( 2025:HHC:22686 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.1069 of 2024 Reserved on: 20.06.2025 Date of Decision: 14th July, 2025. Jagdish Kumar Negi ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioner : Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Aman Thakur, Advocate. For respondent No.1/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For respondent No.2 : Mr. Parikshit Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 189/2021 dated 9.11.2021 registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 506 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a Notary public. An affidavit was brought before the petitioner for attestation on 10.8.2021. The petitioner attested the same. The executant was identified by Gurjeet Singh. Respondent No.2 again brought an agreement on 19.8.2021 along with the witnesses, namely, Lovely and Vikram Singh. The petitioner attested the agreement. Respondent No.2 was identified by Vikram Singh. Subsequently, the petitioner came to know that FIR No.189 of 2021 was registered against him. The petitioner had attested the affidavit dated 08.12.2021 and agreement dated 19.08.2021 as a Notary Public, and he did not commit any offence. Respondent No.2/the informant had made a statement in a Criminal Case bearing CIS No.242 of 2021, admitting the execution of the agreement dated 19.08.2021. The informant filed a false FIR against the petitioner. No offences were disclosed against the petitioner in the FIR. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR lodged against the petitioner be quashed. 3 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) 3. The petition is opposed by filing a reply/status report asserting that the informant/respondent No.2 made a complaint to the police that Gurjeet Singh got sanctioned ₹8,00,000/- as a home loan to the informant. He had also obtained the blank signed cheques, documents related to the land, photographs, Aadhar card and a PAN card of the informant. Gurjeet Singh also took a loan of ₹1,58,000/- from the informant and issued the cheques of ₹50,000/-, ₹50,000/- and ₹58,000/- to the informant. However, these cheques were dishonoured by the bank. Gurjeet Singh told the informant that he wanted to get a vehicle financed, but he had not filed the income tax return, and the bank was not financing the vehicle. He obtained the copies of the Income Tax Return (ITR) from the informant. Gurjeet Singh purchased a vehicle, which was registered as HP-17G-0369, in the name of the informant. He promised to deposit the monthly instalments of ₹12,500/- with the bank, however, Gurjeet Singh stopped paying the instalments. The bank issued the notices to the informant. Gurjeet Singh took the informant to the Court and prepared the agreement dated 11.05.2021. He again failed to deposit the instalments and told the informant that the vehicle was stolen, and an affidavit was executed in the name of the 4 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) informant, which contains the forged signatures of the informant. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police seized the agreements dated 18.05.2021, 23.08.2021 and 28.11.2021 executed between the informant and Gurjeet Singh. Agreement dated 23.08.2021, was attested by the petitioner, Jagdish Kumar Negi. The specimen signatures were obtained, and these were sent to FSL for analysis. The result is awaited. Nirmal Singh has absconded. He has to be arrested, and his specimen signatures are to be taken. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Aman Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel, for respondents No.2/informant. 5. Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. He is a notary public and is entitled to the protection given under Section 13 of the Notaries Act. The agreement was attested by the petitioner while working as a 5 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Notary Public, and the Executant was identified by Vikram Singh, attesting witness. The informant had admitted the execution of the agreement in his statement recorded on oath before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour (H.P). The continuation of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments passed by this Court in Dalip Singh Thakur v. State of H.P 2024 SCC Online HP 233, in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the petitioner had not entered the agreement in the Register, which shows that the petitioner had not acted in a bona fide manner. The statement recorded by the Court in another proceeding cannot be looked into while exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant, adopted the submissions of learned Additional 6 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and submitted that the present petition has been filed after a delay of two years. Hence, the same be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad 7 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, 8 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound 9 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was not disputed in the reply/status report that the petitioner is a Notary Public. 13. Section 13 of the Notaries Act reads as under: 13. Cognizance of offence.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence committed by a notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his functions under this Act save upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorized by the Central Government or a State Government by general or special order in this behalf. 10 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) (2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable under this Act. 14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that the Court is barred from taking cognisance of any offence committed by a Notary in the exercise of his function under this Act except upon a complaint made by an officer authorised by the Central or the State Government. It is undisputed that the petitioner had attested the agreement in the exercise of the functions conferred upon him under the Notaries Act; therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the Notaries Act will apply to the present case. It was laid down by Bombay High Court in Chandmal Motilal Bora v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 SCC OnLineBom 762: (2004) 2 Mah LJ 41: (2004) 106 (2) Bom LR 521: (2005) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 823, that when any allegation is made against the notary touching the official purpose, the Criminal Court cannot take the cognizance except upon the complaint made in writing. It was observed: “10. Therefore, if any allegation is made against a Notary which touches the official performance as a notary, the Criminal Court is forbidden from taking cognisance unless the complaint in writing is made by an officer authorised by the Central Government or State Government by general or special order in this behalf. Therefore, whenever an official act of a Notary comes into 11 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) the picture, it becomes the duty of the criminal Court to see whether the allegations are directly concerned with his official duty or the performance which he has to do as indicated in section 8 of the Notaries Act. The Court, which has been requested to take cognisance of the complaint, has to apply its judicial mind and see whether the act which is the subject matter of the complaint is the official act of a Notary or it is an act which is beyond his official performance. Suppose if the notary is alleged to have committed an offence by his act directly in his personal capacity, then there is no need for sanction, because, the said act is not connected with his official performance, like an allegation showing that the notary committed he murder or Notary assaulted a person for the purposes of causing simple hurt, grievous hurt etc. If the allegations show that by an act which is not in accordance with the provisions of the Notaries Act, the notary has been alleged to have committed an offence, there is no need to have a sanction to the complaint in writing of an officer as contemplated by provisions of section 13 of the Notaries Act. But if the act alleged is touching his official performance, the Court has to be on guard when it has been requested to take cognisance of the allegations against the Notary. 11. If such protection is not granted to the Notary, he would be involved, implicated and roped in in a number of offences, because a number of documents are being notarised before him in his Notarial register. Some documents may be purporting to be for the offence of cheating, blackmailing or an offence of commercial transactions. He would be involved in a number of offences concerned with the disposal of property, transfer of the property, sale of the property, and exchange of property. He would also be coming into the picture as an accused in a number of offences connected with a number of commercial crimes. A Notary is not supposed to know each and every person before him for the purpose of notifying a document in his Notarial register. He is not 12 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) supposed to know the truth behind the documents brought before him for entries. He is generally introduced to parties by persons who happen to be persons of his acquaintance. Such a person may be an advocate, a clerk of the advocates, or some persons who are connected with him by his profession as a Notary or by his profession generally as a lawyer. If such protection is not granted to a notary, it would be very difficult for him to work as a notary and members of the public at large would be facing a number of difficulties at every step. With this object, section 13 has been enacted by the Legislature with foresight. xxxxxx 14. As a special feature of a legitimate precaution which the notary should have, a lawyer should have, while performing his duty as Notary or lawyer, by his profession as such, by his work as such, by his function as such, he is likely to be in near proximity of a probable accused or an accused. In the performance of his duty as such, he is likely to do some act, as requested by such person, maybe as a client or a person who has come to notarising a document. The advocate or a notary will have to do such an act as requested by that person. At that stage, he may not be known as to what would be the consequences of the document which he has prepared or notarised. Would it be proper to permit such an advocate or a notary to be roped in, in the prosecution, which would be initiated against such a person in the future proximity. The reasonable answer would be “no”. If such protection is not granted to such persons, it would be very difficult for them to perform the acts contemplated by the profession of a lawyer or the functions contemplated to be done by a notary. A Criminal Court has to take into consideration the cognisance of such special features if they are indicated by the prosecution or by the complaint of which the criminal Court is requested to take cognisance. The Criminal Court has to consider this aspect if an application is made to exonerate such an 13 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) accused, who happens to be a professional or performing an official duty. When such a request is made, even at the initial stage and if there is a case to act accordingly, the Criminal Court should not be shy in entertaining such an application and even allow it if such an application deserves to be allowed. Exactly that has been contemplated, in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhavrao Scindia's case (supra). 15. A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in Ashokbhai Rameshchandra Ghantivala v. State of Gujarat, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 2203, wherein it was observed: 8. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. Having regard to the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the parties, this court is of the view that it is not necessary to enter into the merits of the allegations made in the chargesheet or the F.I.R., as the same could have a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings emanating from the F.I.R. However, examining the main contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner namely, that in view of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the court could not have taken cognizance of the complaint except as provided under the said provision, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act which reads as under: “13. Cognizance of offence. - (1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence committed by a notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his functions under this Act save upon complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by the Central Government or a State Government by general or special order in this behalf. (2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable under this Act.” 14 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) A plain reading of Section 13 makes it clear that a complaint against a notary in exercise or purported exercise of his functions under the Act has to be made in writing by an officer authorised by the Central Government or the concerned State Government by general or special order in this behalf. Unless a complaint is made in the manner prescribed, no Court is empowered to take cognisance of the offence. This view finds support from the objects and reasons behind the said provision, which reads thus: “The Committee consider that protection should be given to notaries in respect of cognisance of offences. They think that protection should be given only to notaries who commit an offence, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their functions under this Act. This clause has been inserted with this object.” From the objections and reasons, it is apparent that even if an offence is committed by a notary while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his functions under the Act, a complaint can be lodged only as provided under Section 13 of the Act. Thus, any offence committed by a notary acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his functions under the Act would fall within the ambit of the Section, and a Court can take cognisance of such offence only if the complaint is made in the manner laid down in the Section. 16. Kerala High Court also held similarly in P.C. Jeeva v. State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 8294, as under: 7. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a special procedure has been contemplated by virtue of the said provision and it provides that the cognizance of any offence committed by a Notary in exercise or purported exercise of his function under the Notaries Act can be instituted only upon a complaint in writing made by an officer authorized by the Central 15 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Government in this behalf. The crucial aspect to be noticed in this regard is that Section 13 of the Act is made applicable to any offence committed by a Notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his functions under this Act. It is evident that irrespective of the question that the offence which is a subject matter is committed under the provisions of the Notaries Act or any other enactment, procedure as contemplated under Section 13 has to be followed while taking cognisance of an offence against a Notary Public. The aforesaid question came up for consideration before this Court in Jyolsana VP. v. State of Kerala [2020 (6) KHC 334]. In paragraph 11 of the said judgment, this Court made the following observations: “11. As discussed above, it is quite impossible for a Notary to know the genuineness of the document produced before him for attestation. The Notary is not supposed to know each and every person before him for the purpose of notifying a document in his Notarial Register. He is generally introduced to parties by persons who happen to be persons of his acquaintance. If such protection is not granted to a Notary, it would be very difficult for him to work as a notary and members of the public at large would be facing a number of difficulties at every step. With this object, S. 13 has been enacted by the Legislature as a safeguard.” 8. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the stipulation contained under Section 13 is a mandatory provision as far as the offence alleged to have been committed by a Notary Public in exercise or purported exercise of his function is concerned. It is also clear that no court can take cognisance of such offences unless the procedure contemplated under Section 13 of the Notaries Act, 1952, is followed. In this case, it is evident that the proceedings have been instituted and cognisance thereon was taken on the basis of a police report, which is not the procedure as contemplated under Section 13 of the Act. In such circumstances, as the procedure which is 16 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) mandatorily required to be followed under Section 13 of the Act is not complied with, the prosecution now ongoing against the petitioner is vitiated. In such circumstances, I find some force in the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. Karnataka High Court also held similarly in Praveen Kumar Adyapady and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (11.04.2022 - KARHC) MANU/KA/2178/2022 as under: 6. Upon hearing and perusal of records, which reveal that accused No. 1 got married to the victim girl and the daughter of this complainant-respondent No. 2, defacto- complainant, by producing the affidavit before the Arya Samaj before accused Nos. 7 and 9 and married the victim girl, stating that the victim girl was major and had attained the age of majority by manipulating the date of birth of the victim girl as 25.09.1999, even though her actual date of birth was 25.09.2000. Admittedly, these two petitioners were advocates/notaries, and they have given a declaration in an affidavit filed by the parties. After looking at the documents produced by the parties, of course, while discharging the duty they have signed and given declarations in the document produced by the parties but it cannot be said, that these petitioners had intentionally colluded with the other accused persons and signed agreement of declaration for helping the accused No. 1 by manipulating the age of the victim. That apart, as per Section 13 of the Notaries Act, there is a bar for taking cognisance by the Court for offences committed by the advocate and notary. Under the said Notaries Act, they have to obtain the permission of the Central Government or State Government for filing the charge sheet and taking cognisance. Admittedly, the petitioners are said to be Notaries of the Central Government. Such being the case, as per Section 13 of the Notaries Act, the sanction is necessary or permission is necessary before filing a 17 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) charge sheet and taking cognizance against this petitioner but no such permissions were obtained or produced by the Investigation Officer along with the charge sheet and also not mentioned anything about obtaining of the sanction in the charge sheet. Such being the case, conducting criminal proceedings against these petitioners/accused Nos. 8 and 10 requires to be quashed. 18. No precedent to the contrary was brought to the notice of this Court. 19. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section and its interpretation by various High Courts that the Court cannot take cognisance of the commission of the offence stated to have been committed by the Notary in the discharge of his official duties except upon a complaint made in writing by the officer authorised by the Central or State Government. In the present case, no complaint in writing was ever made by any officer; hence, the learned Trial Court could not have taken cognisance of the commission of the offence alleged against the petitioner. The continuance of the proceedings without the complaint made by the Competent Authority would be an abuse of the process of the Court, and the same cannot be permitted. 20. Heavy reliance was placed upon the photocopy of the statement purported to have been made before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonta Sahib, District 18 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Sirmour (H.P). A certified copy of the statement was not filed, and the authenticity of the statement is not established. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 21. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing 19 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C.” 22. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and the evidence presented in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 20 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) 23. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 24. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 25. A similar view was taken in Iveco MagirusBrandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the 21 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied). 26. Therefore, it is impermissible to look into the statement to quash the present proceedings. 27. In view of above, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No.189/2021, dated 9.11.2021, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. qua 22 ( 2025:HHC:22686 ) the petitioner is quashed. The present petition stands disposed of and so are the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th July, 2025 (mamta)