2025:HHC:31349 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 838 of 2025 Reserved on: 2.9.2025 Date of Decision: 12.9.2025. Mohit Ranta ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Jagan Nath, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 113/19, dated 22.12.2019, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 185 and 186 of Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act), registered at Police Station, Kotkhai, District Shimla, H.P. and the proceedings pending before learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:31349 Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, Circuit Court, Theog, District Shimla, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was going to his village in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0844. Some animals crossed the road suddenly. The petitioner tried to save them, but the car skidded and fell off the road. The petitioner sustained minor injuries. The matter was reported to the police, and the police registered the FIR. A charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. No person was present on the site of the accident, and there is no basis for filing the charge sheet. There was no negligence on the part of the petitioner. No other person had sustained injuries. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 3. I have heard Mr. Jagan Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 4. Mr. Jagan Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there is no eyewitness to the incident. No fruitful 3 2025:HHC:31349 purpose would be served by continuing with the proceedings. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Saurabh Sharma v. State of H.P., Cr.MMONo. 1096 of 2022, decided on 8.12.2022 in support of his submission. 5. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in a state of intoxication, and Section 185 of the MV Act was added by the police. The vehicle had left the road, and the principle of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present case. The FIR cannot be quashed merely because no one had witnessed the incident. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the 4 2025:HHC:31349 decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 5 2025:HHC:31349 (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as 6 2025:HHC:31349 contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 7 2025:HHC:31349 9. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It is undisputed that the vehicle had left the road. The vehicles do not usually leave the road, and when they do, the driver has to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Akbar versus State of Karnataka 1980 (1) SCC 30, that the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused rests on the prosecution. However, where the facts of the accident are such that the accident could not have been caused except for the negligence of the accused, the principle of res ipsa loquitor can be applied. It was observed:- “29. However, shorn of its doctrinaire features, understood in the broad, general sense, as by the other line of decisions, only as a convenient ratiocinative aid in the assessment of evidence, in drawing permissive inferences under S. 114, Evidence Act, from the circumstances of the particular case, including the constituent circumstances of the accident, established in evidence, with a view to come to a conclusion at the time of judgment, whether or not, in favour of the alleged negligence (among other ingredients of the offence with which the accused stands charged), such a high degree of probability, as distinguished from a mere possibility has been established which will convince reasonable men with regard to the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such harnessed, functional use of the maxim will not conflict with provisions and the 8 2025:HHC:31349 principles of the Evidence Act relating to the burden of proof and other cognate matters peculiar to criminal jurisprudence. 30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. There are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt. 11. In Keshavamurthy versus State 2002 Cri. L.J 103, a car left the road and hit a tree. It was held that the accident prima facie showed that the driver was negligent, and he had to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was observed: - “It could therefore be seen that, at about 1.00 a.m. in the night, on a road of a total width of 19ft with 6ft kacha road on either side, with no other vehicles in the area, the car hits the roadside tree. As the Supreme Court points out in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2000 (3) Crimes 119 (2000 Cri LJ 3508 (SC)), an accident of such a nature would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident was for a reason 9 2025:HHC:31349 other than his negligence. This is what the Supreme Court states in paragraph-6 of the judgment:- "It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident, negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part." In light of this ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case could be seen. Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of IMV Inspector at Ex.P5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it was for the petitioner driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the petitioner has done in the course of his examination under S.313 Cr. P.C. is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, on the basis of a presumption that the Supreme Court was speaking about a that conviction could be based. 10 2025:HHC:31349 12. In Thakur Singh versus State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208, the accused admitted that he was driving the bus, which left the road and fell into the canal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain how the accident had taken place. It was observed:- “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge, and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 13. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the principle of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to a criminal case. Where the facts speak for themselves and there can be no explanation for the accident except the negligence of the accused, the court can apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur, and the burden will shift upon the accused to show how the accident took place. 14. The petitioner claimed that he was trying to avoid wild animals. This is to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. 11 2025:HHC:31349 Further, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that Section 185 of the MV Act has been added to the present case, which shows that the petitioner was driving the vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on this ground as well. 15. In Saurabh Sharma (supra), the motorcycle had hit the car on the road and not left it. Therefore, the facts were not such that the principle of res ipsa loquitur could have been applied, and the cited judgment will not assist the petitioner. 16. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground that there is no eye witness and continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. 17. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court has taken cognisance of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs State of Maharashtra Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.13424/2025 decided on 03.09.2025 (SC) that the jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS should be exercised after taking cognisance, when the order taking cognisance is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail it. It was observed: 12 2025:HHC:31349 “11….So long cognisance of the offence is not taken, a writ or order to quash the FIR/charge-sheet could be issued un- der Article 226; however, once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided the same is placed on record along with the req- uisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up.” 18. In the present case, the order of cognisance has not been placed on record, and the jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS cannot be exercised. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 21. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 12th September, 2025 (Chander)