2025:UHC:6899-DB HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL HON’BLE JUSTICE SRI MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI AND HON’BLE JUSTICE SRI SUBHASH UPADHYAY Writ Petition (S/B) No. 334 of 2013 Dashrath Singh Rana --Petitioner Versus Union of India and others --Respondents -------------------------------------------------------------------- Advocates:- Mr. Alok Dalakoti, Advocate for the petitioner through video conferencing. Mr. Virendra Kumar Kaparuwan, Advocate for the Union of India -------------------------------------------------------------------- The Court made the following: JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari) 1. Petitioner has challenged judgment dated 22.05.2013, rendered by Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 1889 of 2010 (U). By the said judgment, original application filed by petitioner challenging order passed by disciplinary authority as affirmed by appellate authority, was dismissed. 2. It is not in dispute that petitioner was posted as Officiating Deputy Postmaster in General Post Office, Haldwani (Nainital) from 01.01.2002 to 31.08.2002. During said period, a huge amount of money was siphoned off from the R.D. accounts of depositors. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner and enquiry was held. Based on the findings returned by Enquiry Officer, petitioner was dismissed from service by the Director of Postal Services, vide order dated 19.07.2007. 3. Petitioner preferred departmental appeal challenging the dismissal order. His appeal was partly 1 2025:UHC:6899-DB allowed and the punishment of dismissal was modified to that of reduction in rank and he was directed to be reinstated vide order dated 27.03.2008, passed by Chief Postmaster General, Uttarakhand Circle, Dehradun. 4. Petitioner thereafter approached Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, challenging order passed by disciplinary authority and also the appellate authority. Learned Tribunal dismissed his Original Application vide judgment dated 14.05.2013. Thus, feeling aggrieved, petitioner has approached this Court, challenging judgment rendered by learned Tribunal. He has also challenged the orders passed by disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. 5. Mr. V.K. Kaparuwan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents is right in submitting that since the order passed by appellate authority has merged in the judgment rendered by learned Tribunal, therefore, it cannot be independently challenged in this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself during the course of enquiry. He submits that at the stage of inspection of documents, he was given documents which were not legible; witnesses did not directly support the charge; none of the depositors made any complaint regarding wrong payment; no independent witnesses was produced before enquiry officer; two departmental witnesses stated before the enquiry officer that there is no direct evidence against the applicant and regarding charge 2 2025:UHC:6899-DB no. 3, it was stated that fraud was committed in 2001 when applicant was not posted at Haldwani Post Office; the orders passed by disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are non-speaking and were passed without considering full facts and the charge-sheet was vague. 7. We have gone through the impugned judgment. Learned Tribunal has held that although the primary responsibility for misappropriation of money was of Mr. M.C. Suyal, however, petitioner, who was working in supervisory capacity, failed to exercise adequate supervision and control over Mr. M.C. Suyal, as per the provision contained in Post Office Manual. 8. It further reveals that Enquiry Officer held charge number 1 and 5 as not proved, but charge number 2, 3 & 4 were found to be proved. Learned Tribunal has held that petitioner’s allegation that certain documents were not legible relates to preliminary enquiry and petitioner has not alleged that he was not allowed full access to all documents as mentioned in the charge-sheet. If the documents were not legible, then petitioner could have requested for legible copies of the documents. There is no averment that petitioner made such a request. 9. Degree of proof in a departmental enquiry is different from a criminal trial. In a departmental enquiry, an employee can be punished based on preponderance of evidence while in criminal trial, charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt for punishing someone. It is not the case of petitioner that enquiry report is based on no evidence. Admittedly, 3 2025:UHC:6899-DB enquiry was held as per norms. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar Vs. Shashikant S. Patil and another reported in 2000 (1) SCC 416 has held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. 11. It was further held that the settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. In the case of State of A.P. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “the High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether 4 2025:UHC:6899-DB the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Whether there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 13. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, Hon’ble Supreme Court considered and discussed the scope of judicial review of a punishment order. Para 12, 13 and 14 of the said judgment are extracted below: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or 5 2025:UHC:6899-DB finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 14. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas [(1993) 4 SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 230 : (1993) 25 ATC 844] when the order of transfer was interfered with by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P. Vora [1993 Supp (1) SCC 551 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 281 : (1993) 23 ATC 672] it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant. Recently, in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow [(1994) 2 SCC 537 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 687 : (1994) 27 ATC 149 : JT (1994) 1 SC 217] a Bench of this Court of which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ.) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority.” 14. We concur with the view taken by learned Tribunal. The punishment to be imposed upon an employee is exclusively within the domain of 6 2025:UHC:6899-DB disciplinary authority and the appellate authority has coextensive power to re appreciate the evidence or to modify the punishment order. In a departmental enquiry, adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. 15. In the case in hand, Appellate authority reduced the penalty on the ground that Mr. M.C. Suyal, who was the co-accused and was suspected to be the primary offender, could not be subjected to disciplinary enquiry due to his death. The Appellate Authority also took into account the family circumstances of the petitioner for reducing the penalty imposed upon him. 16. Thus, learned Tribunal was justified in not interfering with the punishment as modified by appellate authority. 17. Thus, there is no scope for interference in the impugned judgment. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. _______________________________ MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J. ____________________________ SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J. Dt: 6th August, 2025 Mahinder 7 MAHINDER SINGH Digitally signed by MAHINDER SINGH DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=da6212e6e78d94ed3134842bc6a8d6ca168979ca7b8c2f031a92d1a18b08 923c, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=AB77B7C5B240908B392BE84F5CDD4C2AF35DC4626D305B1BC9EA 4BABA43D2B8F, cn=MAHINDER SINGH Date: 2025.08.08 13:51:13 +05'30'