in sexual intercourse Such a scenario cannot be construed as constituting an offence as alleged or as held by the trial Court It is evident that the trial Court erred in law by falling to give due consideration to this crucial aspect of the matter while convicting the appellant under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. 2012. The oversight in evaluating the element of consent and voluntary participation has resulted in a miscarriage of justice in the appellant's conviction. 25. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the prosecutrix. However, there is an important caveat that the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim must inspire confidence. Even 25 though the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim is not required to be corroborated if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 26. In light of the overall quality, consistency and reliability of the evidence presented before this Court, it is concluded that the prosecutrix/victim cannot be regarded as a minor on the date and at the time of the alleged incident. Consequently having carefully examined the material on record it is evident that the allegations ascribed by the prosecution have not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, no offence as alleged can be said to have been committed by the accused. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances of the case, the offence under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act, would not be made out against the present appellant. 27. In that view of the matter the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant herein for the offences under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and under Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 and he is liable to be acquitted on the basis of benefit of dobut. Accordingly, the conviction and sentences of the appellant for the offence under 363, 366 and 342 of IPC and 26 under Section 6 of POCSO Act 2012 are hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. We direct that he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other case. 28. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. 29. In compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties of the like amount before the concerned court. The bond shall be effective for six months and include an undertaking that in case of filing a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment, the appellants will appear before the Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 30. Registry is directed to transmit the lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Raghu Jat