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2025 DAILYLAW 24065 (CHH)

YUGRAJ SINGH v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

MCRCA/895/2025 · 2025-06-30

Shri Rakesh Mohan Pandey

body2025

Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:29633 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MCRCA No. 895 of 2025  Yugraj Singh S/o Chabilal Singh Aged About 40 Years R/o Village- Gouhanikala, District- Chitrakut, Uttar Pradesh --- Applicant(s) versus  State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station- Chilphi, District Kabirdham (C.G.) --- Non-applicant(s) For Applicant : Mr. Aishwarya Diwan, Advocate For Non-applicant : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Dy. G.A. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order On Board 01-07-2025 Heard. 1) Earlier, a bail application for the grant of anticipatory bail of the applicant was rejected by this Court on merits in MCRCA No. 975 of 2023 vide order dated 04.10.2023. 2) The applicant has preferred this second bail application under Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023 for the grant of anticipatory bail as he apprehends his arrest in connection with Crime No. 03/2020 for the offence punishable under 20(B) of NDPS Act, 1985 registered at Police Station–Chilphi, District–Kabirdham (C.G.). 2 3) As per the prosecution story, on 6.10.2020, after getting secret information, the police intercepted one vehicle bearing registration No. C.G. 17 T 0984 and recovered 24 kg of ganja. On the same date, one more vehicle bearing registration No. U.P. 96 B 9909 was intercepted at Chilphi, District Kabirdham but the persons who were travelling in the said vehicle fled away from the spot and 6 kg of ganja was seized from that vehicle and the FIR was registered against unknown persons on 6.1.2020 for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(B) of NDPS Act. The co-accused, namely, Amarjeet of Crime No. 2 of 2020 made a confessional statement before the learned Court below to the effect that the present applicant is the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No.U.P. 96 B 9909 and on the date of the incident, he was transporting 6 kg of ganja. It was also stated that the applicant fled away from the spot and thereafter, the police recovered 6 kg of ganja. On the basis of such a statement, the offence was registered against the present applicant and one Rakesh Kushwaha. 4) Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is the owner of the offending vehicle but he is not involved in the crime. He further submits that a false case has been registered against the present applicant on the basis of the statement of one Amarjeet (co- accused) in Crime No. 2 of 2020. He contends that the applicant will not tamper with the witnesses and will cooperate in the investigation. He prays for the grant of anticipatory bail. 5) Learned counsel for the State would oppose the prayer and submit that anticipatory bail is not a statutory right linked with Article 21 of the 3 Constitution of India, therefore, successive pleas are not maintainable. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohd. Shamim Khan Vs. State of Jharkhand, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.9449/2021 and the judgment passed by the High Court of Allahabad in the matter of Raj Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P., reported in 2022 LiveLaw (AB) 493. 6) The first bail application was dismissed on merits by this Court and the second bail application has been preferred by the applicant more or less on the same grounds. 7) In the matter of Mohd. Shamim Khan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of filing a second anticipatory bail application and held as under:- “The first application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner was rejected by the High Court by an order dated 10.11.2020. There was no substantial change of circumstances placed on record while filing the second application seeking pre-arrest bail under Section 482 of the Code and that came to be rejected by the High Court under the order impugned dated 02.08.2021. Even before us, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is unable to show any change of circumstances to invoke the jurisdiction of filing second application under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court. We deprecate such practice of filing second application under Section 482 of the Code after the first being rejected. We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and find no reason to interfere in our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” 4 8) In the matter of Rajbahadur Singh (supra), the High Court of Allahabad held that the power to grant anticipatory bail does not flow from Article 21 of the Constitution but it has been conferred by the Statute enacted by the Parliament whereas provisions contained in Section 439 flow from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The observation made in para 8 is as under:- “8. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that there is no substantial difference between Sections 482 CrPC (Anticipatory bail) and 439 CrPC (Regular bail), as regards the appreciation of the case as to whether or not a bail is to be granted. The only distinction is that in a case under Section 482, the person who approaches the Court apprehends that he may be arrested without any basis whereas under Section 439, such person approaches the Court after his arrest. Evidently the power to grant anticipatory bail does not flow from Article 21 of the Constitution but it has been conferred by the Statute enacted by the Parliament whereas provisions contained in Section 439 flow from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If bail application of the accused under Section 439 is dismissed once, he can move second and successive bail application on the ground of substantial change in factual situation between the earlier bail application and the subsequent one, but filing of second and successive bail applications on the basis of new argument and new twists on the same facts cannot be encouraged. Speedy trial is a Constitutional right of the accused provided to him by Article 21 of the Constitution. If first application of the accused who is in custody is dismissed on merits and the trial is delayed, the accused has a right to make second bail application on the ground of delayed trial. Section 439 relates to Constitutional right of the accused whereas Section 482 to his statutory right. The provisions of Section 482 should not be put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous accused.” 9) Taking into consideration the fact that the first bail application was dismissed on merits and further considering the law laid down by the 5 Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Allahabad, I am of the view that there is no change of circumstance, thus, this successive application is not maintainable and the same is hereby dismissed. 10) The observations made in the course of this order are only for considering the case of the applicant. The concerned Trial Court shall not be influenced or bound by the observations made in this order. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE Ajinkya Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2025.07.07 17:11:52 +0530