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2025 DAILYLAW 2440 (RAJ)

MATADEEN v. STATE

CRLA/22/1995 · 2025-05-21

Anil Kumar Upman

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

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[2025:RJ-JP:22873] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 22/1995 Matadeen S/o Shri Arjun Singh, R/o Village Gopipura, Tehsil Kotputli, District Jaipur. --Accused-Appellant Versus The State of Rajasthan through Government Advocate. ----Non-Appellant. For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ran Singh For Respondent(s) : Mr. Tapesh Agarwal, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN J U D G M E N T 21/05/2025 1. The appellant herein has been convicted and sentenced as below vide judgment dated 23.12.1994 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kotputli, Jaipur in Sessions Case No.106/1992:- Offence Sentence Fine Default Sentence 326 IPC Three years’ R.I. Rs.2,000/- 06 month’s R.I. 324 IPC One year’s R.I. ------ -------- Both sentences shall concurrently 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 02.03.1991, first informant/complainant Guman Kanwar appeared before SHO Kotputli who recorded her parcha bayan (Ex.P/14). In her statement, she stated that they are three sisters and for four brothers namely Laxman Singh, Rewat Singh, Matandin (accused appellant herein) and Malsingh. Her in-law’s house is situated in [2025:RJ-JP:22873] (2 of 6) [CRLA-22/1995] village Kothiya. On 03.03.1991, there was a function in the homes of her brothers Rewat Singh and Malsingh and therefore, she and her sister Meera was invited by her brother Malsingh. On her invitation, they went to their house. She further stated that her brother Matadin was not happy with their presence and therefore, he made ruckus and disturbance in the function. He brought a sword from his house and inflicted a blow with the sword on the person of her sister-in-law (bhabhi) Gulab. He also inflicted a blow with the sword on her wife. She also stated in her parchabayan that Matadin caused injury on the person of Sikhadevi and Ridmal with the sword and set the house of Shyodan Singh and himself on fire. 3. On the basis of the above report, FIR No.80/1991 Police Station Kotputli, District Jaipur for offences under Sections 307 and 436 IPC was registered and investigation was commenced. On completion of investigation, police filed charge-sheet for offences under Sections 324, 326, 307 & 436 IPC in the court of Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kotputlil, wherefrom the case was committed to the court of learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Kotputli, Jaipur for trial. 4. During the course of trial, prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited certain documents. Upon being questioned the accused appellant under Sec. 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant admitted the fact regarding causing injury on the hand of Smt. Gulab Devi but he denied rest of the allegations. During the course of trial, out of three injured namely Chando Devi, Gulab Devi and Ridmal, injured Smt. Gulab Devi entered into compromise with the appellant. An application for compromise and [2025:RJ-JP:22873] (3 of 6) [CRLA-22/1995] attestation qua offence under Section 324 IPC was filed by the appellant and injured Gulab Devi, which was accepted by the learned trial court and accordingly, the accused appellant was acquitted for the charge punishable under Section 324 of IPC to the extent of injured Gulab Devi only. However, trial was conducted for remaining charges. 5. After conclusion of trial, considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the material available on record, the learned trial court vide judgment dated 23.12.1994, convicted and sentenced the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 326 and 324 IPC. However, the appellant was acquitted for charges punishable under Sections 307 and 436 IPC. 6. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence vide impugned judgment dated 23.12.1994, the appellant filed this criminal appeal before this Court. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently and fervently contends that learned trial court has erred in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. He further contends that the learned trial court did not appreciate the material available on record in right and correct perspective and committed perversity in convicting the appellant. He also submits that there are several infirmities and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and as such, the conviction based on such evidence is not sustainable and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. His alternative submission is that the occurrence relates back to year 1991 and since then, he is facing agony and trauma of protracted trial. Presently, the appellant is of 66 years. He had remained in custody in connection with the present case for nearly [2025:RJ-JP:22873] (4 of 6) [CRLA-22/1995] one month and 21 days. He thus, prays that the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant for the aforesaid offences may be reduced to the period already undergone by him. 9. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial court has rightly recorded conviction of the accused appellant, which need not to be interfered with by this court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction for the reason that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of sentence. 10. I have heard and considered the arguments advanced at bar and perused the record. 11. After hearing submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and learned Public Prosecutor and perusing the judgment passed by the learned trial court and material available on record, I am of the considered opinion that the trial court has rightly recorded conviction of the accused appellant for the aforementioned offences. Learned trial court has not committed any illegality or perversity in recording conviction of the accused appellant for the aforesaid offences and same does not require any interference by this Court. Now comes to the alternative submission of learned counsel for the appellant for releasing the accused appellant on the period already undergone by him. 12. This Court is conscious of the judgments rendered in, Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 and Haripada Das Vs. State of W.B. (1998) 9 SCC 678 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:22873] (5 of 6) [CRLA-22/1995] Alister Anthony Pareira (Supra) “There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances.” Haripada Das (Supra) “…considering the fact that the respondent had already undergone detention for some period and the case is pending for a pretty long time for which he had suffered both financial hardship and mental agony and also considering the fact that he had been released on bail as far back as on 17-1-1986, we feel that the ends of justice will be met in the facts of the case if the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone…” 13. The matter pertains to an incident which occurred in the year 1991 and this criminal appeal is pending since 1995. The appellant had remained in custody for nearly one month and 21 days. The accused appellant also suffered the agony and trauma of protracted trial. Thus, looking to the over-all circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper if the sentence awarded by the trial court is reduced to the period already undergone by him. However, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the fine part, imposed upon the appellant by the impugned judgment. Six months’ time is given to the appellant to deposit the same. If the appellant fails to deposit the same within [2025:RJ-JP:22873] (6 of 6) [CRLA-22/1995] the given time, he shall serve default sentence, as ordered by impugned judgment. 14. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is partly allowed. While maintaining the appellant’s conviction for the aforesaid offences and fine part along with default sentence, the sentences awarded by the learned trial court for the aforesaid offences are hereby reduced to the period already undergone by him. He is on bail. He need not to surrender. His bail bonds are discharged. 15. The record of trial Court be sent back forthwith. (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J CHARU SONI /65