IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY. THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSANDAND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA WRIT PETITION NO: 46805 OF 2016 Between: A. Anil Kumar, S/o. A. Subba Rao, Aged about 49 years, R/o. 1/159, Sai Santhi Nilayam, Satyavathi Nagar, Chinnapadugupadu (M), Kovur - 524137, Sri PSR Nellore District. ...Petitioner AND 1. Life Insurance Corporation of India. 'Yogakshema', Jeevan Bima Marg, P.B. No 19953, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021. Rep. by its Chairman & Managing Director. 2. The Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Central Zone Office, 0pp. Secretariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad- 500 063. 3. The Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance, Corporation of India, Divisional Office, P.B. No.6, Jeevan Prakash, Dargamitta, Nellore. ...Respondents Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court be pleased to pass an Order, Writ or Direction are one in the nature of WRIT OF CERTIORARI quashing the A. Order dated 25-07-2016 passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Respondent No.2 and the Order dated 31-05-2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Respondent No.3 in penalising the petitioner with Dismissal of Service and recovery of loss of Rs.93.794.40 in terms of Regulations 39(1 )(g) and 39(1 )(c) respectively of LIC of India (Staff Regulations), 1960 may M: r fm B. Order dated 18-05-2004 passed by the 3'’'' Respondent by penalising the petitioner with Reduction of Basic Pay to the Minimum of the scale applicable to his cadre under Regulation 39 (1)(d) and Recovery of Rs.24,077.40 under Regulation 39(1) (c) of Staff Regulations as the same are arbitrary, illegal, perverse, contrary to the principles of natural justice and violative of Articles, 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India and C. Consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with back wages and all the other benefits that the petitioner is entitled to. r I.A. NO: 2 OF 2016fWPMP. NO: 57639 OF 20161 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased suspend the operation and effect of Order dated 25-072016 passed by Respondent No.2 and the Order dated 31-05-2004 passed by Respondent No.3 in penalising the petitioner with Dismissal of Service’ and recovery of loss of Rs.93,794.40 in terms of Regulations 39(1 )(g) and 39(1 )(c) respectively of LIC of India (Staff Regulations), 1960, pending disposal of the main writ petition. LA. NO: 1 OF 2016fWPMP. NO: 57638 OF 20161 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased suspend the Order dated 18-05-2004 passed by the Respondent by penalising the petitioner with "Reduction of Basic Pay to the Minimum of the scale applicable to his cadre" under Regulation 39(1 )(d) and Recovery of Rs.24,077.40 under Regulation 39(1 )(c) of Staff Regulations. 3rd ^ LA. NO: 3 OF 2017(WVMP. NO: 4105 OF 7^7} Between: 1. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 'Yogakshema', P.B. No 19953, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021 & Managing Director. 2. The Zor^l Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Central Zone Office, 0pp. Secretariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad- 500 063. 3. The Senior^Divisional Manager, Life Insurance, Corporation of India, Divisional Office, P.B. No.6, Jeevan Prakash, Dargamitta, Nellore. ...Petitioners/Respondents Jeevan Bima Marg, Rep. by its Chairman AND o' Aged about 49 years, R/o. 1/159 Sai Chinnapadugupadu (M), Kovur-’ 0Z41 j/, Sri PSR Nellore District. ...Respondent/Petitioner Petition under Section 151 CPC stated in the affidavit filed i pleased to vacate the interim order granted on 02-01-2017 in W.P.M.P. No. 57639 of 2016 in W.P.No. 46805 of 2016 in the interest of justice. I.A. NO: 2 OF 2017rWVMP. NO: 4104 OF 2017) Between: PR 'Yogakshema-, Jeevan Bima Marg, P.B. No 19953, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021. Rep. by its Chairman & Managing Director. 2. The Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Central Zone Office, 0pp. Secretariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad- 500 063. 3. The Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance, Corporation of India Divisional Office, P.B. No.6, Jeevan Prakash, Dargamitta, Nellore. ...Petitioners/Respondents praying that in the circumstances in support of the petition, the High Court may be AND A. Anil Kumar, S/o. A. Subba Rao, Aged about 49 years, R/o. 1/159 Santhi Nilayam, Satyavathi Nagar, Chinnapadugupadu (M) Kovur- 524137, Sri PSR Nellore District. Sai ...Respondent/Petitioner Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim order granted on 02-01-2017 in W.P.M.P. No. 57638 of 2016 in W.P.No. 46805 of 2016 in the interest of justice. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI N.JEEVAN KUMAR Counsel for the Respondents: SRI SINGAM SRINIVASA RAO The Court made the following order: 1 APHC010344832016 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3333] FRIDAY ,THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSANDAND TWENTYFIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA WRIT PETITION NO: 46805/2016 Between: A. Anil Kumar, ...PETITIONER AND Life Insurance Corporation Of India and Others Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.N JEEVAN KUMAR Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.SINGAM SRINIVASA RAO The Court made the following: ...RESPONDENT{S) 2 if r ORDER: This writ petition came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: ....to pass an Order, Writ or Direction are one in the nature of WRIT OF CERTIORARI quashing the A. Order dated 25-07-2016 passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Respondent No.2 and the Order dated 31-05-2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Respondent No.3 in penalising the petitioner with Dismissal of Service and recovery of loss of Rs.93,794.40 in terms of Regulations 39(1)(g) and 39(1 ){c) respectively of LIC of India (Staff Regulations), 1960 Respondent by penalising the petitioner with Reduction of Basic Pay to the Minimum of the scale applicable to his cadre under Regulation 39 (1)(d) and Recovery of Rs.24,077.40 under Regulation 39(1) (c) of Staff Regulations as the same are arbitrary, illegal, perverse, contrary to the principles of natural justice and violative of Articles, 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India and C. Consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with back wages and all the other benefits that the petitioner is entitled to and to pass” B. Order dated 18-05-2004 passed by the 3rd The petitioner herein was initially appointed as typist in 3rd 2. respondent’s office on 05.03.1991 and was later promoted to the post of Cashier on 07.02.1998 and is discharging the duties ever since. While he was working at Nellore, he was served an order dated 28.02.2000 of the 3rd respondent wherein it was alleged that the petitioner has indulged in fraudulent misappropriation of premium collections and accordingly was placed under suspension with effect from 29.02.2000. Thereafter, on 05.11.2001 the petitioner was issued the 1st charge sheet alleging that he has misappropriated the amount of Rs.93,794.70 in respect of 25 transactions, to which the petitioner has filed a reply on 18.12.2001 denying the allegations levelled against him. On Kumar was appointed after conducting enquiries has submitted his the petitioner has failed to he has acted in 28.12.2001, one Mr. K. Kishore as the enquiry officer by the disciplinary authority who, report on 25.04.2002 opining that serve the corporation honestly and faithfully and that a manner prejudicial to good conduct and thereby committed breach of regulations 21 and 24 read with regulation 39(1) of the staff regulations. The petitioner has also submitted a reply to the said report affirming that there was no misconduct on his part. However on 26.12.2002, the petitioner was issued show cause notice by the 3rd respondent as to why he should not be held guilty of the charges contained the said charge sheet and why the proposed penalty of ■Dismissal' should not be imposed upon him, for which the in petitioner has submitted a reply on 15.01.2003 3. Subsequently, the petitioner was issued 2"'* charge sheet dated 30.03.2003 by the 3rd respondent that another six transactions in addition to the earlier charge sheet alleging amounting to Rs.24,077.40 were found to be misappropriated by the petitioner and accordingly, one Mr. B.S.R. Murthy was appointed as the enquiry officer who, after conducting enquiry has submitted his report against the petitioner herein, to which the petitioner has submitted his the petitioner was issued another show as to why the petitioner reply denying the same and thereafter, cause notice dated 20.04.2004 by the 3rd respondent should not be held guilty of the charges contained in the 2nd charge sheet and why the proposed punishment of “reduction of basic pay to the minimum of the scale applicable to his cadre under regulation 39(1 )(d) and recovery of Rs.24.077.40 under Regulation 39(1 )(e) of Staff Regulations” should not be imposed on him. While the matter stood thus, a fresh show cause notice in supercession of the 1st show cause notice was issued by the 3rdrespondent on 30.04.2004 seeking explanation from the petitioner as to why he should not be held guilty of the charge contained in the 1st charge sheet and why the proposed penalty should not be imposed; for which the petitioner has also submitted a reply contending that issuance of two show cause notices and one final order with two separate punishments basing on same regulations for the same alleged offences is in violation of principles of natural justice. Thereafter, on 18.05.2004, the 3rd respondent has passed final order in pursuance of the 2nd charge sheet wherein it is held that the petitioner is guilty of the charges leveled against him and a penalty of “Reduction of basic pay to the minimum of scale applicable to of Rs.24,077.40 under his cadre under Regulation. 39(1 )(d) and recovery Regulation 39(1 )(c) of Staff regulations” was imposed on him. On 31.05.2004, the 3rd respondent has passed another final order in pursuance of the 1st charge sheet wherein the proposed punishment was imposed on him and the same was 5 confirmed by the 2nd respondent in the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein vide order dated 28.09.2004. 4. Aggrieved by the orders of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, the petitioner has filed W.P.No.23507 of 2004 which was disposed of on 17.03.2016 observing as under: ...In view of the above, without going into the merits of the case, I feel that ends of justice would be met if the matter is remanded back to the 3rd respondent/appellant for disposal afresh, after giving sufficient opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In the circumstances, the impugned Order dated 28-09-2004 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the 3rd respondent/appellate authority for disposal afresh. In accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order,...” In compliance to the same, the 2nd respondent has addressed a letter dated 19.05.2016 to the petitioner, directing him to attend personal hearing on 30.06.2016 and accordingly, the petitioner has submitted written submissions and explained his grievance. However, ignoring the submission of the petitioner, the 2nd respondent vide orders dated 25.07.2016 has confirmed the order dated 5. 28.09.2004. Aggrieved by the same, the present petition is filed. When the writ petition came up for admission on 02.01.2017, this Court has passed the following interim order: 6. 6 “Pending further orders, there shall be stay of recovery of amounts pursuant to order dt. 25-07-2016 passed by 2""' respondent. ” 7. The respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that while the petitioner was working as a cashier in BO-II, Nellore, he has collected cash towards premium in respect of 25 transactions, but has issued original premium receipt to the policy holders without accounting the same in the books of the respondent corporation. Then the petitioner has reprinted the receipts with the same transaction numbers for producing the same before the core team member for cancellation of receipts so that the amount pertaining to the cancelled transactions will not be included in the day’s total of the cash book. Thus, the petitioner has misused the facility of reprinting and has misappropriated an amount of Rs.93,794.70/- for which, the petitioner was issued a charge sheet dated 05.11.2001 subsequently, as the charges leveled against the petitioner were established during the enquiry, a show cause notice dated 26.12.2002 was issued proposing to levy a penalty of ‘Dismissal’ in terms of regulation 39(1 )(g) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. It is further stated that after issuance of the charge sheet dated 8. 05.11.2001, six more transactions were unearthed where the petitioner has collected the premium without accounting the same and has reprinted the receipts and cancelled. As such, on 30.06.2003, the petitioner was issued another charge sheet for misappropriation of Rs.24,077.40. Accordingly, another show cause notice dated 20.04.2004 was issued to the petitioner proposing to levy a penalty of 'Reduction in Basic Pay to the minimum of the Scale and Recovery of Rs.24077.40 Ps in terms of Regulations 39(1 )(d) and 39(1 Xc) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Thereafter, in supersession of the earlier show cause notice dated 26.12.2002, a revised show cause notice dated 30.04.2004 was issued against the 1^‘ charge sheet dated 05.11.2001 to include the recovery of monetary loss of Rs.93,794.70 in terms of Regulation 39(1 )(c) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 while maintaining the penalty of ‘Dismissal’ which already proposed earlier. was 9. After considering the replies submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority passed orders dated 18.05.2004 and 31.05.2004 with and 1®* charge sheets dated 30.06.2003 and 05.11.2001, confirming the penalties proposed in the respective show cause notices. Though the misconduct committed by the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 30.06.2003 attracts the penalty of dismissal besides recovery of financial loss, if the imposed, the charge sheet dated 05.11.2001 becomes infructuous in which case the financial loss of Rs.93,794.70 cannot be recovered. The charges framed in both the charge sheets dated 05.11.2001 and 30.06.2003 are in respect of different transaction, hence, each charge sheet has to be dealt with separately nd respect to the 2 same is iA 8 r and hence, two different punishments were imposed on the petitioner. The mere fact that the audit and inspection teams have verified the register and the procedures followed in the department without pointing out any discrepancy part of the petitioner cannot be taken as a basis, since the charges of misappropriation of the funds of the respondent corporation have been established during the enquiry proceedings. The petitioner has fraudulently misappropriated the funds of the respondent corporation cancelling receipts of 3T cash transactions by reprinting the receipts after issuing the original receipts to the customers. Hence, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petition, the disciplinary authority has passed orders on 18.05.2004 and 31.05.2004 confirming the proposed penalties. on Challenging the order dated 31.05.2004 of the 3'^^ respondent, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the 2"^^ respondent wherein, vide order dated 25.07.2016, the 2^^ respondent has confirmed the order passed by the 3”^^ respondent. Against the order dated 25.07.2016 passed by the 2'^'^ respondent, the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy of Memorial to the Chairman in terms of regulation 49 of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The petitioner, without taking recourse to the said remedy, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Hence, requested to dismiss the writ petition as it is devoid of merits. 10. 9 11. Heard Mr. N. Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Singam Srinivasa Rao, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent corporation. 12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner had reiterated the facts of the writ petition and contended that the petitioner has not violated any of the LIC of India (Staff Regulations), 1960 and referred to a circular bearing Ref.F&A/Cir.No. 18/97-98 dated 21.01.1998 which stipulates under: as “the HOD (Accounts) would be held accountable for the total receipts stationery and should exercise adequate control over blank or damaged stationery” and “the HOD (Accounts) of Branches are advised to strictly implement the above instructions to have better control Stationery. ” Learned counsel has contended that the onus of surveillance and maintenance of the receipt stationery is on HOD (Accounts) and the said circular envisages that the number of receipt stationery used during the day should be reconciled with the total number of cash transactions of the day and that scrupulously following the circular, the petitioner has submitted all the receipts along with the transactions to the HOD (Accounts) every day and no discrepancy on part of the petitioner has been made. The petitioner, being a cashier the Front End Receipt over or error 10 is not authorized to cancel any of the recorded transactions and it is the HOD (Accounts) who is authorized to cancel the same with proper reasons after enquiring the cashier on the same day itself. As alleged, th.e reprinting of the receipts would become inevitable to overcome certain technical defects such as improper printing of receipts, mutilated receipts and sometimes those printed due to misfiguring of options; such receipts are handed over to the HOD at the end of the cash hours for accountability of receipts. After verifying the total transactions for the day, the record and information gathered on that particular day would be recorded in the Daily Cash Book (DOB) which is closed after authentication of HOD. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that during the tenure of the petitioner as cashier there were audit and inspection teams to the department who have verified the register and the procedures followed in the department, but, they have not pointed out any discrepancy on the part of the petitioner as a cashier. However, the petitioner was issued a suspension notice 13. on 28.02.2000 and a charge sheet was subsequently issued on 05.11.2001, which is after 1 year 8 months from the date of suspension, which in fact is against the principles of natural justice. He further contended that the 2 respondent has committed a gross error in not considering that the issuance of a of the first show-cause notice nd fresh show-cause notice in supersession 11 enhancing the punishment when the enquiry is already conducted for the charges framed in pursuance of the first show cause notice is in violation of principles of natural justice and fundamental rights as guaranteed under the Constitution of India. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the circular dated 21.01.1998 has argued that the onus of surveillance and maintenance of the receipt stationery is on the HOD who ought to have been called as witness for examination, but, neither the HOD was presented as witness nor the original register containing the day-to-day receipts were put forth for examination by the petitioner. The 3"'^ respondent, to establish misappropriation on the part of the petitioner, ought to have taken the ‘Register of Day to Day Usage of Receipt Stationery’ maintained by the petitioner as evidence and to corroborate that the said register is not properly maintained by the petitioner, the concerned HOD ought to have be enquired as one of the witnesses. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner, relied upon a judgment reported in Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India, wherein the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of delay in filing a charge sheet. He further stated that the petitioner was suspended from employment on 28.02.2000, but, the charge sheet was issued on 05.11.2001 which is after one year and eight months, which 12 admittedly is against the principles of natural justice. The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgment has observed as under: “.. .currency of a suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is no served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension.” Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that 16. the appellate authority, while passing the impugned order, has failed to appreciate the settled law that if a party in possession of the best evidence which would throw light on controversy withholds it or fails to appear as a witness, the Court can draw adverse inference against him and the presumption under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 comes into effect. The appellate authority erred in holding that non-production of HOD as witness in the enquiry proceedings to certify the statements of the cashier does not absolve the petitioner of his responsibility of maintaining integrity, acting honestly and faithfully in discharging duties. Hence, requested to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned order dated 25.07.2016 passed by the 2^^ respondent and the earlier orders dated 18.05.2004, 31.05.2004 by which the petitioner was issued two punishments. 13 17. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand, has reiterated the contents of the counter affidavit and has stated that initially on 28.02.2000, the petitioner was issued the order of suspension as per Regulation 36(1 )(a) of the Lie of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 with effect from 29.02.2000 for the alleged fraudulent misappropriation of premium collections. Subsequently, 05.11,2001, the petitioner was issued a charge sheet alleging misappropriation of the amount Rs.93.794.70 in respect of 25 transactions, to which the petitioner has submitted his reply denying the same. Thereafter, an enquiry officer appointed, who after conducting a detailed enquiry has submitted on was a report opining that the petitioner is guilty. The petitioner was also given the opportunity of submitting a reply to the aforesaid report, after receiving which, the S'"* a show cause notice dated 26.12.2002 respondent has issued seeking explanation from the petitioner as to why the proposed penalty of 'Dismissal' should not be imposed on him. Thereafter, on 30.04,2004, in supersession to the earlier show oause notice dated 26.12.2002, the 3'" respondent has issued another show cause notice as to why the petitioner should not be held guilty of the charge contained in the charge sheet and why the proposed penalty 'Recovery of Rs.93,794.70 under Regulation 39(1 )(e) of Staff Regulations” i addition to the penalty of ‘Dismissal’ should of in not be imposed. To the said show cause notice, the petitioner has submitted his reply contending that iissuance of 14 two charge sheets and two show cause notices and one final order with two separate punishments in same regulations for the same alleged offences leveled against the petitioner is in violation of principles of natural justice. Considering the same, the 3'^'^ respondent has passed the final order on 31.05.2004 holding that the petitioner is guilty of the charges contained in the charge sheet and show cause notice and accordingly, the proposed punishment was imposed on him. Learned Standing Counsel has contended that aggrieved by the said 18. order dated 31.05.2004, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the disciplinary authority on 23.06.2004, which was carefully considered with relevant records by the authority and vide final order dated 28.09.2004, the order dated 31.05.2004 was confirmed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected. Challenging the said order dated 28.09.2004 and the order dated 31.05.2004, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of a writ petition vide W.P.No.23507 of 2004 wherein this Court, vide order dated 17.03.2016 has observed as under: “...In view of the above, without going into the merits of the case, I feel that ends of justice would be met if the matter is remanded back to the 3rd respondent/appellant for disposal afresh, after giving sufficient opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In the circumstances, the impugned Order dated 28-09-2004 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the 3rd respondent/appellate authority r“ 15 for disposal afresh, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order,..." 19. It is further contended that in pursuance of the aforesaid order, the petitioner has submitted a letter dated 07.05.2016 authority to re-appreciate his requesting the appellate case; accordingly, the appellate authority has allowed the petitioner for personal hearing and after considering all the relevant documents and facts, the 2^^ respondent has confirmed 31.05.2014. the order dated 20. Denying the contention of the petitioner that the impugned order suffers from many legal infirmities, learned Standing Counsel has contended that disciplinary proceedings are quasi judicial in nature where the proof of charges in a departmental enquiry is based on the principles of preponderance of probability and not on the proof beyond reasonable doubt. Learned Standing Counsel further contended that after issuance of the 1®‘ charge sheet dated 05.11.2001 has SIX more transaction were identified wherein premium was collected and without accounting for the same, receipts were reprinted and thereafter cancelled warranted issuance of the second charge sheet dated 30.06.2003. As the charges framed in both the charge, sheets dated 05.11.2001 which and 30.06.2003 are in respect of different transactions, each charge sheet was to be dealt with separately and the penalty also has to be imposed inj^espect of each charge 16 sheet independently besides recovery of financial loss. Hence, two show cause notices and two final orders dated 18.05.2004, 31.05.2004 were issued after duly conducting enquiry proceedings, separately in each case. While denying the contention of the petitioner with regard to the cancelled receipts, learned Standing Counsel stated that if at all there is mis- fingering of the option, there is no need to cancel the entire transaction but the reprinted receipts itself could have been cancelled. But, the petitioner had cancelled the entire transaction which clearly indicates the malafide intention of the petitioner to misuse the reprint option and defraud the respondent corporation. The petitioner’s contention that all cancellations were verified and the cash was authenticated by the HOD (Accounts) is wrong as the collections for the day would be verified with the respective cash books, but, the cancelled transactions would not appear in the said cash book. Learned Standing Counsel has vehemently argued that mere fact that the audit and inspection teams have verified the register and the procedures followed in the department and have not pointed out any discrepancy on the part of the petitioner cannot be taken as basis as the charges of misappropriation of the funds of the respondent corporation have been established during the enquiry proceedings. While concluding his arguments, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that against the impugned order passed by the 2”*^ respondent, there is an efficacious remedy 21. 17 Of Memorial to the Chairman i Regulations, 1960 and further contended that the said alternative remedy, has straight the present petition is liable to be dismissed m terms of regulation 49 of LIC of India (Staff) the petitioner, instead of availing away approached this Court and hence. 22. In Pravin Kumar V. Union of India wherein as under at paragraph Nos.25, 26 and 28; the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed ‘25. The learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidence on record with the intention of highlighting We feel that such an lacunae and contradictions, exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings ,s quite high. The power ofjudicial review discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power eyeroised by a departmental appellate authority It would be gainsaid that jUdical review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision Itself Judical review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. result in significant injustice; or in 26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a three-judge Bench of a this Court C. Chatunvedi v. Union of India in the following extract: (SCO pp. 759-60. in B. paras 12-13) ■12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power ofjudicial review Is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When conducted on charges of misconduct by an inquiry is a public servant, the CourtfThbunai concerned is to determine whether the i, whether rules of natural justice conclusions are based inquiry ivas held by a competent officer or are complied with. Whether the findings on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the or power power and authority to reach a finding of fact conclusion. Bui trial finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, or T 18 technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/ Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the evidence, proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/ Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at SCR pp. 728-29 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers g from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 21. XXX 28. It is thus well settled that the constitutional courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority. Their junsdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority." On a perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it can be understood that a judicial review in disciplinary proceedings is not an appeal from 23. 19 the decision itself, but it is a review of the process through which the decision was taken. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual i: treated fairly and that proper procedures were followed, but it is not necessary to determine whether the authority’s conclusion IS was correct in the eyes of the Court. In a case where inquiry is conducted regarding allegations of misconduct by a public servant, the Court is primarily concerned with whether the inquiry was conducted by a competent authority and whether the rules of natural justice adhered to. It can also be understood that the Court were is not tasked with re- appreciating the evidence or substituting its own findings, but, however, it can intervene where the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in a manner that violates natural justice, statutory rules, or where the conclusions drawn are not supported by any evidence. 24. In view of the aforesaid judgment, I would like to examine the case on hand. The petitioner, initially was appointed as a typist in the year 1991 and later was promoted to cashier in the year 1998, subsequently, he was suspended in the year 2000 due to allegations of misappropriating premium collections. As such, a charge sheet was issued in 2001 accusing him of misappropriating Rs.93,794.70 in 25 transactions. After misconduct, and a show-cause notice an enquiry, he was found guilty of was issued in the year 2002 proposing dismissal. A second charge sheet was issued in 2003 accusing him of 20 misappropriating Rs.24,077.40. Despite his denial, he was penalized with a reduction in pay and a recovery of the misappropriated amount. When the petitioner has challenged these orders before this court, the case was remanded for fresh disposal in the year 2016, despite submitting written explanations, the 2nd respondent upheld the earlier orders in July 2016. 25. On a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the case and as well as the circular dated 21.01.1998, it is evident that the responsibility for surveillance and maintenance of receipt stationery lies with the Head of the Department (HOD) of Accounts. The relevant circular referred earlier specifies that the number of receipt stationery used must be reconciled with the total cash transactions each day. The petitioner alleges that he was not authorized to . cancel any recorded transactions; such cancellations were solely within the HOD’S authority, who would verify the matter with the cashier on the same day. Reprinting of receipts was sometimes necessary due to technical issues, such as improper printing and these receipts were handed over to the HOD for accountability at the end of the cash hours. After verifying all transactions, the record was documented in the Daily Cash Book (DOB), which was closed after the HOD’S authentication. However, the HOD was not examined, and the register containing daily receipts was not produced for examination during the course of enquiry. The counsel argued that to establish misappropriation, the "Register of 21 Day to Day Usage of Receipt Stationery" maintained by the petitioner should have been taken into consideration as evidence and the HOD should have been questioned to corroborate that the register was properly maintained. Had the Head of the Department (HOD) and the register containing 26. the daily receipts been presented as witnesses and evidence during the enquiry proceedings, the outcome would likely have been significantly different. The "Register of Day to Day Usage of Receipt Stationery" was a critical document, as it would have directly provided a clear and accurate record of the transactions, including the usage of receipt stationery on a daily basis. This register, meticulously maintained by the petitioner, was designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and proper documentation of cash transactions. If it had been examined during the enquiry, it could have substantiated the petitioner’s claim that there was no discrepancy or misappropriation on his part. As the individual responsible for overseeing and maintaining the receipt stationery, the HOD is the key witness who could have verified whether the register was properly maintained and whether the procedures for handling the receipts were followed as per the regulations. The HOD would have been able to testify to the accuracy of the daily reconciliations between the receipts and cash transactions, as well as confirm the correctness of the process of reprinting receipts for technical issues, which was a routine and necessary procedure^This testimony would have 22 provided crucial evidence that the petitioner was acting in accordance with the departmental guidelines and that the alleged misappropriations were not a result of any error or omission on his part. Moreover, failure to call the HOD as a witness would itself mean that 27. the enquiry lacked the crucial validation of the procedures. Without the HOD’s testimony, there was no clear explanation or verification of the process followed for reconciling receipts, canceling erroneous transactions, or managing the receipt stationery. This omission deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to demonstrate that the responsibility for monitoring and overseeing these procedures lies with the HOD, but not with the petitioner. By not presenting the register and the HOD as witnesses, the enquiry was left with a substantial gap in the evidence, leading to an incomplete and unjust evaluation of the petitioner’s actions. The absence of both the HOD’s testimony and the register created a situation where the petitioner was unfairly placed in a position where his defense could not be properly substantiated. The failure to produce these critical pieces of evidence undermined the fairness of the proceedings, as they could have conclusively demonstrated that the petitioner was following established procedures and that any discrepancies or technical issues related to receipt printing were not due to any fault or negligence on his part. As a result, the enquiry proceedings, had they included these witnesses and evidence, would 23 that would have exonerated the have likely led to a different outcome—one petitioner of the charges of misappropnation. Even otherwise, on a perusal of the impugned order dated be understood that the role of the appellate authority is to 28. 25.07.2016, it can review the proceedings in a fair and impartial manner, ensuring that the the facts, evidence, and legal the appellate authority failed to disciplinary action initiated is justified based on principles. However, in the instant case discharge this critical responsibility and simply affirmed the dismissal order. The appellate authority, instead of carefully examining the grounds presented by the petitioner, such as non-production of the register and the HOD as witnesses, chose to simply accept the conclusions of the inquiry officer without scrutiny. This is a clear violation of the petitioner’s right to a fair hearing and undermines the credibility of the appellate process. The appellate authority is expected to address the specific issues raised by the petitioner, provide a reasoned not sufficient to overturn or modify the explanation of why those issues were and demonstrate that the principles of natural justice were upheld decision, throughout the inquiry process. By merely affirming the inquiry officers findings without detailed consideration of the petitioner’s appeal, the appellate authority has failed to exercise its duty as an independent reviewing body. It should have provided a comprehensive response to the points raised, considering whether r 24 evidence affected the fairness of the the procedural flaws and lack of proper A detailed and reasoned finding based on the grounds presented in the inquiry, appeal is not just a procedural requirement, but also an essential safeguard to ensure fairness in the disciplinary process. In view of the above discussion, this writ petition is allowed and the respondent for fresh consideration of the aforesaid observations made by this Court. The said 29. nd matter is remanded back to the 2 keeping in view the shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of same, process receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned proceedings dated 25.07.2016 are hereby set-aside. No costs, sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Sd/- M. SRINIVAS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR 30. As a //TRUE COPY// N OFFICER SE' To, 1. The Chairman & Managing Director, Life Insurance Corporation of India 'Yogakshema', Jeevan Bima Marg, P.B. No 19953, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400 021. 2. The Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, South Central Zone Office, 0pp. Secretariat, Saifabad, Hyderabad- 500 063. 3 The Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance, Corporation of India, Divisional Office, P.B. No.6, Jeevan Prakash, Dargamitta, Nellore. 4. One CC to Sri N Jeevan Kumar, Advocate [OPUC] 5. One CC to Sri Singam Srinivasa Rao, Advocate [OPUC] 6. Two CD Copies RAM 1 W*GH COURT DATED:21/03/2025 ORDER p *^P-No.46805 yo g 0! APK 20?5 |)i Of 2016 >/'■ ■ST . Current Saction ^ WP COSTS