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2025 DAILYLAW 23803 (KAR)

SRI K .V.SUBBARATHNA SETTY v. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT

WA/654/2024 · 2025-03-03

T M Nadaf, V Kameswar Rao

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Judgment text

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- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF MARCH, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 654 OF 2024 (L-KSRTC) BETWEEN: SRI K.V.SUBBARATHNA SETTY, S/O LATE SRI VENKATARSHAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS, R/AT NO 22/51, 8TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD, TENT ROAD, SANJEEVININAGAR, NAGARABHAVI POST, BENGALURU-560072. REPRESENTED BY GENERAL SECRETARY, KSRTC AND BMTC UNITED EMPLOYEES’ UNION, NO.23, 4TH MAIN ROAD, MATHIKERE EXTENSION, BANGALORE-560054. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. SOMA SUNDER RAO R, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, BENGALURU CENTRAL DIVISION, BENGALURU BY ITS DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER. 2. STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, Digitally signed by K G RENUKAMBA Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 PRESIDING OFFICER, NO.5, LABOUR STATE INSURANCE SCHEME MEDICAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARIAT, VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. RENUKA H R, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R2) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 01.02.2024 IN WRIT PETITION No.20255/2021 (L-KSRTC) PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT, ETC. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated 01.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP No.20255/2021, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein challenging the award dated 25.10.2019 of the Industrial Tribunal in ID No.102/2011. - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 2. The appellant herein while working as a conductor, was imposed with a punishment of reducing his basic pay by one increment for a period of six months vide order dated 07.03.1991. He attained the age of superannuation in the year 2004. He challenged the order dated 07.03.1990 by raising an industrial dispute in the year 2005, which dispute was finally referred to the Industrial Tribunal vide reference dated 15.02.2011 by the appropriate Government. The English translation of the reference is in the following terms: “1. Divisional Controller, KSRTC Bangalore Central Division, Bangalore of Administrative Board has imposed penalty to Sri K V Subbarathna Shetty Conductor 64 years. Whether it is lawful to that said applicant has raised the issue after 19 years without informing the reason for delay? 2. Whether it is lawful to non cumulatively reduce the next 1 annual pay increment of Sri KB Subbarthna Shetty Conductor, 64 years represented by General Secretary, KSRTC & BMTC United Employees Union, Matikere Extension Bangalore for 6 months and Whether it is lawful that he is not eligible for any pay increment during the said period - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 as per the Order No; KST/BNG/EST/420/7805/90-91 dated: 07-03-1990 by Divisional Controller, KSRTC Bangalore Central Division Bangalore of Administrative Board? 3. If not said labour is eligible for what relief?” 3. The Industrial Tribunal answered the reference in favour of the appellant herein by giving findings in the following manner: “17. In view of my findings on point No.1 and 2, I pass the following: AWARD The claim statement filed by the first party is allowed. Point No.1 of the reference referred by the Government under Section 10(1)(d) of I.D.Act is hereby answered in affirmative holding that the first party is justified in raising the dispute after lapse of 19 years from the date of punishment order 07.03.1991. Point No.2 of the reference is answered holding that the second party is not justified in reducing the basic pay of the workman Sri.K.V.Subbarathnashetty, by one ensuing annual increment for a period of 6 months and dis-entitling him for any increment during the said period vide - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 punishment order dated 07.03.1991. The said punishment order dated 07.03.1991 is set aside. The first party workman is entitled for all the reliefs in view of setting aside the said punishment order dated 07.03.1991. Send Copy of this Award to the Government for publication. The Government is directed to publish the award in such manner as it thinks fit within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the same. The award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 of the I.D.Act 1947. The Government is directed to intimate the publication of award to all the parties to the case by registered post acknowledgement due, without fail.” 4. The grounds on which the writ petition had been filed by the respondent nol.1 includes, the appellant herein had not questioned the order of punishment, as such the appellant cannot seek a reference with respect to punishment order separately. It was also the case of respondent No.1, that the reference itself was belated and - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 the order of the Industrial Tribunal condoning the delay without any proper application is bad. 5. On the other hand, the case of the appellant was, the appropriate Government has rightly referred the industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. No prejudice has been caused to respondent No.1 as the records were required to be kept in order, even after a lapse of time. This stand is primarily made against the stand of the respondent No.1 that records have been destroyed. The learned Single Judge has set aside the findings of Industrial Tribunal in paragraphs No.6 to 8, which we have already reproduced. 6. The submission of Sri. Somasunder Rao.R, learned counsel for the appellant is that, the Tribunal has clearly erred in setting aside the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. According to him, the reference is not belated in as much as the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of punishment was not considered as the same was not replied to and the appellant was waiting for a reply on - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 the departmental appeal submitted by him. It is only after his retirement he has raised the industrial dispute. This is a proper explanation for the delay and laches and the Industrial Tribunal has rightly condoned it. 7. We are not in agreement with the submission made by Sri. Rao for the simple reason that the punishment order having been passed in the year 1990, raising of an industrial dispute after 15 years was highly belated. That apart, there is no proper explanation as to what prevented the appellant to raise an industrial dispute immediately after the passing of the punishment order. In the absence of proper explanation, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein. This we say so in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar –Vs.- Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Anr. [(2015) 15 SCC 1], wherein in paragraphs No.42.1 to 42.3, has stated as under: - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 “42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that “any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended”. The words “industrial dispute exists” are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred.” (Emphasis Supplied) 8. Though the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh -Vs.- General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar [(2014) 10 SCC 301], the same was considered by the Supreme Court in its latest judgment Prabhakar (Supra) referred to above and the same has been distinguished by the Supreme Court in paragraph No.27, which we reproduce as under: “25) In Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar 16, this Court scanned through most of the available case law on the subject and emphasized that the words 'at any time' occurring in Section 10 of the Act would imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to Labour Court - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 within reasonable time considering circumstances in which the appellant therein was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for delay given by the workman 16 (2014) 10 SCC 301 in raising the dispute. In that case, it was found that there was a criminal case pending against the workman and further the Management had assured him that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of evidence due to the said delay.” 9. Whereas in the case in hand, the Industrial Tribunal has, on point No.1, in paragraph No.16, held as under: “16. Learned counsel for the first party has also relied on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in W.P.No.29043/2015(S-KSRTC) dated 08.03.2018 wherein Their Lordships have held that Regulation 22 of KSRTC Servants (C&D) Regulation 1971 was not followed and allowed the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner in the said case with regard to hear on enquiry by the writ petitioner. The allegations made against the first party workman and the punishments were issued to him on the charges without holding enquiry. In the said case, law recognises for issuance of charge sheet after framing the charges, it mandates on the part of the second party management to hold enquiry against - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 the erred officials whether he has committed misconduct or not. Without the enquiry report, the punishments were passed against him behind his back which hits the principles of natural justice. In the present case, no choice to conduct the defence by the official who committed misconduct as alleged in the charge sheel. Therefore it cannot be held that there is a delay in raising the dispute as he was unaware of the punishment order. In the case between Raghubeer Singh Vs General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301, Their Lordships have observed that the dispute could be adjudicated upon despite delay since there was no loss or unavailable of evidence due to delay. Further more, Their Lordships have held that the workman cannot be denied relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute. Therefore the delay in raising the dispute is hereby condoned as principles of natural justice was not followed in the present case without giving an opportunity to the first party workman before passing the punishment order.” 10. The aforesaid conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal is not a proper reasoning on the delay that has occurred for the appellant to raise an industrial dispute. It follows that, the reference made after almost 20 years is - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:9046-DB WA No. 654 of 2024 bad. Moreover it is the case of respondent no.1, that the records have been destroyed. 11. In view of our discussion above, we agree with the final conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 12. We do not see any merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE PA List No.: 1 Sl No.: 28