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2025 DAILYLAW 24098 (GAU)

AJBHAN BIBI @ MUSSTT. ASBHAN BIBI v. THE UNION OF INDIA

WP(C)/7267/2025 · 2025-12-15

Kalyan Rai Surana, Shamima Jahan

Writ Petition (Civil)body2025

Judgment text

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Page No.# 1/11 GAHC010278862025 undefined THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/7267/2025 AJBHAN BIBI @ MUSSTT. ASBHAN BIBI D/0- ASKAR ALI SK. W/O- RAHIMUDDIN SK. VILL. - HUDUMKHATA , P.S.- GOSSAIGAON. DIST.- KOKRAJHAR,,ASSAM VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI- 110001. 2:THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA GOVERNMENT OF INDIA NEW DELHI-110001. 3:THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRERSENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM HOME DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006. 4:THE STATE COORDINATOR NATIONAL REGISTER OF CITIZENS (NRC) BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI- 5 5:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER KOKRAJHAR P.O. AND DIST.- KOKRAJHAR Page No.# 2/11 ASSAM 6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (B) KOKRAJHAR DIST.- KOKRAJHAR ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR H R A CHOUDHURY, MS A DAS,MR. H ALI Advocate for the Respondent : DY.S.G.I., GA, ASSAM,SC, F.T,SC, ECI BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHAMIMA JAHAN ORDER 16.12.2025 (K.R. Surana, J) Heard Mr. H. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. B. Sarma, learned CGC for respondent no.1; Ms. S. Katakey, learned standing counsel for respondent no.2; Mr. G. Sarma, learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC, for respondent nos. 3, 4 and 6; and Mr. H.K. Hazarika, learned Govt. Advocate for respondent no.5. 2) By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Ajbhan Bibi @ Musstt. Asbhan Bibi, has assailed the opinion dated 04.07.2017, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, Kokrajhar, in Case No. K/FT/399/06 [arising out of No. B/TC/86/2016, dated 12.09.86], by which on failure of the petitioner to contest the proceeding, the reference was answered in favour of the State and against the petitioner, thereby declaring her to be a foreigner of post 1971 stream. 3) On service of notice of the proceeding, the petitioner had filed her written statement on 16.02.2017. In her written statement, apart from usual Page No.# 3/11 defence, it was stated that in the year 1932, her father was born and brought up in village- Chalandanga, P.S. Dhubri, in the then undivided Goalpara District and about 55 years ago, due to financial crisis, he had shifted to village No.1 Guabari Colony, under P.O. Guabari, P.S. Gossaigaon, in the district of Kokrajhar. The petitioner was born and brought up in village Guabari, under P.O. Guabari, P.S. Gossaigaon, in the district of Kokrajhar. On 03.08.1985, she was married to Rahimuddin Sk of village No.2 Hudumkhata, P.S. Gossaigaon, in the district of Kokrajhar, where she is residing in her husband’s residence. She has (a) Elector Photo Identity Card (EPIC for short); (b) Gaonburah’s certificate issued by the Gaonburah of village No.1 Guabari Colony, under P.O. Guabari, P.S. Gossaigaon, in the district of Kokrajhar as Ajbhan Bibi, daughter of Late Askar Ali Sk; (c) VCDC Certificate dated 06.01.2017, issued by the Chairman, Guabari VCDC; (d) Link certificate dated 20.06.2015, issued by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Gossaigaon Revenue Circle. Her name, Ajbhan Bibi, is recorded in voter list of 2016, 1993, 2010, under No. 29 Kokrajhar West (S.C.) LAC. In paragraph 17 of her written statement, though it is pleaded that the name of her father and mother appeared in the voter list of 1970, under No. 29 Kokrajhar West (S.C.) LAC, but in the connected sub-paragraph, reference is made to the voter list of 2016. The name of her mother appears in the legacy data of NRC voter details of voter list of 1971 and the name of her grandfather appears in the legacy data of NRC of 1951. Hence, she claims that the petitioner is not a foreigner. 4) From the materials available in the writ petition, it appears that the petitioner had filed her written statement on 16.02.2017, and the impugned opinion was passed on 04.07.2017. Thus, the opinion was passed after 4 months, 18 days after filing of the written statement. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not file her evidence-on-affidavit or adduced any oral Page No.# 4/11 evidence. 5) The learned counsel for the petitioner, by referring to the statements made in the writ petition, has submitted that the petitioner was completely dependent on her learned counsel, who informed her that she was not required to come on every date and he would inform her as and when her presence was required. Her engaged learned counsel had kept her thumb impression on several blank pages. It was stated that due to financial problem, she along with her husband had gone to Silchar to work in a brickfield and she could not contact her learned counsel as she lost his contact number. It was submitted that the petitioner was not informed about the opinion passed against her. However, on 14.11.2025, when the petitioner was taken into custody, only then she came to know about the opinion. Some time was consumed in obtaining certified copies and to engage learned counsel at Guwahati and the present writ petition was filed on 12.12.2025. 6) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the enquiry against her by the Local Verification Officer was perfunctory and mechanically done, which vitiates the reference. 7) The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as the petitioner has all the relevant documents to prove that she is a citizen of India, the petitioner may be afforded one opportunity to file her evidence and to prove her defence. It has been submitted that if no opportunity is granted to the petitioner, she would suffer great injustice and her citizenship right since birth would be irreversibly lost forever. It has been submitted that the petitioner had been denied reasonable opportunity to prove her defence. It has been submitted that the petitioner has no other efficacious remedy available to her. Page No.# 5/11 8) In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that as citizenship was a valuable right, this Court in a series of orders, had granted one opportunity to the proceedee to contest the proceeding after setting aside the impugned opinion. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following cases, viz., (i) Hasen Ali v. The Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 365/2021, decided by a Coordinate Bench on 08.02.2021, (ii) Hamida Begum v. The Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 4708/2023, decided by a Coordinate Bench on 21.08.2023. 9) Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC had opposed the prayer made in this writ petition. 10) In this case, the written statement was filed on 16.02.2017, and after the impugned opinion was passed on 04.07.2017, the petitioner was taken into custody on 14.11.2025. Thus, between 16.02.2017 to 14.11.2025, i.e. for 3188 days or 8 years, 8 months, 29 days, the petitioner or her family members admittedly had not made any attempt to meet the petitioner’s engaged learned counsel. 11) Therefore, it is necessary to examine the scope of certiorari jurisdiction. 12) It must be taken into consideration that in this case, the Court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction and not appellate of revisional jurisdiction. The limitations of the writ Court in exercising certiorari jurisdiction is seen to have been elaborately discussed and settled by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Council for Research in Auyrvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, 2023 INSC 733: (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763, the scope of interference has been reiterated. Paragraph 77 thereof is quoted below:- Page No.# 6/11 77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to confine the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular exercise, or the non-exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct errors of finding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise, it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed: “26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.” 13) On the point of when certiorari jurisdiction ought to be invoked, it would be also relevant to refer to paragraph nos. 20 to 23 of the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233: (1954) 0 Supreme(SC) 175, which are quoted below:- “20. We are also of opinion that the Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution, and that that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. That was held by this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath , AIR 1954 SC 215 (K), where it was observed that in this respect Article 227 went further than section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the superintendence was purely administrative, and that it restored the position under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may also be noted that while in a certiorari under Article 226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under Article 227, do that, and also issue further directions in the matter. We must accordingly hold that the application of the appellant for a writ of certiorari and for other reliefs was maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 21. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of Page No.# 7/11 certiorari in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employees Association, Madras , AIR 1952 SC 179 (L): - Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. . AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); - Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi , AIR 1952 SC 319 (N),& quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440(C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings or fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari." These propositions are well settled and and not in dispute. 22. (4) The further question on which there has been some controversy is whether a writ can be issued, when the decision of the inferior Court or Tribunal is erroneous in law. This question came up for consideration in- Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw , 1951-1 KB711 (O), and it was held that when a Tribunal made a "speaking order and the reasons given in that order in support of the decision were bad in law, certiorari could be granted. It was pointed out by Lord Goddard, C. J. that that had always been understood to be the true scope of the power. (1878) 4 AC 30 (D), and - Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ld , 1922-2 AC 128 (P), were quoted in support of this view. In 1878-4 AC 30 (D), Lord Cairns L. C. observed as follows : "If there was upon the face of the order of the court of quarter sessions anything which showed that that order was erroneous, the Court of Queen s Bench might be asked to have the order brought into it, and to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it, and if the court found error upon the face of it, to put an end to its existence by quashing it". In 1922-2 AC 128 (P), Lord Summer said: "That supervision goes to two points; one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise". The decision in 1951-1 KB 711 (O), was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in - Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw , 952-1 KB 338 (Q). In laying down that an error of law was a ground for granting certiorari the learned Judges emphasised that it must be apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L. J. who stated Page No.# 8/11 the power in broad and general terms observed : "It will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is one governing rule: certiorari is only available to quash a decision for error of law if the error appears on the face of the record ." The position was thus summed up by, Morris, L. J. : "It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring an order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or decision , or irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where shown." In AIR 1952 SC 192 (M), it was observed by this Court that under Article 226 the writ should be issued, "in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record . In AIR 1954 SC 440 (C), the law was thus stated : "An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings , e. g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision." 23. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C. J. in - Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality , AIR 1953 Bom 133 (R), that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record it was not self-evident, & if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self -evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.” Page No.# 9/11 14) This Court, in the case of Ajbahar Ali v. Union of India, (2025) 0 Supreme (Gau) 763 [Review Petition No. 29/2021, decided on 13.06.2025], had held to the effect that the plea of compliance of the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners. Similar opinion has also been expressed by this Court in the case of Abu Bokkor Siddique v. Union of India, 2019 (1) GLT 813, and Ajbahar Ali v. Union of India, 2019 (1) GLT 818: (2019) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1640. 15) It may be relevant to mentioned herein that as per the provision of Order 3(14) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, a mandate is given to the Foreigners Tribunals to dispose of a reference within a period of 60 (sixty) days of the receipt of reference from the competent authority. 16) It may be mentioned that the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665, in paragraph 73, has held to the effect that the procedure under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is just, fair and reasonable and does not offend any constitutional provision. In paragraph 63 thereof, the Supreme Court of India had observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the State of Assam is facing external aggression and internal disturbance on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals and that it, therefore, becomes the duty of the Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 70, it was observed that the influx of Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally migrated into Assam pose a threat to the integrity and security of the North Page No.# 10/11 Eastern region and that their presence has changed the demographic character of that region and the local people of Assam have been reduced to a status of minority in certain districts. 17) In the case of Hasen Ali (supra) and Hamida Begum (supra), no law has been laid down, and without finding any infirmity in the impugned opinion, the proceedee therein were granted an opportunity to contest the proceeding after setting aside of the opinion under challenge. Therefore, it appears that when the said cases were decided the precedents referred to above were perhaps not placed before this Court. 18) The impugned opinion was rendered on 04.07.2017. Thus, the petitioner has remained silent for more than 8 years, 5 months, 8 days, to assail the impugned opinion only after the petitioner was apprehended and taken into custody on 14.11.2025. 19) In this writ petition, this Court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction and not appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The Court is only to see if the learned Foreigners Tribunal has failed to act in accordance with the mandate of law and if the opinion of the learned Foreigners Tribunal is not vitiated by any procedural impropriety and if the opinion is not found to be vitiated by taking into account irrelevant considerations or ignored to take note of the pleadings and evidence, it is not open for this Court to substitute its wisdom over the otherwise correct opinion expressed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal when no fault whatsoever can be found in the impugned opinion. 20) Therefore, in light of the discussions above, the discussions above, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed on the ground of unexplained and enormous delay and laches of 5905 days or 16 years, 2 Page No.# 11/11 months approximately in assailing the impugned opinion. Under Order 3(14) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, the time allowable to dispose of a reference is 60 days. In this case, the petitioner had the petitioner had filed her written statement on 16.02.2017, and the impugned opinion was passed on 04.07.2017. Thus, the opinion was passed after 4 months, 18 days after filing of the written statement. 21) Hence, this writ petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost. 22) The learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC, shall send a downloaded copy of this order to the Home and Political (B) Department, for communicating it to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal, so as to make it a part of the record of the case for future reference. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant