- 1 - IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR. N.V. ANJARIA, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND WRIT APPEAL NO. 632 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1 . SRI M. BASAVARAJ NAIK S/O LATE MANYA NAIK AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT NO.1569/45, 3RD CROSS TARALABALU BADAVANE VIDYA NAGAR DAVANAGERE - 577 005 ... APPELLANT (BY SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI B. VINAYAKA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY 2 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE VIKASA SOUDHA BENGALURU - 560 001 - 2 - REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL SECRETARY 3 . THE COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001 4 . CENTRAL RELIEF COMMITTEE M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001 REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY ... RESPONDENTS (SRI K. SHASHIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL A/W SMT. SHWETA KRISHNAPPA, ADDITIONAL GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 3 SRI H.N. VASUDEVAN, ADVOCATE AND MS. ADOORYA BOMAKKA HARISH, ADVOCATE FOR CAVEATOR/RESPONDENT No.4) --- THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE FINAL ORDER DATED 05.04.2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION No.10994/2023 AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION No.10994/2023. THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED AS UNDER: - 3 - CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND C.A.V. JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA) The challenge in this appeal preferred by appellant-original petitioner, under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 is addressed to the common judgment and order of learned Single Judge dated 5th April 2024 in two writ petitions, in so far as the said judgment and order is relatable to decision in writ petition No.10994 of 2023, whereby the petition came to be dismissed. 2. What was prayed by the petitioner in his petition was to set aside communication dated 22nd May 2023 issued by the Chief Secretary, whereby the nomination of the petitioner as a member and consequently as Chairman of the Central Relief Committee was cancelled before expiry of the term for which the petitioner was nominated. 3. As per Section 4(3) of the Karnataka Prohibition of Beggary Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The term of office of the non-official members is three years. The petitioner was - 4 - nominated on 26th July 2022 and came to be displaced from the post by Notification dated 23rd May 2023. 3.1 Section 4 of the Act which provides for Central Relief Committee and under which the nomination of the petitioner as non-official member and consequential appointment in capacity of member to the post of Chairman is governed, reads as under: “4. Central Relief Committee- (1) The Government may by notification constitute a Central Relief Committee (hereunder referred to as the Committee). The Committee shall consist of,- (a) The Secretary to Government Social Welfare and Labour Department … Member (b) The Director of Social Welfare in Karnataka … Member (c) The Secretary to Government, Finance Department … Member (d) Four non-official members nominated by the Government … Members The Government may appoint one of the Members of the Committee as its Chairman and appoint a Secretary who may or may not be a member of the Committee. (3) Subject to the pleasure of the State Government, the term of the office of the non- official members shall be for a period of three years: - 5 - Provided that if a non-official member of the Committee absents himself without permission of the Committee for two consecutive meetings of the Committee, he shall cease to be a member. (4) (a) Casual or other vacancies in the Committee shall be filled by the Government in the prescribed manner. (b) During any vacancy in the Committee the continuing members may act as if no vacancy had occurred. (5) The non-official members shall be paid such remuneration and allowances as may be prescribed. (6) The Committee shall meet at least once in two months. (7) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the supervision, direction and control of all matters relating to the administration of relief shall vest in the Committee.” 3.2 It could be noticed from the above statutory provision that as per sub-Section (3), the term of the office of a non-official member is provided to be for a period of three years, to be subject to the pleasure of the State Government. In other words, provision of Section 4(3) incorporates doctrine of pleasure in respect of the term of a non-official member. The membership remains at the pleasure of the State Government as per the plain language of the provision. - 6 - 3.3 The petitioner stated in his petition that he was a former Member of Legislative Assembly of the State of Karnataka who had won election from Mayakonda constituency from Davangere and that he served as Chairman of Thanda Development Corporation. Referring to the provisions of Section 4(3) of the Act, it was the case that thereunder the term of the office of the non-official member was provided to be three years subject to the pleasure of the State Government, and that the petitioner was nominated by Notification dated 26th July 2022 under Section 4 of the Act, discharging his duties as Chairman of the Central Relief Committee since the date of his nomination. However, by communication dated 23rd May 2023 issued by the Hon’ble Chief Minister nominations of all the Chairmans, Directors and Members of all the Boards and Corporations in the State were cancelled in arbitrary manner, guided by political consideration due to change of the Government. 3.4 It was the case of the petitioner by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India [(2010) 6 SCC 331], that though the term of the nominated member- petitioner was subject to pleasure of the government, the doctrine of pleasure does not empower the government to act capriciously - 7 - and arbitrarily and that the Notification dated 23rd May 2023 removing the petitioner in the middle of the term was not permissible. 3.5 In the statement of objections, it was the stand of the government that the provisions of Section 4(3) of the Act contained a specific stipulation about the term of the office of the non-official member to be subject to pleasure of the State Government. It was contended that a nominated member could not claim any right or lien over the post to which nomination was made. 4. Learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition, considered the scope of doctrine of pleasure by extensively referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal (supra) and the observations made therein, to notice that though the application of doctrine of pleasure in a democratic set up to unseat the appointee to the post cannot be in arbitrary manner, after analyzing the various judgments, learned Single Judge concluded highlighting the observations in the decision of the division bench of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. Dr. Deepthi Bhava which was writ appeal No.617 of 2021 decided on 25th September 2021, wherein a view was taken that a person holding office as nominee would hold the office at the pleasure of the State - 8 - and it cannot be viewed that any right is taken away by cancelling the nomination. 5. The doctrine of pleasure evolved in England encapsulates a kind of prerogative power that the order of an office would be under the pleasure of the State, liable to be removed at any time without assigning reason or without notice and without there being a need for any cause. In other words, the pleasure appointment is an assignment of someone to employment that can be taken away at any time. An appointee appointed with condition that it would hold the office at the pleasure of the government, would remain on the post at such pleasure. 5.1 Whether the invocation of the doctrine of pleasure in a given set of case may depend upon variety of attendant aspects, including the nature of the post and the nature of appointment, and all the above, the language of the provision under which person holds the office. These and such relevant factors would guide the degree of application of the doctrine. 5.2 In the facts of the case, two aspects emerge in the forefront. Firstly, provisions of Section 4 of the Karnataka Prohibition of Beggary Act, 1975 which governs the rights of the appointee - 9 - member-the petitioner, unequivocally mentions and incorporates in its sub-section (3) the doctrine of pleasure. It says that the term of the office of the non-official member shall be for a period of three years, but subject to the pleasure of the State Government. It expressly provides that the pleasure of doctrine operates. In the second place, the membership of the petitioner is a non-official member who was nominated membership by virtue of Section 4(2)(d) of the Act. The petitioner was a nominee member nominated amongst four non-official members to be nominated by the government. 6. The position of law in respect of application of Doctrine of Pleasure vis-à-vis the nominated member's tenure was considered by the Supreme Court in Om Narain Agarwal and others Vs. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and others, (1993) 2 SCC 242, in light of the provisions of Section 9, fourth Proviso to U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, inter alia, contemplated that a member nominated under Section 9 shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government, but not beyond the term of the Board. 6.1 The Supreme Court observed, "... In respect of a nominated member, power of curtailment of term has now been given to the State Government under the fourth proviso to - 10 - Section 9 added after the third proviso through the amending Act of 1990. In the cases before us, we are concerned with the removal of nominated members under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act ... " (para 11) 6.1.1 It was observed that right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body, depends upon and arises under a statute. It was stated in the context of the facts of that case that the initial nomination of two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. The position of nominee member under Section 9 was contrasted with Section 40 which dealt with an elected member stating that the legislature had provided grounds in Section 40 itself under which the elected members can be removed. However, so far as the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided, it was stated, that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. 6.1.2 The Supreme Court further observed, "If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or - 11 - authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. ..." (para 11) 6.1.3 The Supreme Court stated that the Doctrine of Pleasure contained in the fourth Proviso to Section 9 of the UP Municipalities Act did not offend any of the Articles of the Constitution nor could be said to be against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution and that the question of violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity of hearing to the nominated members before his or her removal does not arise under the Pleasure Doctrine. 6.2 The principles laid down with regard to operation of Pleasure Doctrine and the nominated member was further carried on and considered by the Apex Court in Krishna S/o Bulaji Borate Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2001) 2 SCC 441. The said decision concerned the removal of nominated trustees from the office by the State Government "at any time" under Section 6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. It was held that removal of trustee under Section 6 of the Act was not stigmatic and such removal was completely different from a removal of any trustee under the Act for the specific reasons set out in the said section. - 12 - 6.2.1 Section 6 provided that the term of the office of the Chairman or of any trustee appointed under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall be five years, provided that the Chairman or any trustee may be removed from office by the State Government at any time before the completion of such term. In other words, by providing that the removal can be at any time Doctrine of Pleasure was incorporated. 6.2.2 The Supreme Court observed thus, "The removal spoken of here neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of pleasure which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent of the legislature." (para 9) 6.2.3 The Supreme Court stated that though the word "removed" was used in the Section and some other word would have been employed, there was no gainsaying that Section 6 incorporated the Doctrine of Pleasure. It was further observed by referring to the decision in Om Narain Agarwal (supra), - 13 - "Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then sub-section (3) of Section 10 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing an order or removal under Section 10, while there is no such corresponding sub-section under Section 6. Thus intent of legislature of very clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of pleasure is implicit under Section 6. ..." (para 11) 6.3 This High Court in H. Rajaiah and others Vs. State of Karnataka, 2000 (6) Kar.LJ 401 addressed the very issue of premature removal of nominated members before the completion of the tenure in the context of the provisions of Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 to specifically observe that the intensity of judicial review in respect of decision relating to making or unmaking the nomination, is very low. According to this High Court, as observed in H. Rajaiah (supra), Doctrine of Pleasure could not be viewed just as a relic of arbitrary power of absolute monarch but, it has its own purpose which empowers the State Government to remove a government servant from the office when such government servant is intended to hold the office at the desire and pleasure of the government. - 14 - 6.3.1 It was stated that in India the recognition of the doctrine is found incorporated in the provisions of Articles 76(4), 156(1), 165(3) and 311 of the Constitution. It was held that the Doctrine and the amplitude of power available thereunder cannot be viewed to be voilative of Right to Equality. This Court in H. Rajaiah (supra) relied on the very decision of the Supreme Court in Om Narain Agarwal (supra) and highlighted the nature of the nominations, "Such then is the nature of the nominations. They are made without following any transparent or objective process of selection of those vying for such nominations. They hold good during the pleasure of the Government and are therefore tenuous lacking certainty or security of tenure. The intensity of review of any decision relating to the making or unmaking or a nomination has thus to be low. ..." (para 15) 7. The fine yet subtle and substantive distinction between 'appointment' and 'nomination' came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Cheviti Venkanna Yadav Vs. State of Telangana and others, (2017) 1 SCC 283 in the context of the provisions of Telangana (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. The issue was relating to removal of nominated member prior to the expiry of the tenure of the appointment. It was held that the nominated members were not elected and were not - 15 - appointed by any kind of selection but, they were chosen by the State Government from certain categories. The Supreme Court viewed that even if the word "appointed" was used in the previous provision which was subsequently amended to substitute the word "nominated", even in the earlier provision what was contemplated was not an appointment which could be equated to a post in service jurisprudence. 7.1 Following observations are relevant to notice which brings out the conceptual and legal differentiation between appointment and nomination, "The word "appointment" has been substituted by "nomination". It is an appointment by nomination. It is from certain categories for the purpose of representation. It is not appointment as the word ordinarily connotes. The legislature, in its wisdom, has substituted the word "appointment" and made it "nomination with retrospective effect". To enable it to curtail or reduce the term, the procedure Zfor removal remains intact. A nominee can go from office by efflux of time when the period is over. That is different than when he is removed. A nominated member, in praesenti, can also be removed by adopting the procedure during the period. Otherwise, he shall continue till his term is over; and the term is one year. The plea of vested right is like building a castle in Spain. It has no legs to stand upon and, therefore, we unhesitatingly repel the said submission." (para 34) - 16 - 8. The principle that there is no carte blanche available for the State Government in applying the Doctrine of Pleasure and that the Pleasure power cannot be invoked capriciously and at the whims of the Government operates with a different degree in the facts or categories of cases, given the context of the nature of post and nature of appointment. The Doctrine of Pleasure when to be applied and invoked in relation to a person nominated to any Board or statutory body when his or her nomination is subjected to the Doctrine of Pleasure of the Government, there will be a little room to contend that nominee member is not permitted to complete the regular total period of the tenure of nomination. 8.1 By the very fact that it is a nomination, the same is liable to be withdrawn or cancelled before the tenure is completed. It could be said that it is possible and permissible to operate the Doctrine of Pleasure with more rigor in the cases of nomination validly distinguished from the appointment, even as the nomination is often viewed as mode of appointment. Nomination remains a nomination where the nominee will not secure himself or herself a vested right to continue. 9. In light of the above position of law discussed, reverting back to the facts obtained in this case under the Karnataka Prohibition of - 17 - Beggary Act, 1975, as provided in Section 4 of the Act, the Government constitutes Central Relief Committee. As per Section 2, the Committee consists of Secretary to Government, Social Welfare and Labour Department, the Director of Social Welfare in Karnataka and the Secretary, Finance Department to be the three members and in addition, four non-official members nominated by the government. Thus, the Committee is set up by the State Government consisting of seven members. 9.1 The further provision that the Government may appoint one of the members of the Committee as its Chairman. It could be well said that the Central Relief Committee constituted under Section 4 of the Act is in a way controlled by the State Government for the purpose of its constitution. It was a membership nominated to the Central Relief Committee and not to any autonomous body where the control or interference of the government has to be eschewed and avoided. Sub-Section (3) starts with the group of words ‘subject to pleasure of the State Government’, to provide that some of the non-official members shall be for a period of three years. The chairmanship is consequential to membership, or that the basis is membership which qualifies for becoming Chairperson. - 18 - 9.2 Evidently, the doctrine of pleasure is expressly incorporated to be operated in case of nominated members. When the petitioner is nominated as a member by Notification dated 26th July 2022, it was clearly contemplated that it was ‘until further orders’. It implied that pleasure of doctrine could be invoked at a particular juncture. Pursuant to Note dated 22nd May 2023 by the Hon’ble Chief Minister, the Secretary to the Government, Social Welfare Department issued impugned Notification dated 23rd May 2023 cancelling the nomination of the petitioner. 9.3 The petitioner being a nominee member and his ‘appointment’ as nominated member was under the express provision of Section 4(3) contained in the pleasure of doctrine, it was not possible for the petitioner to seek any enforceable right to continue on the post. The State Government was within its right to withdraw the nomination or cancel the appointment before three years. Though the nomination can be viewed as a mode of appointment and it could be loosely used as substitute for appointment, the nomination to the Committee under Section 4(2) of the Act read with Section 3 of the Act, has its own connotation and import to divest the petitioner of any exercisable right and - 19 - entitled the State Government to prematurely cancel the status of the nominee petitioner under the doctrine of pleasure. 10. For the foregoing discussion read with the reasons supplied by learned Single Judge, the dismissal of the petition and consequential refusal to grant relief by learned Single Judge is eminently proper and legal. No interference is called for in the impugned judgment and order. 11. The appeal is dismissed. Sd/- (N.V. ANJARIA) CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- (K.V. ARAVIND) JUDGE AHB - 20 - ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA) After the pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate Mr. S.P. Siddhartha for learned advocate Mr. B. Vinayaka requests the Court to continue the interim order for some time. The request was objected to by learned Additional Government Advocate Smt. Shwetha Krishanappa. In view of what is held by the Court in the judgment, the request cannot be acceded to. It is rejected. Sd/- (N. V. ANJARIA) CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE CR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1