2025:HHC:33393 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP (M) No. 2047 of 2025 Reserved on: 19.09.2025 Date of Decision: 25.9.2025. Inder Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajesh K. Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 17 of 2024, dated 07.03.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 22 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (for short ‘NDPS’) at Police Station Renuka Ji, District Sirmaur, H.P. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:33393 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police intercepted a scooty bearing registration No. HP18C-5005 on 07.03.2024. The driver and pillion rider identified themselves as Inder Singh (present petitioner) and Arun Dhiman, respectively. The police checked the Scooty in the presence of two independent witnesses and recovered a plastic packet containing 144 capsules of SPASMO-PROXYVON Plus and 432 Capsules of SPAS-PARVION PLUS. The police seized the capsules and arrested the petitioner and the co-accused. The weight of TARMADOL was found to be 337.392 grams. The petitioner had earlier filed a petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1837 of 2024, and was dismissed by this Court on 13.12.2024. The petitioner is in custody for 1½ years, and the trial has not concluded. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The State has filed a status report asserting that the police party was on nakkabandi duty on 07.03.2024 at Bayari. They stopped a Scooty bearing registration No. HP18C-5005 coming from Nahan. The driver showed his driving license on his mobile phone. He revealed his name as Inder Singh (the 3 2025:HHC:33393 present petitioner). The pillion rider revealed his name as Arun Dhiman. Scooty's insurance had expired. The police issued a traffic infringement report. Police asked the driver to unlock the dickey of the Scooty, on which both riders became frightened. The police checked the Scooty in the presence of two independent witnesses and found a plastic bag containing 144 capsules of SPASMO-PROXYVON PLUS and 432 Capsules of SPAS-PARVION PLUS. Both of these drugs contained TRAMADOL, which is a prohibited salt. A license/permit was demanded from the riders for possessing the drugs, but they could not produce any license/permit. Hence, the police seized the drugs and Scooty after completing codal formalities. Inder Singh revealed on inquiry that he is a drug addict and used to purchase the capsules from Arun Dhiman. Arun Dhiman revealed that he had purchased the capsules from Bhupender Sharma, owner of a Kirana Store. The shop of Bhupender Sharma was searched, and the pieces of a cardboard box of TRAMADOL were found in the plastic box beneath the counter. Arun Dhiman and Bhupinder Sharma were in touch with each other. The location of Bhupinder Sharma and Arun Dhiman was found in Kala Amb (Haryana) between 1 pm and 1:30 pm. The 4 2025:HHC:33393 capsules were sent to FSL, and as per the report of the analyst, they contained TRAMADOL weighing 337.39 gms. Challan was presented before the Court on 21.05.2024. The matter was listed for the prosecution’s evidence on 22.09.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Rajesh K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Rajesh K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner has spent more than 1 ½ years in judicial custody, and the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of Tramadol, 5 2025:HHC:33393 hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions as laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail. He had filed a bail petition earlier, which was dismissed by this Court. There is no change in the circumstances. The trial is progressing normally, and there is no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No.1837 of 2024, and was dismissed on 13.12.2024 by this Court. It was held in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic 6 2025:HHC:33393 changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 7 2025:HHC:33393 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 8 2025:HHC:33393 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 9 2025:HHC:33393 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is impermissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. It was submitted that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated, and the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence despite a lapse of 1½ years. The petitioner has not placed on record copies of the order-sheets to demonstrate that the delay is not attributable to him but to the Court or the prosecution. Therefore, his plea that his right to a speedy trial is being violated cannot be accepted without any material. 15. The petition does not mention any other change in the circumstances. The petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of TRAMADOL and has failed to satisfy the twin conditions as laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act; hence, he is not entitled to bail. 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 10 2025:HHC:33393 18. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 25th September, 2025 (Ravinder)