1 2025:CGHC:8809-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 172 of 2023 1 - Manoj Yadav @ Bhatkhauha S/o Late Shyamrath Yadav Aged About 28 Years R/o Irrigation Colony, I.T.I. Colony (Jhopdi), Polic Chowki-Rampur, Police Station Kotwali, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Jeetu Tandon S/o Panchram Tandon Aged About 24 Years R/o Irrigation Colony, I.T.I. Colony (Jhopdi), Police Chowki Rampur, Police Station Kotwali Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Chowki Manikpur Polic Station Kotwali, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Shri R.V. Rajwade, Advocate. For Respondent : Shri Nitansh Jaiswasl, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 20.02.2025 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.10.2022 passed by the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Korba, in Sessions Case No.71/2019 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under : Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2025.02.24 16:54:01 +0530 2 Conviction Sentence 397 IPC RI for 10 years with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for 6 months 302/34 IPC Life imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional RI for six months. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the deceased Pradeep Kumar Bhagat was admitted to District Hospital Korba in injured condition by the persons of Dial-112 Service on 30.04.2019, where he died during treatment on 01.05.2019. Merg intimation Ex.P/17 was sent by the Doctor from District Hospital, Korba to the police at Police at police out post District Hospital Korba from where it was transferred to jurisdictional police outpost Manikpur and numbered merg intimation Ex.P/18 was recorded. The inquest Ex.P/12 of the dead body of deceased was prepared in presence of witnesses. The dead body of deceased was identified by witnesses and also by Ashok Kumar Bhagat, the brother of deceased, identification memo Ex.P/13 was prepared. The dead body was sent for its postmortem to District Hospital, Korba, where PW-9 Dr. G.S. Jatra conducted postmortem of the dead body of deceased and noticed following antemortem injuries : • Abrasion 2x1 cm over left cheek; • Lacerated wound 1x1/2 cm on the right side of cheek; • contusion 3x2 cm right side of the chest anteriorly and middle part 6 cm below from right nipple; • contusion 4x3 cm left anteriorly and middle part of chest 5 cm below from left nipple; On internal examination, hemorrhage was found on the right side of chest at the level of 7th 8th & 9th ribs and the said ribs were found, 7th & 8th ribs of left side was also found fractured. Liver and Spleen were also found ruptured and massive blood present in the abdominal cavity. 3 3. After postmortem of the body, the doctor on the basis of findings of postmortem examination, opined that cause of death is severe injuries on the vital organs of abdomen and chest and his postmortem report is Ex.P/20. Bloodstained and plain soil was seized from the spot vide seizure memo Ex.P/2. Spot map Ex.P/3 was prepared by the Patwari, whereas Ex.P/22 by the Police. During merg inquiry, the accused Manoj Yadav was taken into custody on 03.05.2019 and his memorandum statement Ex.P/4 was recorded in which he disclosed that he along with other co-accused have committed various offences. On the basis of his memorandum statement, one mobile phone was seized from him vide seizure memo Ex.P/7. When the fact discovered that other persons are also involved in the offence, the co-accused Jeetu Tandon was also taken into custody on 28.05.2019 and his memorandum statement Ex.P/5 was also recorded and based on his memorandum, one bag was seized in which a mobile phone was recovered vide seizure memo Ex.P/6. The motorcycle and its RTO papers were seized from the wife of deceased vide seizure memo Ex.P/1. The police also made a query from the doctor who conducted postmortem with respect to nature of death, to which Dr. G.S. Jatra gave his query report vide Ex.P/21 stating that nature of death can be homicidal or accidental, he further advised to co-relate with circumstantial evidence. FIR Ex.P/23 was lodged against the appellants on 03.05.2019 for the offence under Sections 397 and 302/34 IPC. Dehati Nalisi Ex.P/23-A was also registered. With respect to mobile number 9753912141, 9691424116 and 9893306643 call details and CAF were obtained by the police vide Ex.P/38 to P/43. Bloodstained and plain soil seized from spot were sent for its chemical 4 examination to regional FSL Bilaspur from where report Ex.P/37 was received, according to which, the bloodstained soil was found to be contained with blood. 4. Statement under Section 161 CrPC of the witnesses were recorded. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants for the offence under Sections 397 and 302 and 34 IPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Korba. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions Judge from where it has been transferred to the trial Court for its trial. 5. The trial Court has framed charge against the appellants for the offence under Sections 397 and 302/34 IPC. The appellants abjured guilt and claimed trial. 6. In order to establish charge against the appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 CrPC of the appellants have also been recorded in which they denied the circumstances appears against them, plead innocence and have submitted that they are innocent and falsely implicated in the offence. 7. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in the opening para of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict them for the alleged offence. No TIP of accused persons were conducted to prove that they looted the motorcycle of deceased. There is no eyewitness to the 5 incident. Further, the alleged memorandum and seizure have also not been proved in accordance with law as independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. The appellants are roped in offence only on the basis of seizure of motorcycle of deceased whereas, the said motorcycle was seized from the wife of deceased. There is no evidence against the appellants that they have committed murder of deceased or looted him. Except memorandum statement of appellants, no other evidence is available on record to hold their conviction. The appellants cannot be convicted only on the basis of their memorandum statement as the same is inadmissible piece of evidence. There is lack of cogent and clinching evidence. Therefore, the evidence produced by the prosecution is not sufficient to hold them guilty and they are entitled for acquittal. 9. On the other hand, the counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants and have submitted that there is ample evidence against the appellants to convict them for the alleged office, but for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of witnesses are fully reliable and conviction can be made on the basis of evidence came on record. The articles belonging to deceased was found in possession of the appellants which was seized on their memorandum statement for which they have not offered any explanation, therefore, adverse inference can be drawn against them. The motorcycle of deceased was seized from the appellant Manoj Yadav in Crime No.241 of 2019 which has been proved by PW-10 Rajesh Chandravanshi. Discovery of fact from the memorandum statement of appellants are admissible piece of evidence which can be taken into consideration against them. After appreciating the oral as 6 well as evidence led by the prosecution the trial court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants which is absolutely justified and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 10. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case. 11. So far as the nature of death of the deceased is concerned, the prosecution has examined PW-9, Dr. G.S. Jatra who conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased and gave report Ex.P/20 and query report Ex.P/21. He has stated in his evidence that on 01.05.2019 he conducted postmortem of the dead body and found injuries on his body. His 7th 8th and 9th ribs of left side and 7th & 8th ribs of right side were found fractured. Spleen and Liver was also found ruptured, and he opined that cause of death is sever injuries to vital organs of abdomen and chest. In query report he opined that nature of death may be homicidal or accidental which may be co-related with circumstantial evidence. In cross examination, he admits that in the requisition for postmortem it was mentioned that deceased had received injuries by falling himself. He further admits that on the stomach of deceased Alcohol contents were found and the injuries found on the body of deceased could have been received by falling from the motorcycle. Although, the doctor has opined that injuries on the body of the deceased may have been received by him by falling from his motorcycle, but looking to grievousness of the injuries as also rupture of his internal organ and further from the query report Ex.P/21 in which the Doctor has opined that nature of death may be homicidal or 7 accidental, the other evidences came on record suggests the nature of death to be homicidal. 12. PW-5, Sunil Kumar Channe, is the person who has taken merg intimation from hospital to police out post which is Ex.P/16 & P/17. 13. PW-8, Gheshdas Mahant, is the incharge of police out post and he recorded the unnumbered merg intimation Ex.P/17. The investigating officer PW-10 Rajesh Chandravanshi have recorded the statement of Ashok Kumar Bhagat, the brother of deceased, in which he disclosed that on 30.04.2019 the deceased had gone to distribute the marriage card by his motorcycle bearing registration No.CG-12-AM-3998. The motorcycle, purse and mobile phone of the deceased was missing and during inquiry, the motorcycle was seized in Crime No.241 of 2019 from the accused Manish Yadav and the present appellant Manoj Yadav was admitted in the hospital for his treatment. PW-10 have further stated that on 30.04.2019 near the liquor shop there was an incident of Marpeet and from spot inspection the blood like stain soil was seized and when he interrogated one Jitendra @ Palu Patel, he disclosed that on 01.05.2019 the appellant Manoj Yadav came to his house by Honda Shine motorcycle and had gone towards Mudapar after consuming liquor and near Mudapar turning he met with an accident in which he received injuries and thereafter he searched the accused Manoj Yadav and his memorandum statement Ex.P/4 was recorded in which he disclosed about the incident that after committing Marpeet with the deceased, they looted his motorcycle, mobile and purse. 8 14. Therefore, from all these sequence of incident, it can safely be held that nature of death of deceased was not an accidental, but was homicidal. 15. So far as involvement of the appellants in question is concerned, the case of prosecution is based on the memorandum statement and seizures made from the accused persons. Shiv Kumar Patel and Manoj Kumar Khakha, PW-3, are the witnesses to memorandum statement Ex.P/4 of the appellant Manoj Yadav @ Bhatkhauwa. Shiv Kumar Patel have not been examined. However, PW-3, Manoj Kumar Khakha, have stated in his evidence that on 01.05.2019 the younger brother of deceased came to his house and asked to search his brother. In the meantime, he received a telephonic call from Arun and he informed him that his brother met with an accident and is admitted in the hospital. When they had gone to the hospital, he found his brother dead. After 2-3 days, the police persons informed the younger brother of deceased that vehicle of his brother have been seized and he was called at police station. When the went there, he identified the vehicle of the deceased and informed that the police has informed them that the vehicle of deceased was being looted by Manoj Yadav and Jeetu Tandon and when he was driving the vehicle after consuming liquor, near Kalibadi, SECL, they met with an accident and therefore vehicle was being seized by the police. He proved signature over the memorandum Ex.P/4 & P/5 and seizure memo Ex.P/6 & P/7. In his cross examination, he states that the police has already seized the said motorcycle and when they reached at police station, the accused Manoj was already there in police station. He saw the accused Manoj first time at police station. He did not know the date 9 and time when his memorandum statement was recorded. He further states that with respect to ownership of mobile phone, no voucher or receipt was seized by the police. In further cross examination, he states that after 20-25 days of the first seizure, the mobile phone of deceased was seized from appellant Jeetu Tandon. 16. PW-4, Ashok Kumar Bhagat, is the witness to seizure memo Ex.P/1 by which the motorcycle of the deceased was seized from the wife of deceased. He states in his evidence that the investigating officer called them at police station and when they went there, the appellant Manoj disclosed that after consuming liquor, when they were returning back, the traffic police seized their vehicle and thereafter they prepared a plan to commit loot of motorcycle from any other person and accordingly looted the motorcycle of deceased. He states that in his presence nothing has been seized. In cross examination, there is no incriminating material against the appellants that motorcycle was seized from the possession of present appellants. His evidence is shaky. Further, he is witness to seizure memo Ex.P/1 of the motorcycle from the wife of the deceased. 17. The another circumstance on which the prosecution has relied, is the seizure of mobile phone of the deceased from appellant Jeetu Tandon vide seizure memo Ex.P/6. Shiv Kumar Patel and Manoj Kumar Khakha are witnesses to that seizure memo. Shiv Kumar Patel have not been examined. PW-3, Manoj Kumar Khakha have stated that no bills or vouchers were seized with respect to said mobile phone that it was of accused Jeetu Tandon. He further states that after 20-25 days of first seizure, the mobile phone was seized from appellant Jeetu Tandon. 10 18. From call detail report and CAF application, the prosecution could not be able to establish that the mobile phone seized from appellant Jeetu belongs to deceased as there there was no mention of mobile number in the seizure memo Ex.P/6 which can be connected through the call details and other relevant evidence. 19. The relevancy and evidentiary value of disclosure statement made by the accused persons came to be considered by the Supreme Court in case of Manoj Kumar Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC Online (SC) 984, wherein it has been observed in paragraph 21 to 25 as under : “21. The facts of the case reveal that all the accused persons made disclosure statements to the I.O. whereupon recovery of money, jewellery, etc. was effected. Although it is quite unusual that all five accused, after being arrested, would lead the I.O. to the places for effecting recovery of the stolen articles, we do not propose to disbelieve the prosecution plea only on this score. Manoj's involvement was primarily based on the disclosure statements made by co-accused Suleman and Jaihind where they admitted to selling the stolen articles to him and a similar statement made by Manoj himself which led to recovery under Section 27, Evidence Act. Similarly, both the courts below, in convicting Kallu, largely relied upon the disclosure statement made by Kallu himself as well as co-accused Jaihind, who confessed to giving Rs.3,000.00 to Kallu from the stolen money and storing a country-made pistol along with three cartridges at his house/tapra. 22. A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 23. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements under Section 27, Evidence Act made by the accused himself seems to be well established. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya and others vs. King-Emperor4 holds the field even today wherein it was held that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered fact, including details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the accused person's awareness of these aspects. The Privy Council observed: The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into s. 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by s. 26. Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can 11 seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law. 24. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements of co- accused too is settled; the courts have hesitated to place reliance solely on disclosure statements of co-accused and used them merely to support the conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins observed in Emperor vs. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty5, to "lend assurance to other evidence against a coaccused". In Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar6, this Court, speaking through the Constitution Bench, elaborated upon the approach to be adopted by courts when dealing with disclosure statements: 13. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. 25. In yet another case of discrediting a flawed conviction under Section 411, IPC, this Court, in Shiv Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh7 overturned the conviction under Section 411, declined to place undue reliance solely on the disclosure statements of the co- accused, and held: 24…... the disclosure statement of one accused cannot be accepted as a proof of the appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods. The prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the appellant to believe that the utensils seized from him were stolen articles. The factum of selling utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the appellant was aware of the theft of those articles. The essential ingredient of mens rea is clearly not established for the charge under Section 411 IPC. The prosecution's evidence on this aspect, as they would speak of the character Gratiano in Merchant of Venice, can be appropriately described as, "you speak an infinite deal of nothing." [William Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act 1 Scene 1.]” 20. PW-1, Jyoti Bhagat, wife of deceased, is the witness to the effect that on 30.04.2019 at 8:30 PM she made a call from her mobile number 9165153266 to the mobile number of her husband 9753912141 then he replied that after sometime he will come back. When she again made a call, his mobile phone was found switched off. When she was in his search and had gone to District Hospital, Korba, she found the appellant Manoj Yadav @ Bhatkhauwa in injured condition and after 12 sometime, she received information from her brother in law that her husband had died. She subsequently came to know that from the motorcycle of her husband there was an accident near Mudapar Kali Mandir. In her cross examination, she resiled from her 161 CrPC statement Ex.D/1 and stated that all the incident have been disclosed by her to the police and if it is not there in her police statement, she could not tell the reason. 21. From all these evidence, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence and the chain of circumstance is not complete. There is no eyewitness in the present case. The case of the prosecution rests on the circumstantial evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ravindra Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2022 (7) SCC 581 has held in para 10 as under:- “10. The conviction of A2 is based only upon circumstantial evidence. Hence, in order to sustain a conviction, it is imperative that the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent and coherent. This court has consistently held in a long line of cases [See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa @ Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Balwinder Singh @ Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC 1890)] that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. 10.1. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances, the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negate the innocence of the accused and bring the offence home beyond any reasonable doubt. 13 10.2. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed that: “21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.…” 22. In the matter of para Surendra Kumar and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2021 (20) SCC 430, the Hon’ble supreme Court has held in 11 and 12 as under:- “11. As the case against the appellants is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary to determine whether the available evidence lead only to the conclusion of guilt and exclude all contrary hypothesis. The enunciation on the law of circumstantial evidence stood the test of time since Hanumant Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh1 where Mahajan J., has written as under:- “10…………It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused……………” 12. The nature, character and essential proof required in criminal cases was discussed in detail by Fazal Ali J in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra2 and the proposition of law culled out on circumstantial evidence was approved in many subsequent judgments and was recently reiterated by Krishna Murari J., writing the opinion for a three Judges Bench in Shailendra 1 AIR 1952 SC 343 2 (1984) 4 SCC 116 Rajdev Pasvan & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. 3 where it was succinctly laid down as under:- “17. It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.” 14 23. In the matter of Digambar Vaishnav and Another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 (4) SCC 522, the Hon’ble supreme Court has held as under- “14. One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof. The onus of the prosecution cannot be discharged by referring to very strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculpate the accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the defence at best, be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt. 15. This Court in Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27, has held that even if the offence is a shocking one, the gravity of offence cannot by itself overweigh as far as legal proof is concerned. In cases depending highly upon the circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court has to be watchful and ensure that the conjecture and suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be established clearly and that the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. 16. In order to sustain the conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the following three conditions must be satisfied: i.) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; ii.) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; and iii.) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and it should also be incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. 17. In Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1993 Suppl (3) SCC 745, this Court has held that suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 18. In Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406, this Court, while examining the distinction between 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'suspicion' has held as under: "13. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large differ- ence between something that “may be” proved, and something that “will be proved”. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal 15 proof. The large distance between “may be” true and “must be” true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence pro- duced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between “may be” true and “must be” true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure con- clusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dis- passionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a com- plete and comprehensive appreciation of all fea- tures of the case, as well as the quality and credi- bility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so de- mand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely prob- able doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense". 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Madhu Vs. State of Kerala, 2012 (2) SCC 399 has held in paragraph 5 as under: “5. The care and caution with which circumstantial evidence has to be evaluated stands recognized by judicial precedent. Only circumstantial evidence of a very high order can satisfy the test of proof in a criminal prosecution. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete unbroken chain of events leading to the determination that the inference being drawn from the evidence is the only inescapable conclusion. In the absence of convincing circumstantial evidence, an accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt.” 25. In the matter of Nagendra Sah Vs. State of Bihar, 2021 (10) SCC 725 in paragraphs 17 and 18 replying upon the golden principles enumerated in case Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (4) SCC 116, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “17. As the entire case is based on circumstantial evidence, we may make a useful reference to a leading decision of this Court on the subject. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2, in paragraph 153, this Court has laid down five golden principles (Panchsheel) which govern a case based only on circumstantial evidence. Paragraph 153 reads thus : - “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should be 16 proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made: 19…..Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” (emphasis added). 18. Paragraphs 158 to 160 of the said decision are also relevant which read thus : “158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful argument submitted by the Additional Solicitor-General relying on a decision of this Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, to supplement his argument that if the defence case is false it would constitute an additional link so as to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect to the learned Additional Solicitor-General we are unable to agree with the interpretation given by him of the aforesaid case, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus: 9…….But in a case like this where the various links as started above have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, . . . such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain." 159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the absence of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will amount to be an additional link to complete the chain but these observations must be read in the light of what this Court said earlier, viz., before a false explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied : (1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation. 160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court can use a false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, this does not appear to be such a case. This aspect of the matter was examined in Shankarlal case where this Court observed thus: 30……..Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to 17 succeed. A false plea can at best be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused." (emphasis added)” 26. Thus, from the overall consideration of the evidence which has come on record, it would reveal that there are a lot of broken links in the prosecution's case which does not complete the chain of circumstances for conclusively reaching to the conclusion that it was the Appellants who have committed murder of the deceased. In the light of all the infirmities in the prosecution case and in absence of complete chain of events, it would be difficult for upholding the conviction of the appellants only on the basis of circumstantial evidence of strong suspicion which have come on record. In a case of circumstantial evidence, conviction cannot be based on suspicion. 27. It is settled principles of law that prosecution has Burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and where two views are possible, arising based on the same evidence, the view which is favoruable to the accused should be taken into consideration and the accused should be given benefit of doubt. In the matter of Digambar Vaishnav (Supra) it has been held as under : “19. It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one binding to the guilt of the accused and the other is to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence [See Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808].” 28. Thus, in view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that there are various components which are missing from the chain of circumstantial evidence. By giving the benefit of doubt to the appellants, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentences of appellants for the offence under Sections 397 18 and 302/34 IPC, is set aside. Both the appellants are acquitted from all the charges. The appellants are reported to be on bail in the present case. 29. The records of the case along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder