•w ' APHC010339072017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI V j_ TUESDAY,THE TWELFTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE C PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN lA NO: 1 OF 2017 (CMAMP 1401 OF 2017) IN/AND CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 839 OF 2017 Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of C.P.C, against the Order dated 04.07.2016 passed in I.A.694/2015 in O.S.No.147 of 2014, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri Between: 1. Mallineni Kotaiah, S/o. Balakotaiah, Hindu, aged 66 years, Occ. Agriculture, Resident of Kattabadivaripalam Village, Kondepi Mandal, Prakasam Dist., Markapur DMC. 2. Kolli Srinivasa Rao, S/o. Mallikharjuna Rao, Aged 48 years, Hindu, Occ. Agriculture, Resident of Pedavadlapudi Village, Mangalagiri Mandal, Guntur Dist., Mangalagiri DMC. ...Appellants AND Kandikatia Seetha Maha Lakshmi, W/o. Durga Prasad, Aged 39 years. House wife, DT Lane, Governorpet, Vijayawada City, Krishna Dist., Vijayawada DMC. ...Respondent lA NO: 1 OF 2017 (CMAMP 1401 OF 2017) Petition under Section circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 2549 days in presenting the CMASr.No.26021 of 2017. lA NO: 2 OF 2017 fCMAMP 1402 OF 2017) Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased stay all further proceedings pursuant tp passing of Preliminary Decree dated 25.02.2015 in OS No.147 of 2014 on the file of the Hon’ble Senior Civil Judge, Mangalgiri including passing of Final Decree pending the mam CMA. Counsel for the Appellants : Sri G Vijaya Babu Counsel for the Respondent: Sri Kuntamukkala Sai Sree Sanjay The Court made the following: 5 of Limitation Act, praying that in the to APHC010339072017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3506] TUESDAY,THE TWELFTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 839/2017 Between: 1.MALLINENI KOATAIAH, MARKAPUR DMC & ANR, S/0. BALAKOTAIAH, HINDU, AGED 66 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE, RESIDENT OF KATTABADIVARIPALAM VILLAGE, KONDEPI MAN DAL, PRAKASAM DIST, MARKAPUR DMC. 2.KAI SRINIVASA RAO,, , S/0. MALLIKHARJUNA RAO, AGED 48 YEARS, HINDU, OCC. AGRICULTURE, RESIDENT OF PEDAVADLAPUDI VILLAGE, MANGALAGIRI MANDAL, GUNTUR DIST, MANGALAGIRI DMC. ...APPELLANT(S) AND 1.KANDIKATLA SEETHA MAHA LAKSHMI VIJAYAWADA DMC, W/o. Durga Prasad, Aged 39 years. House wife, DT Lane, Governorpet, Vijayawada City, Krishna Dist., Vijayawada DMC. ...RESPONDENT Appeal Under Section 04.07.2016 passed in I.A.694/15 in 0.S.No.147 of 2014, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri lA NO: 1 OF 2017fCMAMP 1401 OF 2017 against ordersagainst the Order dated Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 2549 days in presenting the CMA Sr.No.26021 of 2017 in the interest of justice and pass lA NO: 2 OF 2017(CMAMP 1402 OF 2017 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings pursuant tp passing of Pre.iminary Decree dated 25.02.2015 in OS No.147 of 2014 on the file of the Hon'ble Senior Civil Judge, Mangalgiri including passing of Final Decree pending the main CMA in the interest of justice and pass Counsel for the Appellant(S): 1.G VIJAYABABU Counsel for the Respondent: 1.KUNTAMUKKALASAI SREE SANJAY The Court made the following: THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN I.A. No.1 of 2017 (C.M.A.M.P. NO.1401 OF 2017) IN/AND C.M.A. N0.839 OF 2017 COMMON JUDGMENT: The present appeal is instituted by the unsuccessful defendants 7 and 8 aggrieved by order dated 04.07.2016 passed in I.A. No.694/2017 in O.S. No.147 of 2014 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, rejecting application filed for setting aside ex parte decree dated 25.02.2015. For the sake of convenience, parties herein are referred to 2. as they were arrayed in the suit. The brief facts of the case in a nutshell are that; 3. O.S. No.147 of 2014 was filed by the plaintiff/respondent (a) herein for partition of plaint A schedule property into five equal shares and for allotment of one such share with metes and bounds and for separate possession. The suit was instituted on 07.07.2014. Plaintiff instituted suit against her father (D1), two brothers (D2 & D3) and sister (D4), besides her maternal aunts i.e. her father’s sisters (D5 & D6) and the subsequent purchasers (D7 to D9). It was claimed in the suit that suit schedule properties. J 2 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of2017 in particular plaint A schedule property, was purchased in the name of her father and plaint B schedule in the name of her mother by grandfather of plaintiff from ancestral funds and he died intestate, therefore, the properties being ancestral properties and plaintiff and defendants being class - I legal heirs were entitled for share in the said property. (b) It is also stated that defendants 1 to 3, 5 and 6 have fraudulently executed sale deeds in respect of items 1 and 2 of schedule A and schedule B properties in favour of defendants 7 to 9 on 28.06.2014, which are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. (c) Notices were issued to defendants. D1 to D8 entered appearance through counsel by filing vakalath on 19.08.2014. The suit was adjourned for filing written statement. On 19.09.2014, the defendants sought further time to file written statement. 21.11.2014, neither written statement came to be filed nor was there appearance for defendants, thereby D1 to D8 ex parte. After few hearings, ultimately, preliminary decree to be passed on 25.02.2015. On were set came fid ' 3 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 (d) Defendants 7 and 8 filed I.A. No.694/2015 under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree within one month of passing the said decree. In the affidavit filed along with the said application, it was specifically pleaded that the defendants 7 and 8 after receiving summons, entered appearance in the matter by engaging advocate and sought for time for filing written statement, however, as their vendors informed that the matter would be settled out of the court and the suit would be withdrawn, they did not chose to file written statement and only recently, they came to know of the ex parte decree, therefore, they were misguided by the plaintiff in securing the preliminary decree, on such reasons, they sought to seek setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree. (f) Plaintiff filed counter denying the contents of I.A., inter alia stating that the matter was adjourned many a times granting sufficient time for filing of written statement, despite the same, all defendants failed to file written statement even after extended time and having no other go, rightly the trial court set them ex parte by order dated 21.11.2014 and thereafter, the said suit came to be preliminary decreed on 25.02.2015, therefore, defendants were negligent and had no bona tides in pursuing the suit. It is also stated that before filing the suit, the plaintiff had issued paper 4 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 publication on 13.06.2014 intimating that she got right over suit schedule properties and cautioned not to enter into any transaction with the same and further also made written representation dated 28.06.2014 to Sub-Registrar, Mangalagiri, not to entertain registrations with respect to suit schedule properties, despite the same, defendants 1,4 and 5 executed conveyance deed in favour of 7 and 8 in particular just before filing of the suit, therefore, clearly it is a case of collusion and lack any bona fides. any The trial court, having considered the plea of both defendants 7 and 8 and plaintiff, dismissed the said I.A. holding that there were no bona fides and did not show sufficient cause to set aside the preliminary decree. (g) Assailing the same, the appellants stated to have initially filed appeal before the District Court at Guntur on 12.09.2016. The same was stated to be returned on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction as the value of the suit exceeded Rs. 10,00,000/- and thereby, directed to present before the appropriate court. Later, the defendants resubmitted the same with a delay of 68 days on 02.01.2017. Yet again, the same came to be returned on 03.01.2017. It is stated that the said returned file was misplaced by earlier counsel in his office on account of change of clerk. The new clerk could not identify and 5 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 trace it out for almost six months and ultimately, the same was traced out in last week of July, 2017 and immediately after availing legal advice of the present counsel, the appeal came to be presented before this Court with a delay of 259 days. Therefore, it necessitated tofilel.A. No.1 of 2017 (C.M.A.M.P. No.1401 of 2017) for condoning such delay in entertaining the appeal. 4. Heard Sri G.Vijaya Babu, learned counsel for appellants/defendants and Sri Kuntamukkala Sai Sree Sanjay, learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff. 5. (a) Learned counsel for appellants, while reiterating the contents of the affidavit filed in support of I.A. No.1 of 2017 (C.M.A.M.P. No.1401 of 2017), submitted that the appellants were very much diligent enough in pursuing both the suit and as well as subsequent proceedings, in particular present appeal and it is only on account of wrong promise made by plaintiff who proposed settlement and thereafter backed out resulted in they being set ex parte and further that the appellants were bonafidely pursuing the appeal before District Court under mistaken impression, having realized that appeal lies before this Court had immediately taken steps to institute the same and in the process, on account of 6 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 misplacing of the bundle and change of clerk concerned with trial court, there occurred delay of 259 days in filing the appeal. The said delay is not of much significance and having regard to the explanation offered in the affidavit filed in support of I.A., the same needs to be condoned, and even on merits, the trial Court erroneously rejected the application on flimsy grounds. (b) It is also contended that courts should be liberal substantial justice while considering application under Section 5 of Limitation Act rather than exhibiting rigidity to subserve the ends of justice. In support of his submission reliance has been placed G.Haribabu v. Lagula Krishnaiah Goud and four othersT to do on (c) He has also tried to address the issue on merits of the appeal by contending that the reasons shown for setting aside ex parte decree were very much sound and that the trial court ought to have allowed the said application by giving fair chance to contest the suit. 6. (a) Per contra, opposing aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff submitted that firstly, the appellants lack bona tides and very much negligent all through in were 2017 (6) ALT 136 2016(2)ALD477 7 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 pursuing both the suit and as well as the present appeal. In elaboration, it is stated that the appellants, even before filing of suit, very much aware of paper publication issued by the plaintiff cautioning to deal with suit subject properties, despite they chose to enter into sale deed and later, they did receive notices/summons in suit, however, chose not to file any written statement in spite of granting multiple chances before being set ex parte on 21.11.2014. They have been fens sitting and watching proceedings closely and allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte on 25.02.2015. Thereafter, they filed I.A. on 25.03.2015 for setting aside ex parte decree. were Further, after dismissal of the said I.A., appeal has been presented before inappropriate court and when objection was raised by the said court on entertainability of the appeal, they chose to re-present the same once again with a delay of 68 days, without any explanation as to how it was maintainable and later, as the same was returned once again on 03.01.2017, yet almost after seven months, appeal was presented before this Court with a delay of 259 days, which is clearly unexplainable and without any sufficient cause. (b) 8 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 He further contended that the trial court has clearly found that the application was filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC without bona fides and there was no sufficient cause shown as to what prevented them in pursuing the suit, therefore, the same does not warrant any interference at all. (c) To buttress the argument with respect to the condonation of delay, learned counsel has placed reliance on the following (d) judgments; Judgment of the Madras High Court in The Project Director V. S.Arivanandasiva^. (i) Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Ramaswamy v. R.Nallammal and others^ (ii) Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and others'*. (iii) Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. V. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)®. (iv) ^ 2024 Supreme (Online) Madras 80816 3 Law Finder Doc.lD # 2700561 (Civil Appeal No.3505 of 2025, dated 03.03.2025) '•(2021) 18 see 384 5 2024 sec OnLine SC 513 9 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 (v) Judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Ramesh Flowers Private Limited v. Sumit Srimal®. 7. ■ Perused the record and considered the rival submissions made by both parties. Both learned counsels have addressed the appeal on the aspect of condonation of delay and as well as merits of the case, therefore, first this Court intends to deal with the delay and later on merits. 8. Consideration regarding Delay: 9. It is not in dispute that the appellants/defendants 7 and 8 entered appearance in suit on 19.08.2024 by engaging counsel and sought for time for filing written statement. Initially 30 days time was granted and matter got adjourned to 19.09.2014. Further time was sought for, for filing written statement. Accordingly, suit was adjourned to 21.11.2014. Appellants failed to file written statement nor were they represented by counsel. The trial court set them ex parte on 21.11.2014. Thereafter, the suit was proceeded with and after few hearings, preliminary decree came to 2024 see OnLine Mad 4785 10 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 be passed on 25.02.2015. The application filed for setting aside ex parte decree came to be dismissed on 04.07.2016 after contest. Appeal was preferred before learned District Court, Guntur, on 12.09.2016 and the same was immediately returned with objection on entertainability. With delay of 68 days, the same was re-presented, however, without any cogent reasons or explanation before very same court. Yet again, it was returned on 03.01.2017. After the delay of almost seven months from then, present appeal is preferred, with a total delay of 259 days. In the background of aforesaid facts, the legal submissions made by respective counsels are considered as under. 10. Learned counsel for appellants, while reiterating his contentions, has referred to judgment rendered by Coordinate Bench of this Court in G.Haribabu’s case (supra 1), paragraphs 6 & 9, in particular, read thus: “6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act which reads as under confers a discretion on the Court to condone the delay. Section 5: Extension of prescribed period in certain cases; Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that / " 11 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period, (emphasis by this court) Explanation:-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 9. It is now a crystallized principle in our jurisprudence that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain or even a reasonable limit. Length of delay is, thus, not of significance, but what is most vital is the acceptability of the explanation and that was the only criteria by which the cause for condonation of delay should be judged. The main purpose for which Section 5 was enacted was to enable the Court to do substantial justice and that is the precise reason why very elastic expression sufficient cause is employed therein, so as to sub-serve the ends of justice. It is well to remember that the very purpose sought to be achieved by the Courts is to sub-serve the ends of justice. Therefore, when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice had to be preferred to that of the technicalities, inasmuch as, no party can every claim a vested right when injustice is being done, all due to the delay in approaching the Court by the other party.” 12 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent firstly placed reliance on The Project Director’s case (supra 2) to contend that every day of delay to be explained and further that the appellants have miserably failed to show sufficient cause for this Court to exercise the discretion of condoning the delay. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment reads as under: “10. Each and every day of delay has to be explained. The petitioner has not given any reason as to why they have not filed the copy application in time and also why they have not filed the appeal even after obtaining the corrected copy of the order in time. Therefore, the delay has not been properly explained. In this regard, it is relevant to refer the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Rep. by Executive Engineer Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd./ wherein it has been held that the delay of beyond 90 days only an exception and not a rule. The relevant para 58 is extracted hereunder:- vs. IS “58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, ' (2021) 6 see 460 13 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 the expression “sufficient cause is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer®, has held: 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party “has not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation (2013) 14 see 81 14 CGR, J CMA. No.839 of2017 of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior (emphasis by this Court) 10. InArjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar^, this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. purpose. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and straitjacket formula is possible. 11. In this case, the delay has not been properly explained and the reason also has not been given for delay in filing the copy application. Therefore, by relying the above said judgment, this Court finds that the petitioner has not made out the requirements that he has bona fide reason. Though the length of the delay is not the matter, but the reason is only the significance. If there is valid reason, the Court normally will not consider the length of the delay. If there is no reason, the Court no ’AIR 1964 SC 993 15 CGR, J CiVlA.No.839 of 2017 could not consider the days of the delay. Though in this case, the delay in filing the appeal is 143 days, however, the petitioner has not given any particular about the delay and proper reason for the delay. Therefore, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra 7), the delay is only an exception and not a rule. Further, it is well settled proposition of law that at the time of considering the application for the delay, the Court need not go into depth about the merits of the case. However, there is no valid and acceptable reason given for the delay. It is well settled that while deciding an application for condonation of delay, merits of the case cannot go into and what has to be seen that as to whether sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the Court. Therefore, under these circumstances, this Court is not satisfied with the reason stated in the accompanying affidavit. Hence, the present petition filed to condone the delay of 143 days in filing the appeal in CMA(MD)SR No.66902 of 2022, is dismissed. No costs.” He further relied on the judgment of Pathapati Subba 12. Reddy (Died) By L.Rs and others case (supra 4), which culled out the law laid by Apex Court in relation to limitation and condonation of delay. Paragraph No.26 of the said judgment reads thus: 16 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court evident that; it is (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; The provisions of the Limitation Act have (ii) (iii) to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such where there is inordinate delay, negligence and of due diligence; Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the or cause of of (V) as want (Vi) 17 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” (vii) (viii) There is no quarrel regarding the propositions laid down in aforesaid judgments cited by either of counsels. Law regarding 13. how limitation has to be construed and how courts have to exercise discretion in the process of condoning delay has been succinctly enunciated above. If sufficient cause is explained, the court has to exercise its power of discretion keeping in view to advance substantial justice, even if to adopt liberal approach to deal with the prayer for condoning the delay. Having said that. Courts should also examine from the perspective of whether the party intending to seek condonation of delay was negligent, lack bonafides or there is inaction on the part of such party, and merely adopted device to cover ulterior purpose. The party, in a way, should be more vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. These aspects of the matter have to be culled out from facts of each case. 18 CGR, J CMA. No.839 of2017 14. Keeping in view aforesaid parameters in consideration, if the same were to be tested with reference to the facts of the present case, it is very much apparent and writ large that the appellants definitely exhibited negligence and clearly fens sitting and watching the proceedings without participation. They also failed to establish bonafides. When they were set ex parte way back on 21.11.2014, were not being vigilant of consequences. After passing of preliminary decree, they immediately woke up and moved application for setting aside the same, though within one month. A glance at said application goes to show that it merely mentions that they recently came to know of the ex parte preliminary decree’. They conspicuously are silent as to the manner, source and time of knowledge. Be that as it may, later, after dismissal of the said application, they chose to move appeal before inappropriate court. When the same was returned with objections on maintainability, they almost took 68 days to come back and height of the was that they re-presented the appeal with no possible reason why appeal was entertainable before that court. Later the matter same got returned immediately on the next day, appellants took almost seven months to file present appeal. Though the reasons set out in the affidavit state that the bundle was mixed up and clerk got 19 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 changed, the said reasons do not inspire their dona tides in pursuing the matter, rather, it appears to be clear act of cover up. The sequence of events clearly demonstrates how negligent they were. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Basavaraj’s case has succinctly held that while exercising discretion to condone the delay, the same has to be done judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. Further that the expression sufficient cause cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction, or lack of bona tides is attributed to the party. This case clearly falls under aforesaid observations. No explanation is forthcoming on why appeal was preferred before District Court at first and even after returning on pecuniary jurisdiction, it was re-presented that too after 68 days without any reasons or possible explanation. Even the reasons mentioned for further delay in opinion of this Court is clear act of cover up but not for bona tide reasons. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretion to condone the said delay. 15. 16. Coming to merits of the matter, though this court has expressed its opinion on the aspect of delay, it is the case of appellants that they were misguided by the plaintiff under the guise 20 CGR, J CMA. No.839 of20]7 of settlement, preventing them from filing written statement. The pleaded reason in I.A. falsifies their stand. The record discloses that sale deed in favour of appellants came to be executed on 28.06.2014 after issuance of paper publication, which is marked as Ex.A6, dated 13.06.2014 and written Registrar, marked as Ex.A7, dated 28.06.2014. executed by defendants 1,4 and 5, who also remained the suit on 21.11.2014. They have not filed representation to Sub- Sale deeds were ex parte in any application for setting aside the same, therefore, the same attained finality in so far they are concerned. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC has to be considered from the perspective of same parameters as provided for under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The appellants are required to demonstrate that they were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing in the suit when called for hearing. The admitted facts clearly indicate that they did on 19.08.2014 and sought for time for filing written statement. One month time was granted and when they were not ready with written statement yet again two months’ time as neither written statement appear was granted and ultimately came to be filed nor there was any representation, they came to be set ex parte on 21.11.2014. The same clearly illustrates that they were clearly negligent in pursuing 21 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 the matter, besides, they have not placed any material to show any negotiations or settlement talks were engaged between the parties. 17. Even for the sake of argument, if it is to be construed the . reason pleaded in the application on its face value, when the matter was adjourned on 21.11.2014, after they being set ex parte, they should have been vigilant in following up with the suit to note the further steps when it was against listed on 12.12.2014, 23.12.2014 31.01.2015, 21.02.2015 and finally on 25.02.2015 when preliminary decree came to be passed. Therefore, the explanation offered by appellants that they were misguided by the plaintiff clearly has no basis and is hard to believe inasmuch as even the appellants vendors themselves were set ex parte and allowed it to attain finality. 18. In view of aforesaid reasons, even on this count, this Court is not convinced with the reasons and sufficient cause as explained, therefore, the findings recorded by trial court in rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC does not suffer from any infirmity. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 of 2017 (C.M.A.M.P. No.1401 of 2017) stands dismissed and so also C.M.A. No.839 of 2017 is dismissed. No costs. 22 CGR, J CMA.No.839 of 2017 As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending consideration if any, in this case shall stand closed. Sd/- S.V.S.R.MURTHY JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// 9;^ SECTION OFFICER To, 1. The Civil Judge(Senior Division), Mangalagiri, Guntur District (with records) 2. One CC to Sri. G Vijaya Babu Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to Sri. Kuntamukkala Sai Sree Sanjay Advocate [OPUC] 4. The Section Officer, V.R Section, High Court of Andhra Pradesh Amaravathi 5. Two CD Copies at Stu vna HIGH COURT DATED:12/08/2025 COMMON JUDGMENT lA NO: 1 OF 2017(CMAMP 1401 OF 2017) in/and CMA NO. 839 OF 2017 DISMISSING THE I.A N0.1 OF 2017 (C.M.A.M.P No. 1401 of 2017) DISMISSING THE C.M.A