2025:HHC:23405 ______________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1064 of 2024 Reserved on: 18.06.2025 Date of Decision: 21.07.2025 Gautam Munjal & another ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the petitioner : Mr. Saurav Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr. Sarthak Mehta, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State. : Mr. Bhim Raj Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 128 of 2024, dated 27.07.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 316(2) and 324(4) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P. 2 2025:HHC:23405 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant is the co-owner of the property named ‘Hotel Golf Grand’ located at Naldehra, village Koti, Himachal Pradesh. This property was leased out for 20 years to Gautam Munjal- petitioner No.1. A lease agreement was executed on 03.10.2022 at Shimla at the rate of ₹1.5 lakhs per month with 18% GST, however, petitioner No.1 did not pay the rent for about five months. He changed the nature of property and removed the central walls of the structure, which compromised the structural stability of the building. The movable and immovable fixtures were taken out of the Hotel during the night in July 2024. The petitioner said that the articles were to be replaced with modern ones. Twelve bathroom doors, eight windows, floor tiles and two main doors were removed. The property was damaged by using heavy machinery. The Visitor’s Registers laongwith tax books and other transactions were stolen. Subsequently, an email was sent on 21.07.2024 stating that the property was vacated and the possession should be taken from the petitioner. The informant had sepnt ₹50,00,000/- in renovating the Hotel. Therefore, it was prayed that the action should be taken in the matter. 3 2025:HHC:23405 3. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. It was found during the investigation that the possession of the Hotel was handed over to the petitioners for twenty years. There was a lock-in period of five years. A dispute arose regarding the payment of rent, and the petitioners were directed to vacate the premises. They took out the articles affixed by them and handed over the possession. There is a clause for settling the dispute by arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The investigation was continuing. An amount of ₹51,42,000/- would be spent on the restoration of the property. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. The F.I.R. was lodged to wreak vengeance on the petitioners. Both parties entered into a Management and Operations Agreement, which was executed on 03.10.2022. The informant posted an advertisement for leasing the property, and petitioner No.1 approached the informant. Both parties entered into a Lease Agreement. Petitioner No. 1 paid ₹3,00,000/- before entering into the agreement. The informant violated the terms and conditions of 4 2025:HHC:23405 the agreement because he failed to obtain the licenses for running the Hotel as required by clause 11-H of the agreement. The petitioners paid rent regularly to the daughter-in-law of the informant, along with the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Parts of Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh faced an emergency of flooding in the month of July 2023. The Government of Himachal Pradesh declared it a natural calamity. The area was declared a natural calamity-affected area. The road got severely damaged due to heavy flooding and rain. Petitioner No.1 invoked the force majeure clause of the agreement from July to September 2023. This fact was conveyed to the informant. The informant himself directed the petitioner to vacate the property vide e-mail dated 21.06.2024. The petitioners vacated the property as per the informant’s demand. The informant failed to correct the material defects in the building. He did not provide the Building Completion Certificate to run the Hotel. The informant and his Advocate reached the office on 20.07.2024 and abused petitioner No. 2 and the staff present on the spot. He visited the Police Station to restrain petitioner No.2 from taking the articles owned by the petitioners. The parties have agreed to the arbitration, and the informant did not resort 5 2025:HHC:23405 to the arbitration proceedings. The allegations made in the F.I.R. show the civil dispute between the parties. The essential ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Section 316(2) and 324(4) of BNS are missing. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R., be quashed. 5. A status report was filed by respondent No.1 reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. and steps taken during the investigation. 6. A separate reply was filed by informant/respondent No.2, taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and cause of action, the petitioners having not come to the Court with clean hands, the petition having been filed to delay the trial pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., and the petitioners being estopped from filing and maintaining the present petition. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioners caused a huge financial loss to the informant. The petitioners will get an 6 2025:HHC:23405 opportunity to put their version before the learned Trial Court. The petitioners were irregular in paying the rent, and they stole the articles lying inside the hotel. The informant had handed over the Hotel complete in all respects, and did not violate any terms and conditions of the agreement. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have heard Mr. Saurav Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Bhim Raj Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant. 8. Mr. Saurav Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the dispute between the parties is regarding the terms and conditions of the lease. F.I.R. was wrongly registered in the present case. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: 7 2025:HHC:23405 i. Rikhab Birani & anr. Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 512; ii. Naresh Kumar & another vs. The State of Karnataka and another 2024 INSC 196; iii. Paramjeet Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand and Ors Manu/SC/1108/2012; iv. Sarabjit Kaur vs State of Punjab & Ors. Manu/SC/0193/2023; and v. Vijay Kumar Ghai & Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. passed in Criminal Appeal No. 463 of 2022 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 10951 of 2019. 9. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. show that the damage was caused to the property and the fixtures lying inside the Hotel were removed dishonestly by the petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction cannot go into the correctness or otherwise made in the F.I.R. and has to accept those allegations as correct. The allegations in the F.I.R. disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The police found sufficient material to file a charge sheet against the petitioners. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8 2025:HHC:23405 10. Mr. Bhim Raj Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2, submitted that the petitioners had committed the theft of the articles from the hotel. They claimed that the articles were affixed by them. However, the informant has taken the photographs at the time of handing over the lease to show that the articles were already affixed in the Hotel. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and it should be left to adjudicate the same. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this 9 2025:HHC:23405 Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 10 2025:HHC:23405 (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal 11 2025:HHC:23405 proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 14. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High 12 2025:HHC:23405 Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed on page 703: “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 15. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761: 33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well- established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established 13 2025:HHC:23405 principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. *** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or 14 2025:HHC:23405 (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case. 16. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498: 15 2025:HHC:23405 13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged. 14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) “5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to 16 2025:HHC:23405 abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in 17 2025:HHC:23405 exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied) 17. It was held in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 417 that the High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie opinion when the facts are hazy and the evidence has not been collected. It was observed on page 366: “20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305: 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR 336: AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] 18 2025:HHC:23405 18. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The allegations in the F.I.R. show that the property was leased to the petitioners. They vacated the property and removed the fixtures lying inside the hotel. The damage was caused to the Hotel, and as per the status report, an amount of ₹51,42,000/- would be spent on the restoration of the hotel. These allegations, prima facie, disclose the commission of mischief and theft of the articles lying inside the hotel. 20. It was submitted that the informant violated various terms and conditions of the agreement. This submission cannot be appreciated in the present proceedings. This Court is only concerned with the allegations made in the F.I.R. regarding the damage caused to the Hotel and the removal of the articles kept inside the Hotel. 21. The allegations were also made regarding the non- payment of the rent and violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement by the petitioners and the informant against each other. This is purely a civil dispute, not cognizable by the 19 2025:HHC:23405 Criminal Court. Therefore, no finding is required to be given regarding these allegations. 22. It was submitted that the articles belong to the petitioners and they were within their rights to remove them. It is a matter of the trial and cannot be adjudicated while deciding the present petition for quashing the F.I.R. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 20 2025:HHC:23405 23. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 24. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations 21 2025:HHC:23405 made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 22 2025:HHC:23405 25. Therefore, it is impermissible to go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. 26. It was submitted that the agreement contains an arbitration clause, and the F.I.R. could not have been registered in the present case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 that the availability of the remedy of arbitration is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed at page 690: “9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording relief to the party affected by a breach of the agreement, but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence, albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].” 27. Thus, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed because of the arbitration clause in the agreement. 23 2025:HHC:23405 28. In Rikhab Birani (surpa) the dispute arose out of the agreement to sell between the parties, and it was held that civil proceedings cannot be converted into criminal proceedings unless the ingredients of criminal proceedings were satisfied. 29. Similar views were taken in Naresh Kumar (supra), Paramjeet Batra (supra) and Vijay Kumar (supra). 30. In the present case, the informant made a specific allegation that the leased property was damaged and the articles were stolen. This does not disclose a civil dispute. It is a simple case of mischief and theft. Therefore, cited judgments do not apply to the present case. 31. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge- sheet before the learned Trial Court, hence, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations 24 2025:HHC:23405 levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 32. No other point was urged. 33. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 34. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 35. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) 21st July 2025 Judge (ravinder)