Page No.# 1/11 GAHC040018922025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./259/2025 Nikh Kamin and Anr Son of Late Nikh Khopi, permanent resident of Village Anoipur, PO and PS Diyun, Changlang District, Arunachal Pradesh. 2: Murari Lal Paswan Age: Occupation : Son of Late Shiv Mangal Paswan resident of Village Diyun Bazaar PO and PS Diyun Changlang District Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of Arunachal Pradesh represented through the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : Rintu Saikia, Muchi Mele,Mindo Taso,Idak Bam,Bomchi Taipodia,Limi Bam,Ligam Nochi Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANJAN MONI KALITA ORDER Dated: 10.12.2025 Heard Mr. I. Bam, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. Page No.# 2/11 2. This is an application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, praying for quashing the FIR dated 11.04.2019, which has been registered as Diyun P.S. Case No.08/2019, corresponding to G.R. Case No.109/2019, under Sections 341/352/506/511/171(F) of the IPC, as well as for quashing the subsequent charge-sheet No.02/2020 dated 14.03.2020, in connection with which the trial is pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang District, Arunachal Pradesh. 3. The instant application has been filed jointly by the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.2, contending that an FIR was filed by the petitioner No.2 against the petitioner No.1 as well as another co-accused person. After filing of the FIR, Diyun P.S. Case No.08/2019 was registered under Sections 341/352/506/511/171(F) of the IPC, and thereafter, charge-sheet No.02/2020 dated 14.03.2020 was filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that during the pendency of the trial, both the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.2 have entered into a mutual settlement agreement dated 11.10.2025, whereby they agreed to settle their disputes amicably and not to pursue the case any further. In view of the said settlement arrived at between the parties, the petitioners contend that since they have mutually resolved the matter, the instant petition should be allowed by quashing the aforesaid FIR dated 11.04.2019 and the subsequent charge-sheet No.02/2020 dated 14.03.2020. 5. The gist of the allegations, as narrated in the FIR dated 11.04.2019 is that the accused No.3, an unknown Chakma youth and supporter of accused No.1 Page No.# 3/11 (petitioner No.1) came to the residence of petitioner No.2 and informed him that petitioner No.1 wished to speak to him regarding the election campaign scheduled after a few days. The petitioner No.2 was requested to come to the campaign office of petitioner No.1 located at Avoipur village near Diyun Bazar. When the petitioner No.2 reached the office, petitioner No.1, who was sitting in a chair started accusing him of taking away his voters and supporting another candidate. When the petitioner No.2 denied such allegations, the petitioner No.1 allegedly stood up, smashed his mobile phone and repeatedly hit him on his head. The petitioner No.1 also slapped and punched him on his head and body. The petitioner No.2 was further assaulted and slapped by the PSO of the petitioner No.1. The petitioner No.1 allegedly threatened to kill him if he did not shift all the voters under him to the petitioner No.1’s side. The petitioner No.2 stated that he was held captive inside the office for more than one hour and that he eventually managed to escape and thereafter went for medical treatment. 6. Upon receipt of the FIR, the Police registered Diyun P.S. Case No.08/2019 (G.R. Case No.109/2019) under the aforementioned sections. After recording the statement of the complainant and other witnesses, the I.O. of the case filed charge-sheet No.02/2020 dated 14.03.2020 against the petitioner No.1. 7. It is the case of the petitioners that during the pendency of the trial before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang, both the petitioners have arrived at a mutual settlement by executing a settlement agreement dated 11.10.2025, whereby they have amicably compromised and resolved their differences with the intervention of friends and well-wishers, in their mutual interest and benefit. Accordingly, the instant joint application has been filed by Page No.# 4/11 the petitioners seeking quashing of the proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang. 8. It may be relevant at this stage to summarize the terms of the settlement agreement dated 11.10.2025, entered into between the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.2, as stated hereinbelow: “(i). The petitioner No.2 in pursuance of amicable settlement of his dispute with the petitioner No.1 shall not pursue with the G.R. Case No.109/2019 in Diyun P.S. Case No. 08/2019, U/S 341/352/511/171(F) IPC, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang; (ii) In view of the agreement, the petitioner No.2 shall withdraw/compound G.R. Case No.09/2019 in Diyun P.S. Case No. 08/2019 and shall not pursue the above referred case and both the parties shall submit an application/petition before the appropriate court including High Court or any other court established by Law having jurisdiction to try the above case for passing appropriate order accordingly; and (iii) Both the parties shall maintain cordial and peaceful relation between them and shall not claim any cost or compensation in view of their mutual settlement agreement. 9. Mr. Bam, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner No.1 has been charge-sheeted under Sections 341/352/506/511/171(F) of the IPC, out of which Sections 341/352 and 506 are compoundable, and only Sections 171(F) and 511 IPC are non-compoundable. He submits that in view of several decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, even in the non-compoundable Page No.# 5/11 offences also, this Court in exercise of inherent powers conferred under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 may quash the criminal proceedings, taking into account the fact that the dispute between the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.2 have already been amicably settled and that there is no purpose in continuing with the pending trial before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. 10. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 as well as the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303. 11. Ms. Jini, learned Addl. P.P., submits that in view of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties by executing a settlement agreement dated 11.10.2025, she has no objection if the prayer made by the petitioners is allowed. 12. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be relevant at this stage to refer to the case of Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. Vs. Radhika & Anr., reported in (2011) 10 SCC 705, wherein the Honb’le Apex Court in paragraph 17 has held as under: “17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between Page No.# 6/11 compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C." 13. In the case of Jagdish Chanana & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in (2008) 15 SCC 704, wherein the Honb’le Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 has held as follows: “2. During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court Crl. Misc. Petition No. 42 of 2008 has been filed putting on record a compromise deed dated 30-4-2007. The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in Court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. 3. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transactions that had been Page No.# 7/11 entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash FIR No. 83 dated 12-3-2005, PS City Sonepat and all consequent proceedings." 14. In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Apex Court, after discussing several judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, including the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 in similar circumstances, has laid down the following principles which are quoted herein below: - “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject. may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. Page No.# 8/11 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim has settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. Page No.# 9/11 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction his remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 15. In this connection, it may be relevant to refer to the propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra). The relevant portion of paragraph-61 of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is reproduced herein below: - “61. ……But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre- dominatingly civil flavor stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes Page No.# 10/11 where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim….” 16. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and Ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking into account the fact that the dispute between the parties arose from their marital relationship and that they had already resolved their entire disputes among themselves, even if, the proceedings are allowed to be continued, the chance of conviction is very remote and bleak, for ends of justice, allowed the petition for quashing. It may be relevant herein, to reproduce paragraph-15.5 of the aforesaid case. “15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused, the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.” 17. In the instant case in hand, it is seen that the allegations levelled by the Page No.# 11/11 parties against each other are personal in nature, without having any possible influence on the society at large. It is also apparent that no heinous or serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape, dacoity or any such nature are involved in the allegations made against each other by the parties in the instant case. It is also seen from the facts and in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties that the possibility of conviction of any of the parties is remote and bleak, and therefore, the continuation of such criminal proceeding would be a futile exercise and a wastage of time. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussions and after considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties as well as the materials available on record, and also taking into account the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be served if the instant petition is allowed by quashing and setting aside the proceedings arising out of Diyun P.S. Case No. 08/2019, corresponding to G.R. Case No. 109/2019, under Sections 341/352/506/511/171(F) IPC, along with the charge-sheet so filed vide Charge- sheet No. 02/2020 dated 14.03.2020, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Changlang District, Arunachal Pradesh. 19. Accordingly, the instant petition stands disposed of, in terms of the directions indicated hereinabove. Send back the TCR. JUDGE Comparing Assistant