IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMP(M) No. 1888 of 2023 Decided on: 3.7.2025 ____________________________________________________ Bheemo and another ……….. applicants Versus Dhanu Ram respondent ____________________________________________________ Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the applicants : Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Parveen Chauhan, Advocate. ____________________________________________________ Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present applicant has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing a regular second appeal. There is a delay of 325 days in filing the present appeal. 2. The appeal in the case at hand was decided by the 1st Appellate Court on 14.9.2022. Certified copy whereof was applied on 17.7.2023 and the same was applied on 19.7.2023. It is thereafter that the present application alongwith the regular second appeal was filed on 8th August, 2023. 3. The sole reason given in the application being that applicant No.1 had suffered paralytic attack, on account thereof, he was admitted in the ITBP Hospital for treatment and as a consequence whereof applicant No.2 remained in attendance of applicant No.1 as he is the son of applicant No.1. Insofar as the application is concerned, in order to substantiate the aforesaid 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 plea, no material was appended alongwith the application filed for seeking condonation of delay. 4. In the response so filed by the non-applicant, it was categorically contended that the application filed for condonation of delay is bereft for specific details as it does not mention the date of admission of applicant No.1 to the hospital and date of discharge therefrom. 5. Other than the aforesaid, it has been categorically contended in the response filed that no documentary record of hospitalization has been appended alongwith. A rejoinder was filed by the application, wherein again no documentary record of hospitalization of applicant No.1 had been appended. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings carefully. 7. At the very outset a reference is made to case reported as LAO v. Katiji 1987 (2) SCC 107 wherein it is held as hereunder: “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 3 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passingon-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-nongrata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set 4 aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” (emphasis in original),. 8. In Katiji (supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight of is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800%. (see University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745, at page 758).” 9. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. 2. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute 5 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 10. Condonation of delay is a discretionary power available to courts. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned. 6 11. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under:- …...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure hat a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 12. The sufficient cause stated by the petitioner in the case at hand cannot be termed to be an “explanation” in fact what is being offered is an excuse, the same cannot be accepted 13. Further, the apex Court has emphasised that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the applicants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of 7 delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet. (see Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2025 arising out of SLP(C No. 17575 of 2023 titled Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran and another). 14. For the foregoing reasons, I see no infirmity to condone the delay in filing the appeal, therefore, the present application is dismissed. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge July 3, 2025 tarun