Page No.# 1/11 GAHC040019702025 2025:GAU-AP:1362-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WA/51/2025 1:The State of AP and 5 Ors represented by the Chief Secretary, Govt of Arunachal Pradesh, Civil Secretariat, Itanagar. 2: The Commissioner of Home Age: Occupation : Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Civil Secretariat Itanagar. 3: The Deputy Secretary Age: Occupation : Department of Home Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Civil Secretariat Itanagar. 4: The Under Secretary (Home) Age: Occupation : Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar. 5: The Director General of Police Age: Occupation : PHQ Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar. 6: The Commandant Age: Page No.# 2/11 Occupation : 1st APP Bn Govt of Arunachal Pradesh BHQ Chimpu Itanagar VERSUS Bulang Marik Son of Late Bulang Mangha, resident of Papu Nallah, near Hormin Hospital, Jullang Road, PO and PS Papu Hill, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh. :::BEFORE::: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG For the Appellant(s) :Mr. N. Ratan, AAG For the Respondent : Mr. M. Kato Date on which judgment was reserved : NA Date of pronouncement of judgment: 04.12.2025 Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the judgment? : NA Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) 04.12.2025 (N. Sailo, J.) Page No.# 3/11 Heard Mr. N. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General, A.P. for the appellants and Mr. M. Kato, learned counsel for the sole respondent/writ petitioner. 2. This is an intra-court appeal preferred against the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 195(AP)/2025, by which, the order of extension of the suspension of the respondent/writ petitioner (hereafter referred to as the petitioner for convenience) vide order dated 02.06.2024 was set aside. 3. Mr. N. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General, A.P.,at the outset submits that the limited issue involved in the instant writ appeal is the validity or otherwise of an order extending the suspension period after a period of 90 days when the suspension was reviewed before the expiry of 90 days. He submits that the same has to be answered in the affirmative since review was done within 90 days. He submits that there is also no restriction under the provisions of CCS (CCA)Rules, 1965 (Rules of 1965). He submits that in the instant case, the learned Single Judge relying upon the decision of an earlier judgment of a Single Judge in Santosh Kumar Vs. Union of India& Ors, reported in 2025(3) GLT 485, had interfered with the extension of the respondent on the ground that the same was passed after a lapse of 90 days. He submits that the learned Single Judge in Santosh Kumar(Supra) had misinterpreted the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India & Ors Vs. Dipak Mali, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 222. Referring to the said decision, learned Additional Advocate General submits that according to the Apex Court, review of the suspension period has to be done within 90 days and the Apex Court did Page No.# 4/11 not stipulate that such an extension was to be done by passing an order within 90 days. In this regard, the learned Additional Advocate General has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Rule 10, (6) of the Rules of 1965, wherein the expression “before the expiry of 90 days from effective date of suspension” has been kept within a bracket and thereby, meaning that it is review alone which has to be done within 90 days. In other words, the same is not the prescription in case of the order to be passed after a review is done.He therefore, submits that the extension of the suspension of the respondent may have been done after the expiry of 90 days, but when the review itself has been done within a period of 90 days, the extension of the suspension has been rightly passed and should not have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge. 4. Mr. N. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the petitioner by filing his writ petition had challenged the initial suspension order dated 02.06.2024 and whereas, the learned Single Judge has interfered with the order passed subsequently extending the suspension which was not a subject matter of challenge in the writ petition. Such being the case, the impugned judgment and order is not sustainable and should be set aside. The learned Additional Advocate General has also produced the relevant departmental records. 5. Per contra, Mr. M. Kato, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that although review may have been done within a period of 90 days of suspension of the petitioner, but without a communication made to the petitioner in that regard, the same is of no avail. In other words, the learned counsel submits that although the suspension may have been Page No.# 5/11 reviewed but since the outcome of the review has not been put in the form of an order and also communicated to the petitioner, the claim of the appellants of having reviewed the suspension of the petitioner is of no consequence. Therefore, the prolonged suspension of the petitioner is illegal and the learned Single Judge had rightly interfered with the order of extension of the suspension period. 6. Mr. M. Kato, further submits that the petitioner in fact, had submitted a copy of the order, by which, he was granted bail, i.e. bail order dated 18.01.2025 along with his representation dated 21.01.2025 before the authority concerned.But despite the same, the petitioner was not reinstated and for which reason, he approached this Court by filing his writ petition on 01.05.2025. He submits that, as on the date of filing of the writ petition, the suspension period of the petitioner was not reviewed and no order to that effect had been passed and furnished to the petitioner. It was only during the pendency of the writ petition that the responding authorities concerned passed the order of extension of the suspension period dated 03.06.2025. Since,the order was not passed within the period of 90 days as mandated under the Rules of 1965, the same is not sustainable and the learned Single Judge had rightly interfered with the impugned action of the appellate authorities. He submits that in coming to such a conclusion, the learned Single Judge had rightly relied upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of the Court in Santosh Kumar(Supra), which in turn had relied upon the Apex Court’s decision in Dipak Mali(Supra). Under the circumstance, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that no interference is called for with the impugned Page No.# 6/11 judgment and order and the instant appeal should be dismissed. 7. We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the rival parties and we have perused the materials available on record, including the record produced by the learned Additional Advocate General. 8. Facts in brief is that the petitioner was arrested on 14.05.2024 and for which reason, he was suspended vide order dated 02.06.2024 w.e.f 14.05.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner was released on bail on 18.01.2025 and a communication to that effect was received by the authorities concerned on 03.03.2025. Although, according to the petitioner, he had submitted the order dated 18.01.2025 by which he was granted bail along with his representation dated 21.01.2025, but nowhere in his application has he mentioned about his release on bail or that he has enclosed a copy of the bail order. Therefore, the date of intimation about his release on bail as accepted by the writ appellants i.e., 04.03.2025 which can be seen from Annexure-1 of the writ appeal, which is a communication from the Assistant Inspector General of Police(E) PHQ Itanagar, to the Under Secretary to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, will have to be accepted as the date of intimation. 9. The petitioner, being aggrieved with his prolonged suspension, approached this court by filing his writ petition on 01.05.2025 with a prayer for setting aside and quashing the suspension order dated 02.06.2024.The record reveals that his suspension was reviewed by the constituted members which held its meeting on 29.05.2025. The records reveal that after detailed deliberation and taking into consideration the Page No.# 7/11 charges against the petitioner, it was considered necessary for extending the suspension period for another 180 days w.e.f 02.06.2025. The recommendation of the review committee consequently, came to be approved by the competent authority on 03.06.2025. Accordingly, an order of extension of the suspension period for 180 days w.e.f 02.06.2025 was passed on 03.06.2025, which was after the expiry of 90 days, from the initial period of suspension and during the pendency of the writ petition. The issue therefore, to be considered and decided is as to whether the same would be permissible in law. In other words, when the review was held within a period of 90 days from the initial date of suspension, recommending the extension of the suspension period, would it be permissible in law to have an order passed after a lapse of 90 days. In this connection, we will have to revert back to what is provided under the Rules of 1965, more particularly Rule 10(6) and (7), which is abstracted here under for ready perusal: “(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension [before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension] on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.] (7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. Page No.# 8/11 Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days' period in such case will count from the date of Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.” 10. From the above abstract, it may be seen that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made has to be reviewed by the competent authority before the expiry of 90 days with effect from the date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass the orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Further, as per the Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 10, it is provided that order of suspension made or deemed to have been made shall be valid for period of 90 days, unless it is extended after review for further period before the expiry of 90 days. What can be seen is that the suspension remains valid for a period of 90 days and thereafter, it may be extended, subject to such extension being made before the expiry of 90 days. The Apex Court in Dipak Mali (Supra), in the given facts and circumstances of that case at paragraph-10 of said judgment held as follows: “10. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and having also considered the relevant dates relating to suspension of the respondent and when the petitioners' case came up for review on 20.10.2004, we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, as confirmed by the High Court, Page No.# 9/11 that having regard to the amended provisions of sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10, the review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension and as categorically provided under sub- rule (7), the order of suspension made or deemed would not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it was extended after review for a further period of 90 days.” 11. From the above abstract, it may be seen that Apex Court agreed with the views expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and which was confirmed by the High Court in respect of Sub-Rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the Rules of 1965, that the review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension is required to be done before expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension and as categorically provided under Sub- Rule (7), the order of suspension made or deemed to be made could not be valid after a period of 90 days, unless it was extended after a review for a further period of 90 days. 12. A joint reading of Sub-Rule (6) and (7) would therefore, go to show that the extension of the suspension period has to be within 90 days. The reason is that Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 10 clearly provides that the order of suspension would remain valid only for 90 days. In other words, it shall not be valid after the period of 90 days, unless extended. If the proposition of the appellant is to be accepted that since the review itself was done within 90 days period, passing of an order subsequent thereto, would not be fatal. It may so happen that review was done within 90 days but extension of the suspension came to be passed much latter on and Page No.# 10/11 the same would still be considered to be valid. Such proposition in our considered view cannot be accepted for the simple reason that validity of the suspension order is restricted to 90 days. Passing of extension order after lapse of 90 days period would not amount to passing an order of extension of suspension period but would literally amount to passing of fresh order of suspension. Such being the position, we are of the considered view that the extension period by an order after the lapse of 90 days would not be tenable in law. 13. With regard to the submission made that the order dated 03.06.2025, extending the period of suspension not being a subject matter of challenge in the writ petition, the impugned judgment and order, therefore, should be set aside, we are of the view that as on the date of filing of writ petition dated 01.05.2025, there was neither a review of the suspension period of the respondent and much less an order extending the suspension period. Since, we have held that the extension of the suspension period vide an order dated 03.06.2025 was passed after a lapse of 90 days, the said contention of appellant in our considered view would be of no avail, since the period of suspension for 90 days had already lapsed on the date of issuance of the extension of suspension. While saying so, we have also noticed that the appellants have also filed the instant appeal not as per the format prescribed in this regard by the High Court Rules. In fact, the memo of the appeal should contain (i) facts of the case, (ii) contention of the petitioner before the learned Single Judge, (iii) contention of the respondent before the learned Single Judge, (iv) points which arose for decision before the learned Single Judge, (v) Page No.# 11/11 conclusions and decision of the learned Single Judge, (vi) grounds on which conclusion and decision of the learned Single Judge are challenged and lastly, (vii) the relief sought for in the appeal in terms of Form No.3 A which corresponds to Rule 2 (3) of Chapter V-A of High Court Rules. 14. Nevertheless, we have not rejected the instant appeal on the ground of the appeal not being in a proper format but we would like to make it clear that any writ appeal filed which is not found in terms of the format as stated herein above should not be entertained by the Registry henceforth. 15. Thus, upon due consideration of the case in its entirety, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. 16. A copy of this order be placed before the Registrar for necessary action in view of what has been observed at paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of this judgment. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant