GAHC030000752020 2025:GAU-MZ:325 IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH) RFA NO. 8 OF 2020 Sh. R. Laithuama (L) S/o- Salrothanga (L), R/o- Bawktlang, Kolasib, Mizoram, Substituted by his son Chhandamthanga. …….Appellant -Versus- 1. The State of Mizoram, represented by the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl. 2. The Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram, Land Revenue and Settlement Department, Aizawl, Mizoram. 3. The Director, Land Revenue and Settlement Department, Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl. 4. The Secretary to Govt. of Mizoram, P&E Department, Aizawl. 5. The Engineer-in-Chief, Power & Electricity Department, Govt. of Mizoram, Aizawl. 6. The Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl District, Aizawl. 7. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolasib District, Mizoram. ……. Respondents – B E F O R E – HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI For the Appellant(s) : Mr. C. Lalramzauva, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Stephen Lalbuatsaiha. For the Respondent(s) : Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, Additional Advocate General. Date on which judgment is reserved : N/A Date of pronouncement of judgment : 02.12.2025 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment ? : No. Whether the full judgment has been pronounced : Yes. JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL) Heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Stephen Lalbuatsaiha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State respondents. 2. The present appeal calls in question the judgment & order dated 25.10.2019, passed in Civil Suit No. 3 of 2011, by the learned Senior Civil Judge II, Kolasib District, Kolasib (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), whereby the plaintiff suit for compensation of 8366 numbers of teak trees alleged to be submerged due to the Serlui „B‟ Hydroelectric Power Project was dismissed on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, the same being barred under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “LA Act, 1894”). 3. The appellant/plaintiff‟s case before the trial court was that he was originally allotted 28 bighas of garden land that contained about 9000 teak saplings planted by him, of which 8366 matured. During the construction of the Serlui „B‟ Hydro Project, the garden land was submerged. The Award No. 3 of 2004 quantified compensation only for 1734 trees. Subsequently, the Builum Inquiry Commission‟s Final Report dated 26-01-2010 (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission‟s Report”), after field verification, found that in fact 8366 teak trees stood submerged, but 6632 trees were never assessed or compensated. 4. The appellant/plaintiff contended that since this omission was discovered only through the Commission‟s Report, and the Section 18 reference had long been barred, an independent civil cause of action arose. The respondents contended that the suit was barred because compensation disputes are exclusively referable to Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894. 5. The trial Court accepted the respondents‟ objection and dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. Hence, this appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that the trial court had illegally decided the issue of jurisdiction against the appellant/plaintiff. Page 4 of 19 He submits that there was no issue framed by the trial court as to whether it had the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit. He further submits that it is evident from the reading of the trial court judgment that the suit was decided to be heard on the merit after deciding the maintainability of the suit on 21.02.2013. He further submits that the omission of the 6632 teak trees, which was subsequently discovered by the Commission‟s Report after the making of the Award No. 3/2004, means the said issue therefore cannot relate back to the said Award No. 3 of 2004. He further submits that under Section 18 (1) of the LA Act, 1894, any interested person who has not accepted the award may approach therein. He submits that, however, in the present case, since the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is based on the finding of the Commission‟s Report and not on the compensation awarded to him by Award No. 3/2004, the conclusion of the trial court that the grievance of the appellant/plaintiff was apparently within the sole purview of the reference court is totally erroneous and perverse. He further submits that this court, by judgment & order dated 24.07.2008 in WP(C) No. 13/2008, had given liberty to the appellant/plaintiff to approach the competent court of civil jurisdiction for his redressal, if so advised, and hence the trial court could not have concluded that it was devoid of the mandate as well as the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed by the appellant/plaintiff. He further submits that the trial court has failed to consider the fact that the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was based on the finding of the Commission‟s Report and not on the Award No. 3/2004. Page 5 of 19 7. Per contra, Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the grievance raised by the appellant/plaintiff in the instant suit clearly relates back to the award No. 3/2004, and hence, the same is barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”). She further submits that the appellant, instead of adjudicating the grievances before the reference court under Section 18 of the LA Act, 1894, has filed the instant suit, which on the face of it lacks jurisdiction to try the same, and hence the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction warrants no interference from this court. 8. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties and have perused the material available on record. 9. It appears that the appellant/plaintiff owns a garden land under Village Council Pass No. 1 of 1983 located at Builum Village. It is further apparent that the appellant/plaintiff cultivated teak trees on the said garden land and claimed that 8366 teak trees survived until the garden submerged. It further appears that the Award No. 3/2004 pertaining to the Serlui „B‟ Hydroelectric Power Project assessed only 1734 teak trees of the appellant/plaintiff. It is further apparent that subsequently a State Inquiry Commission, by its Final Report dated 26.01.2010, found that 6632 additional teak trees belonging to the appellant/plaintiff were left unassessed. It appears that the respondents did not dispute the inquiry report during the trial. The trial court also accepted it as credible but dismissed the suit solely on jurisdiction. 10. Apt to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the trial court, which reads as under: - “A. w.r.t sub-issue (i) "Whether there actually is 8366 number of teak trees, at the relevant point of time, in the land of the plaintiff covered by his V.C. Pass No. 1 of 1983 located at Builum Village?" It may be seen that at Para-2 of the plaint, the plaintiff averred that there are 8366 teak trees in his land hereof which survived out of the 9000 planted by him. And at para-15 and 17 of the plaint, he averred that as per the findings of the said Builum Inquiry Commission's final report(supra), reductions were to be effected from those whose total compensation amounted to more than Rs. 5,00,000/-. And, that the defendants had illegally reduced the number of his teak trees to be submerged by excluding 6632 teak trees (6432 teak trees as per serial No. 52 of page 123 of Chapter 5, and, 200 teak trees as per serial No. 293 of page 132 of Chapter 5) at the time of calculating the amount of compensation payable to the plaintiff for the purpose of the Award 3 of 2004, and the commission thereby had recommended for restoration of Rs. 641100/- And Rs. 20000/- respectively. These averments are therefore verified to be actually indicated as such in the said report at para 5.8 to 5.15.2.1 and the table appended thereto as seen at page 120 to 135 thereof. It is also indicated therein that, random reduction were made in the amount of compensation for crops etc although there was no written order or instruction as to how reduction should be made from those who received higher amounts of compensation as per the assessment originally made for the purpose of the Award No.3 of 2004. And as already observed by this court at issue No-1, this report has not been objected by the defendants either in their written statement or during evidence also, and the same also apparently partakes the form of a public record. Besides, despite the evidence of the defendants that they had assessed every teak tree lying within the water level marked as RL 85.00, they however did not counter the report of the said Builum Inquiry Commission which was much later in time and also did not raise any doubt thereof. Hence, there is no further choice but to take the said number of excluded teak trees (6632 teak trees) mentioned above in the Builum Inquiry Commission as a fact, and adding the same with the number of teak trees actually included in the final Award 3 of 2004 i.e. 1734 teak trees, the total number of teaks trees in the land of the plaintiff hereof at the relevant point of time thereby comes to 8366 number in all(i.e. 6632+1734-8366). Therefore, this sub-issue No (i) is found to be in the affirmative. B. w.r.t. sub-issue No-(ii) "If so, whether all these trees lie within the submerged area of the plaintiff's said land?" As can be seen in the above observation also, it may be appreciated that the figure 8366 teak trees is the total sum of those assessed and included in the final Award No.3 of 2004 with that detected as illegally reduced number of teak trees of the plaintiff for the purpose of the said Award No 3 of 2004. This means that the said total number of teak trees were all originally reckoned by the concerned officials to be submerged and thereby had initially assessed the same for the purpose of Award No.3 of 2004 before the abovesaid random reduction on the number of teak trees was made. In other words, based on the abovesaid initial actions of the State defendant itself in the process of making the Award No.3 of 2004 as decipherable from/in the report of the Builum Inquiry Commission which was not countered by the instant defendants, it can be said that all the trees are within the submerged area of the plaintiiff's land hereof. Hence, this sub-issue is also found to be in the affirmative. C. w.r.t. sub-issue No-(iii) "if so, whether the old rate prevailing at the time of acquisition can be substituted by the new rate notified in 2011 for the purpose of valuation of the said teak trees". Page 8 of 19 In this aspect, it may be mentioned that the parties have not led any evidence towards clarifying this question. Hence, in the absence of any contrary point being brought to light by the parties, this court is of the opinion to hold that it is a well settled principle of law that any assessment be made as per the rates prevailing at the relevant point of time. And as the assessment made and the award passed relates to the year 2004, the rates notified in 2011 is inapplicable in the instant case by any counts. This sub-issue is thereby found to be in the negative. To sum up, without prejudice to any decision of the court on the legal status of any other aspect hereof, the finding of this court on this issue (issue No.3) is that the total number of the plaintiff's teak trees originally assessed by the competent Govt. officials to be submerged by the 'Serlui 'B' Hydro Electric Power Project' comes to 8366 in all which are entitled to be assessed as per the official rates for valuation existing at the relevant point of time.” 11. Upon examining the record, the following issues arise for determination: (i) Whether, in the facts of the case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stood barred by necessary implication in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? (ii) Whether the undisputed findings recorded in the Inquiry Commission Report dated 26-01-2010 afforded an independent cause of action to the plaintiff? 12. As regards the issue no. (i), i.e., whether the jurisdiction of the civil court stood barred, apt to refer to Section 9 of the CPC, which embodies the rule of plenary jurisdiction. Section 9 of the CPC reads as under: “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.— The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. [Explanation I].—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [Explanation II].—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.]” 13. Reading the aforesaid section, it is apparent that civil courts shall try all suits of a civil nature except those explicitly or impliedly barred. 14. The Apex Court in Kamala Mills Ltd v. State of Bombay, reported in 1965 SCC OnLine SC 92, has held that exclusion of civil jurisdiction must be strictly construed, and whenever exclusion is pleaded by implication, the court must enquire whether the statute provides an adequate and effective alternative mechanism. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “27. In Raleigh Investment Company Ltd. v. Governor- General-in-Council, Section 67 of the Indian Income Tax Act (11 of 1922) which barred a suit, fell to be considered. The Privy Council held that the said provision barred a suit where the plaintiff sought to challenge an assessment order made by the appropriate tax authorities under the provisions of the said Act. In construing the effect of the words „no suit shall be brought in any civil court to set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act‟, the Privy Council thought it necessary to enquire whether the Act contained machinery which enabled an assessee effectively to raise in the courts the question whether a particular provision of the Income Tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra vires. „The presence of such machinery‟, observed the Privy Council, „though by no means conclusive, marches with a construction of the section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to enquire into the same subject-matter. The absence of such machinery would greatly assist the appellant on the question of construction and, indeed, it may be added that, if there were no such machinery, and if the section affected to preclude the High Court in its ordinary civil jurisdiction from considering a point of ultra vires, there would be a serious question whether the opening part of the section, so far as it debarred the question of ultra vires being debated, fell within the competence of the legislature‟. In other words, these observations indicate that the Privy Council took the view that where an appropriate authority is exercising its jurisdiction to levy a tax in respect of any transaction, it would be competent to such an authority to consider the validity of the taxing provisions themselves. We do not think it is necessary for us to examine this aspect of the matter in the present appeal, because the validity of the charging section is not impeached in the present proceedings. It is true that Mr Sastri has challenged the validity of Section 20, but the said section has no bearing on the assessment made, and so, that plea has no relevance to the point which the Privy Council was considering in the observations to which we have just referred. 30. We do not think Mr Sastri can successfully advance his case before us by relying on these two decisions. After all, as the Privy Council observes in the case of Mask & Co. the determination of the question as to whether Section 20 bars the present suit, must rest on the terms of Section 20 themselves, because that is the provision under consideration „and decision on other statutory provisions are not of material assistance, except insofar as general principles of construction are laid down‟ (p. 237). Besides, in regard to these two decisions, we may, with respect, point out that they do not purport to lay down a general rule that the jurisdiction of a civil court cannot be excluded unless it is specifically provided that a suit in a civil court would not lie In fact, as the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mask & Co. Page 11 of 19 shows, the jurisdiction of a civil court can be excluded even without such an express provision. In every case, the question about the exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil court either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered in light of the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provisions, their object and their purpose. We would also like to make it clear that we do not think it is necessary in the present case to consider whether-the-majority opinion in the case Bharat Kala Bhadar Ltd. was justified in casting a doubt on certain observations made by the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Co. case or on the validity or the propriety of the conclusion in respect of the effect of Section 67 of the Income Tax Act. 31. Mr Sastri has also invited our attention to the decision of the House of Lords in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government In that case, the House of Lords repelled the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the declarations asked for, since by the combined effect of Sections 15 and 17 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, the decision of the Minister on an application to determine whether permission was required was made final and the only method of determining such a question was that provided by Section 17(1), and that the wide discretion conferred by Section 14 on the Minister to impose conditions disentitled the Company from coming to the court for a declaration that the conditions were invalid. In coming to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not excluded, the House of Lords noticed that there was nothing in Section 17 or in the Act which excluded the jurisdiction of the court to grant declarations, Section 17 merely provided an alternative method of having the question determined by the Minister. „It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down‟, said Viscount Simonds, „that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as McNair, J. called it in Francis v. Yiewsley and West Drayton Urban District Council, a 'fundamental rule' from which I would not for my part sanction any departure‟ Approaching the task of construing Section 17 from this point of view, His Lordship came to the conclusion that there was nothing in Section 17 which excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the claim in question We do not see how this decision can afford any assistance to the appellant. 32. There is one more aspect of the matter which must be considered before we finally determine the question as to whether Section 20 excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court in entertaining the present suit. Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the exclusion of the civil courts' jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunal & specially constituted in that behalf, and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. The relevance of this enquiry was accepted by the Privy Council in dealing with Section 67 of the Income Tax Act in Raleigh Investment Co. case and that is the test which is usually applied by all civil courts. 36. Let us, therefore, examine the question as to whether the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal, provides for a remedy to claim a refund of tax alleged to have been illegally recovered. Section 13 of the Act expressly provides for refunds. It lays down that the Commissioner shall, in the prescribed manner, refund to a registered dealer applying in this behalf any amount of tax paid by such dealer in excess of the amount due from him under this Act. The proviso to this section prescribes a period of limitation of twenty-four months from the date on which the order of assessment was passed or within twelve months of the final order passed on appeal, revision, or reference in respect of the order of assessment, whichever period is later. Then, we have Section 21 which provides for the remedy of an appeal, and Section 22 which provides for a revisional remedy. It is significant that though Section 21(1) prescribes a period of sixty days for appeal and Section 22 prescribes a period of four months for revision, under Section 22-B the prescribed authority is given power to extend the period of limitation if it is satisfied that the party applying for such extension had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Section 23- A provides for rectification of mistake. It is thus clear that the appellant could have either appealed or applied for revision and prayed for condonation of delay on the ground that the mistake which was responsible for the recovery of the tax illegally levied, was discovered on 6th September, 1955, because such a plea would have been perfectly competent under Section 22-B. In other words, if the appellant had pursued a remedy available to it under Section 21 or Section 22 read with Section 22-B, its case would have been considered by the appropriate authority and the validity of the grounds set up by it for the refund of the tax in question would have been legally examined Therefore, it cannot be said that even for the claim which the appellant seeks to make in the present suit, there is no alternative remedy prescribed by the Act. This conclusion serves a double purpose. It makes it easier to construe the wide words used in Section 20 and hold that they constitute an absolute bar against the institution of the present suit, and it also helps the respondent to repel the plea of the appellant that Section 20 if it is so widely construed, is unconstitutional. Our conclusion, therefore, is that Section 20 should be construed in the same manner in which Section 18-A of the Madras General Sales tax Act was construed by this Court in Firm and Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons and that even on this wide construction, the said section is constitutionally valid.” 15. Likewise, in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., reported in AIR 1969 SC 78, the Constitution Bench has held that civil jurisdiction survives where “the statute creates rights but does not provide an adequate remedy” and “the bar does not apply where the grievance lies outside what the authority has adjudicated.” 16. The LA Act, 1894, provides machinery under Section 18 for reference regarding measurement, apportionment, and compensation. It is equally well-settled that Section 18 does not provide for condonation of delay. Hence, limitation under the Section 18 is rigid. 17. In the present case, the Award No. 3 of 2004 never adjudicated the existence of 6632 teak trees. That omission surfaced six years later, through the Commission‟s Report in 2010. By that time, the Section 18 reference was statutorily unavailable. 18. Thus, unlike the normal situation where a party sleeps over rights, the right did not exist in knowledge before expiry of limitation. In such facts, applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kamala Mills (supra) as extracted above, civil jurisdiction revives where a statutory remedy is unavailable to redress an actionable deprivation. 19. Supportively, this court in Gouri Shankar Agarwal v. Phani Bhusan Sharma, reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Gau 193, has held that where statutory authorities fail to act and the statute provides no appellate mechanism against such failure, civil court jurisdiction survives. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “31. In the plaint, plea was taken that construction was raised without any valid construction permission from the defendant No 3 and without keeping margin/setback as specified therein. In the complaint dated 18.03.2004, submitted by the plaintiff No 1 to the Development Authority, it was alleged that the defendants had started construction work without following the provisions of the Act of 1959 and Building Bye -laws and, at the same time, it was also indicated that as far as his knowledge goes, the defendant had no permission for the said construction It is not that the plaintiffs straightaway, without approaching the Development Authority, had filed the civil suit They had lodged the complaint which was not taken cognizance of by the Authority Having regard to the scheme of the Act, a complaint has to be entertained by the Authority No order was passed on the said complaint either rejecting the complaint or directing an enquiry on the allegations made in the complaint Under the Act of 1959, an appeal will lie only against an order passed by the Authority Against the inaction of the Authority no appeal lies and there is no provision to take care of such a situation. In the facts of the case, there was failure on the part of the Authority in not taking cognizance of the complaint filed on 18.03.2004. 32. In the petition filed by the defendant No. 3, there was no statement that the Tinsukia Development Authority had passed any order on the complaint of the plaintiffs dated 18 03 2004 or that any permission was granted to the defendant. Nos 1 and 2 to construct any building in the said land only on the basis of the provisions contained in the Act of 1959, it was urged that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. 33. The learned courts below proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs did not file any appeal against the order granting permission in favour of the defendants on the basis of the stand taken by the defendants. But the courts below did not at all advert to the question as to whether the defendant No. 3 had taken cognizance of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and had passed some order thereon That permission was granted was stated only by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 The defendant No. 3 chose to remain silent on that score In any case, assuming that some permission was granted, it is an event, which came to the fore after the written statement was filed. No details of the permission so granted were also given. In paragraph 11 of the written statement, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had also referred to an implied permission of the Tinsukia Development Authority. It will be wholly incongruous to accept the plea of the defendant No 3 that jurisdiction of the civil court is barred when it had not discharged its obligation as enjoined under the statute by taking, cognizance of a complaint lodged by a neighbour, who alleges that his building had developed cracks because of illegal construction raised without any permission from the Authority.” 20. Therefore, the bar under Section 18 operates only where adjudication is within the competence of the reference court. Here, the statutory process did not adjudicate the omitted trees; hence, exclusion cannot be invoked to nullify civil rights. 21. Accordingly, issue no. 1 is answered in the negative. Hence, the civil court‟s jurisdiction was not barred. 22. Now as regards issue no. (ii), i.e., whether the Commission‟s findings created an independent cause of action, it appears that the Commission‟s Report, constituted by the respondent State itself, found that 8366 teak trees stood submerged and recommended compensation for the omitted 6632 trees. Page 17 of 19 23. Neither in pleading nor in evidence was this report disputed by the respondents. The trial court itself acknowledged that this omission exists. Yet it dismissed the suit solely on jurisdiction. 24. In Kamala Mills (supra), as extracted above, the Apex Court has held that where deprivation arises from mistake of fact and omission of statutory assessment, the civil remedy lies to recover the consequential loss. 25. In the present case, the cause of action accrued only upon the Commission‟s Report and not when Award No. 3/2004 was passed. Therefore, the Commission Report is not merely evidentiary, but it crystallized the injury, and consequently, the accrual of the right to sue. 26. Hence, issue no. (ii) is answered in the affirmative. The Inquiry Commission Report created an independent cause of action. 27. From the above, it is evident that: (a) The trial court erred in treating Section 18 as an absolute bar without considering that the statutory remedy was factually unavailable; and (b) The Commission Report constituted a fresh actionable wrong, not adjudicated earlier. 28. I am reminded of the Latin maxim “nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria,” which means “no one can take advantage of his own wrong.” In other words, a person who has committed a wrong should not be able to profit from that wrong. It is pertinent that the said maxim is rooted in the principle of good faith and is used in many legal systems to ensure fairness and prevent parties from manipulating the legal process for their own benefit. Hence, the respondents cannot deny adjudication based on omission attributable to their fault. The trial court erred in dismissing the suit on jurisdiction alone, and factual issues remain unadjudicated. Thus, the dismissal of the suit on jurisdiction is unsustainable 29. Having held so, I am of the unhesitant view that the trial court‟s refusal to adjudicate on merits, therefore, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 30. Reference in this regard is made to Nirmala Bala Ghose and Anr. –vs- Balai Chand Ghose and Anr., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1874, wherein the Apex Court held that remand must be ordered where the trial court failed to adjudicate factual controversies. I am thus of the unhesitant view that to avoid prejudice to either party, remand for full adjudication is the correct approach. The appeal succeeds. 31. Accordingly, the judgment & order dated 25.10.2019, passed in Civil Suit No. 3 of 2011, by the learned Senior Civil Judge II, Kolasib District, Kolasib, is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the trial court for fresh adjudication on all issues on merits in accordance with law. 32. The trial court may permit both sides to lead additional evidence, frame additional issues, if necessary and shall make an endeavour to dispose of the suit within 6 (six) months from receipt of records. 33. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the regular fist appeal stands allowed. 34. Return the trial court record along with a copy of this judgment & order to the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge II, Kolasib District, Kolasib. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Prana b Chand ra Das Digitally signed by Pranab Chandra Das Date: 2025.12.05 10:38:43 +05'30'