-1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Revision No. 895 of 2024 …. Pankaj Kumar Singh, aged about 36 years, son of Anil Kumar Singh, resident of Village –Cherabar, PO- Taleya Babhandi, PS- Taleya Babhandi, Daltonganj, District- Palamu …… Petitioner Versus Kumari Pratima Singh wife of Pankaj Kumar Singh, daughter of Balram Singh, resident of Village- Sudna, PO- Daltonganj, PS- Daltonganj, District- Palamau …… Opp. Party ----- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ----- For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Akhouri Awinash Kumar, Advocate Ms. Aswini Priya, Advocate For the O. P. : Mr. Anand Kumar Pandey, Advocate …… ORAL ORDER IN COURT 14/06.03.2025 This Criminal Revision No. 895 of 2024 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging the order dated 20.07.2024 passed by Sri Martand Pratap Mishra, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Daltonganj, Palamau in M.A.C. Case No. 02 of 2021, whereby petition for maintenance under Section 127 Cr.P.C. filed by the opposite party has been allowed directing the petitioner to pay Rs. 35,000/- per month to his wife i.e. the opposite party as the enhanced maintenance amount from the date of filing of the application i.e. on 18.03.2021. It is further directed to pay the enhanced maintenance amount in ten equal instalment from 18.03.2021 to June, 2024. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the Opposite Party. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Principal -2- Judge, Family Court, Palamau at Daltonganj in view of the fact that a petition filed under Section 127 of the CrPC by the opposite party for enhancement of maintenance amount has been allowed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Palamau at Daltonganj from the date of filing of application i.e. from 18.03.2021, although the enhanced maintenance amount has to be paid from the date of passing of the order. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of S. Vijikumari Versus Mowneshwarachari C reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2930. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the amount of maintenance is an exorbitant one and hence, it cannot be granted as a matter of luxury to the opposite party as it is evident from the evidence of the opposite party that she is expanding Rs. 5,000/- per month as rent and expenses of Rs. 8000/- to 9000/- per month on the education of her child and Rs. 8,000/- per month on fooding etc. It is submitted that the petitioner has also to maintain his old aged parents and as such, the maintenance amount may be reduced. However, during course of argument, it has been fairly submitted that the petitioner will not object on the point of quantum of the amount of the child because it is for the welfare of the child. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required. It is submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below by awarding enhanced maintenance amount from the date of filing of the application i.e. from 18.03.2021. It is submitted that initially the opposite party was not desirous to live with the petitioner, but now the opposite party wants to live with the petitioner. It is -3- submitted that the opposite party is maintaining her child in proper atmosphere. She is imparting education for her child for proper future. It is submitted that she is not spending any amount on luxury, rather she is spending all the expenses for the welfare of her child, who is own son of the petitioner. It is submitted that the opposite party is also apprehensive of the fact that the petitioner may perform 2nd marriage and as such, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below may be upheld and this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 6. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a divorce case is still pending between the parties and the opposite party has earlier refused to live with the petitioner as per the order dated 14.06.2019 passed in Cr. M. P. No. 3158 of 2018 by the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary) of this Court. It is submitted that the petitioner has already been acquitted by the learned Court below vide judgment dated 20.12.2023 in a case being Complaint Case No. 649 of 2016 filed by the opposite party for the offences under Sections 498-A, 323, 379 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and hence, this Criminal Revision Application may be allowed. 7. Heard leaned counsel for the parties and perused the Lower Court Records. 8. It appears from the parties that the parties have several litigations between themselves. When this Court has confronted the question on the point of living together, learned counsel for the petitioner has expressed his inability, after seeking instruction from the petitioner. However, learned counsel for the opposite party has submitted that the opposite party is still desirous to live with this petitioner. -4- 9. From perusal of the Records as well as Lower Court Records, it would appear that the learned Court below has assessed that the monthly salary of the petitioner is Rs. 1,76,679/- and net income is Rs. 1,15,139/- and the petitioner is Senior Manager (Plant) in Indian Oil. 10. It also appears from the impugned order that the opposite party has claimed that the petitioner has married with one Mona @ Vinda, but she could not produce any document. 11. It further appears that the opposite party has fairly stated during her evidence that she has been incurring Rs. 8000/- to 9000/- per month towards the expenses of study including the tuition fee of her child and also expending Rs. 8,000/- per month on fooding etc. and she is paying Rs. 5,000/- per month as rent alongwith the Electricity Bill. Hence, this amount is subject to escalation due to price rise. 12. It has been held in the case of Sunita Kachwaha and Others vs Anil Kachwaha reported in 2014 (16) SCC 715 at para 7, 8 and 10 as follows:- “Para-7:- Inability to maintain herself is the pre-condition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant-wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance. Para-8:- The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant-wife is well qualified, having post graduate degree in Geography and working as a teacher in Jabalpur and also working in Health Department. Therefore, she has income of her own and needs -5- no financial support from respondent. In our considered view, merely because the appellant-wife is a qualified post graduate, it would not be sufficient to hold that she is in a position to maintain herself. Insofar as her employment as a teacher in Jabalpur, nothing was placed on record before the Family Court or in the High Court to prove her employment and her earnings. In any event, merely because the wife was earning something, it would not be a ground to reject her claim for maintenance. Para-10:-The impugned order of the High Court dated 26.06.2008 passed in Criminal Revision No. 2303/2007 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The respondent is directed to pay the maintenance of Rs.3,000/- per month to the appellant-wife as ordered by the Family Court and also pay the arrears of maintenance payable to the appellant-wife within the period of eight weeks.” 13. It has been held in Kalyan Dey Chowdhury Vs Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy reported in 2017 (14) SCC 200 at paragraph 15, as follows:- “Para 15:- The review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC came to be filed by the respondent wife pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court when the earlier order dated 2-2-20152 awarding a maintenance of Rs 16,000 to the respondent wife as well as to her minor son was under challenge before this Court. As pointed out by the High Court, in February 2015, the appellant husband was getting a net salary of Rs 63,842 after deduction of Rs 24,000 on account of GPF and Rs 12,000 towards income tax. In February 2016, the net salary of the appellant is stated to be Rs 95.527. Following Kulbhushan Kumar v. Raj Kumari, in this case, it was held that 25% of the husband's net salary would be just and proper to be awarded as maintenance to the respondent wife. The amount of permanent alimony awarded to the wife must be befitting the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance. Maintenance is always dependent on the factual situation of the case and the court would be justified in moulding the claim for maintenance passed on various factors. Since in February 2016, the net salary of the husband was Rs 95,000 per month, the High Court was justified in enhancing the maintenance amount. However, since the appellant has also got married second time and has a child from the second marriage, in the interest of justice, we think it proper to reduce the amount of maintenance of Rs 23.000 to Rs 20.000 per month as maintenance to the respondent wife and son. -6- 14. It has been held in the case of Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal and Another reported in 2020 (19) SCC 342, that even a wife who has been divorced on ground of desertion is entitled to claimed maintenance and it has been held at para 5 and 7 which are as follows:- “Para 5:- Thereafter, in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri this Court took a similar view: (SCCP 184, para 11) 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that once a decree for divorce was passed against the respondent and marital relations between the petitioner and the respondent came to an end, the mutual rights. Duties and obligations should also come to an end. He pleaded that in this situation, the obligation of the petitioner to maintain a woman with whom all relations came to an end should also be treated to have come to an end. This plea, as we have already indicated above, cannot be accepted as a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance. As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in Section 125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a divorced woman, she is again entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife. A woman after divorce becomes a destitute. If she cannot maintain herself or remains unmarried, the man who was once her husband continues to be under a statutory duty and obligation to provide maintenance to her." “Para 7:- No doubt, as urged by Mr Debal Banerjee. Explanation II to Section 125 9 CrPC by deeming fiction includes a divorced woman to be a wife and, therefore, a woman who has been divorced by her husband can still claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The question is how we should read the provisions of sub-section (4) in this regard, especially when we deal with those women, against whom a decree for divorce has been obtained on the ground that they have deserted their husband. Once the relationship of marriage comes to an end, the woman obviously is not under any obligation to live with her former husband. The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex- husband. The husband cannot urge that he can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be payable to her on the ground that event after divorce she is not willing to live with him. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of Mr Debal Banerjee.” 15. It has been held in the case of Abhilasha Versus Parkash -7- and Ors. reported in (2021) 13 SCC 99, at para 27 to 31, which are as follows:- “Para-27:- Muslim Law also recognises the obligation of father to maintain his daughters until they are married. Referring to Mulla’s Principle of Mohammedan Law, this Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Santra (Smt.), (2000) 5 SCC 182 in paragraph 40 held: (SCC p. 196) “40. Similarly, under the Mohammedan Law, a father is bound to maintain his sons until they have attained the age of puberty. He is also bound to maintain his daughters until they are married. [See: Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law (19th Edn.) page 300]” Para-28:- Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is nothing but recognition of principles of Hindu Law regarding maintenance of children and aged parents. Section 20(3) now makes it statutory obligation of a Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. Para-29:- Section 20 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cast a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his daughter who is unmarried and unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. As noted above, Hindu Law prior to enactment of Act, 1956 always obliged a Hindu to maintain unmarried daughter, who is unable to maintain herself. The obligation, which is cast on the father to maintain his unmarried daughter, can be enforced by her against her father, if she is unable to maintain herself by enforcing her right under Section 20. Para-30:- We may also notice another judgment of this Court in Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim, (1997) 6 SCC 233, which was a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. A Muslim wife with her two daughters and a son filed an application claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The trial court allowed the maintenance to the wife and children from her husband. The husband after divorcing the wife filed application in the trial court seeking modification of the order in view of the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The trial court modified the order insofar as the grant of maintenance of wife was concerned but maintained the order of maintenance to each of the three minor children. The husband challenged the order by means of revision, which was dismissed by the Revisional Court. An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed in the High Court. The High Court accepted the claim of husband and relying on provision of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, 1986 held that a Muslim wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her previous husband for her children only for a period of two years from the date of birth of the child concerned. The High Court held that minor children were not entitled for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. A special leave to appeal was filed questioning the judgment. This Court dealing with Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as Act, 1986 held that effect of a beneficial legislation like Section -8- 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. This Court held that there is no conflict between the two provisions. Para-31:- This Court noticed the provisions of Section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and Section 125 Cr.P.C. It is relevant to refer to the following observations made by this Court in paragraph 7 of the above judgment: (Noor Saba Khatoon Case, SCC pp. 238-39) “7. ...Under Section 125, CrPC the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father (irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and the children have no independent means of their own, it remains his absolute obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125 CrPC which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125 CrPC to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 CrPC, cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act to take away the independent rights of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC where they are minor and are unable to maintain themselves. A Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125 CrPC is absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3 (1)(b) of the 1986 Act.” (emphasis in original) 16. It has been held in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another reported in 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-77, 78, 79, 80, 112 and 113, which are as follows:- “Para-77:- The objective of granting interim/permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There is no straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. Para-78:- The factors which would weigh with the court inter alia are the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant is educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant has any independent source of income; whether the income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed prior to her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife. [ Refer to Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. -9- District Judge, Dehradun, (1997) 7 SCC 7; Refer to Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar, (2011) 13 SCC 112 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 290] Para-79:- In Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain [Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain, (2017) 15 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712] this Court held that the financial position of the parents of the applicant wife, would not be material while determining the quantum of maintenance. An order of interim maintenance is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim has no independent income, sufficient for her or his support. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. The court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay for her or his support. Maintenance is dependent upon factual situations; the court should mould the claim for maintenance based on various factors brought before it. Para-80:- On the other hand, the financial capacity of the husband, his actual income, reasonable expenses for his own maintenance, and dependent family members whom he is obliged to maintain under the law, liabilities if any, would be required to be taken into consideration, to arrive at the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid. The court must have due regard to the standard of living of the husband, as well as the spiralling inflation rates and high costs of living. The plea of the husband that he does not possess any source of income ipso facto does not absolve him of his moral duty to maintain his wife if he is able- bodied and has educational qualifications. [Reema Salkan v. Sumer Singh Salkan, (2019) 12 SCC 303 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 596 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 339] Para-112:- In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse [Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 51] , the Supreme Court was considering the interpretation of Section 125 CrPC. The Court held : (SCC p. 196, para 13) “13.3. … purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.” Para-113:- It has therefore become necessary to issue directions to bring about uniformity and consistency in the orders passed by all courts, by directing that maintenance be awarded from the date on which the application was made before the court concerned. The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing the application, since the period during which the maintenance proceedings remained pending is not within the control of the applicant.” -10- 17. It has been held in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another reported in 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-56, 59, 60 and 61 which are as follows:- “Para-56:-Similarly, in Tanushree & Ors. v A.S.Moorthy, the Delhi High Court was considering a case where the Magistrate’s Court had sine die adjourned the proceedings u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. on the ground that parallel proceedings for maintenance under the D.V. Act were pending. In an appeal filed by the wife before the High Court, it was held that a reading of Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V. Act indicates that while considering an application u/S. 12 of the D.V. Act, the Court would take into account an order of maintenance passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C., or any other law for the time being in force. The mere fact that two proceedings were initiated by a party, would not imply that one would have to be adjourned sine die. There is a distinction in the scope and power exercised by the Magistrate under Section 125, Cr.P.C. and the D.V. Act. With respect to the overlap in both statutes, the Court held : (SCC Online Del para 5) “5. Reading of Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V. Act further shows that the two proceedings are independent of each other and have different scope, though there is an overlap. Insofar as the overlap is concerned, law has catered for that eventuality and laid down that at the time of consideration of an application for grant of maintenance under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the maintenance fixed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. shall be taken into account.” (emphasis supplied) Para-59:- In Sudeep Chaudhary v Radha Chaudhary25 the Supreme Court directed adjustment in a case where the wife had filed an application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., and under HMA. In the Section 125 proceedings, she had obtained an order of maintenance. Subsequently, in proceedings under the HMA, the wife sought alimony. Since the husband failed to pay maintenance awarded, the wife initiated recovery proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the maintenance awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be adjusted against the amount awarded in the matrimonial proceedings under HMA, and was not to be given over and above the same. -11- Directions on overlapping jurisdictions Para-60:- It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the D.V. Act and Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or under H.M.A. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. Para-61:- To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding.” 18. It has been held in Kiran Tomar & Ors Vs State of Utter Pradesh & Another reported in 2022 live law (SC) 904 at paragraph 10 & 11, as follows:- “Para-10:- On the first aspect, it is well-settled that income tax returns do not necessarily furnish an accurate guide of the real income. Particularly, when parties are engaged in a matrimonial conflict, there is tendency to underestimate income. Hence, it is for the Family Court to determine on a holistic assessment of the evidence what would be the real income of the second respondent so as to enable the appellants to live in a condition commensurate with the status to which they were accustomed during the time when they were staying together. The two children are aged 17 and 15 years, respectively, and their needs have to be duly met.” “Para 11:- In this view of the matter, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of the Family Court on the basis of the reasoning which has been extracted above in the earlier part of this order.” -12- 19. It is well settled that the wife is entitled to maintenance as per the status of her husband. 20. It has been held in the case of S. Vijikumari Versus Mowneshwarachari C reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2930, para-14, 15 and 19 as follows:- “Para-14:- However, for the invocation of Section 25(2) of the Act, there must be a change in the circumstances after the order being passed under the Act. Alexander Sambath Abner vs. Miron Lede, 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 2851 is also to the same effect. Thus, an order for alteration, modification or revocation operates prospectively and not retrospectively. Though the order for grant of a maintenance is effective retrospectively from the date of the application or as ordered by the Magistrate, the position is different with regard to an application for alteration in an allowance, which may incidentally be either an increase or a reduction – to take effect from a date on which the order of alteration is made or any other date such as from the date on which an application for alteration, modification or revocation was made depending on the facts of each case. “Para-15:- The position is analogous to Sections 125 and 127 of the CrPC, 1973, wherein the legislature under Section 125(2) of the CrPC, 1973 had given power to the Magistrate to grant maintenance from the date of the application, but did not give any such power under Section 127 of the CrPC, 1973. Therefore, under the Act, the order of alteration or modification or revocation could operate from the date of the said application being filed or as ordered by the Magistrate under Section 25(2) of the Act. Thus, the applicant cannot seek its retrospective applicability, so as to seek a refund of the amount already paid as per the original order. “Para-19:- In the circumstances, the orders of the High Court as well as the first Appellate Court are set aside and the application -13- filed by the respondent is dismissed. However, liberty is reserved to the respondent herein to file a fresh application under Section 25 of the Act, if so advised. If such an application is filed by the respondent, the same shall be considered by the learned Magistrate having regard to the observations made above and on its own merits, which can be relatable to the period subsequent to the date of making the earlier order dated 23.02.2015 in the instant case. Any revocation of the order dated 23.02.2015 could be with effect from the date of the application, if any, to be made by the respondent herein or as ordered by the learned Magistrate.” 21. It is well settled from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the maintenance amount is payable from the date of passing of the order instead of filing of application under Section 127 of the Cr. P. C. 22. However, this Court finds that learned Court below has meticulously examined the income as well as the assets and liabilities of the petitioner. It also appears that the petitioner is having some other properties also apart from the salary. This Court further finds that the learned Court below has expressed his view that the petitioner is having annual income of Rs. 30,00,000/- per year, but it also appears that the petitioner has not filed any Income Tax Return to show that he is not getting anything else other than the salary. This Court is of the view that the order of maintenance amount of Rs. 35,000/- per month is proper. Accordingly, part of the order dated 20.07.2024 by which the learned Court below has directed to pay the maintenance amount of Rs. 35,000/- per month is upheld. 23. Apart from this, it has been settled in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another reported in (2021) 2 SCC 324 that even -14- after the child attains his majority, the father is obliged to look into the welfare of the child and he should take proper care of all the basic needs of the child in future also. 24. In that view of the matter, this Court directs that the petitioner is entitled to pay the maintenance amount to the opposite party from the date of passing of the order i.e. 20.07.2024 instead of from the date of application i.e. 18.03.2021 and the part of the order dated 20.07.2024 passed by Sri Martand Pratap Mishra, learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Daltonganj, Palamau in M.A.C. Case No. 02 of 2021 by which the petitioner was directed to pay the arrears of enhanced maintenance amount from 18.03.2021 to June, 2024 within ten months in ten equal instalment is set aside and it is held that the petitioner is entitled to pay the maintenance amount from the date of passing of the order i.e. from 20.07.2024. 25. So far as payment of Rs. 35,000/- is concerned, this Court modifies the order dated 20.07.2024 passed by the learned Court below to the extent that the petitioner shall pay Rs. 25,000/- in the Bank Account of the opposite party i.e. wife and remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/- shall be paid in the joint bank account of the opposite party i.e. wife and her son namely Pratik Kumar Singh in any Bank i.e. Nationalised Bank or any Bank of well repute till he attains his majority and the opposite party shall not withdraw the amount of Rs. 10,000/- per month, which will be deposited regularly by the petitioner in the joint account of the opposite party i.e. wife and her son. 26. The son of the petitioner and opposite party will be entitled to withdraw the said amount on attaining his majority. 27. The petitioner is further directed to pay the arrears of enhanced maintenance within four months and the petitioner shall -15- continuously pay Rs. 25,000/- in the Bank Account of the opposite party i.e. wife and remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/- shall be paid in the joint bank account of the opposite party i.e. wife and her son namely Pratik Kumar Singh. The opposite party shall furnish the details of the joint bank account to the petitioner at the earliest. 28. This Criminal Revision No. 895 of 2024 is allowed in part to the extent as indicated above. 29. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Learned Court below for the needful. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Kamlesh/