Smt. Lucy Laldingngheti v. Sh. Lalrinawma Renthlei and Anr.
I.A.(Civil)/88/2025 · 2025-11-10
Rajesh Mazumdar
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 23643 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 23643 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
Page No.# 1/6 GAHC030003342025
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/88/2025 Smt. Lucy Laldingngheti D/o Lianchungnunga, R/o Vengthar, Kolasib, Mizoram
VERSUS Sh. Lalrinawma Renthlei and Anr. S/o Thangfala (L), R/o Kualmawi, Bilkhawthlir, Kolasib District, Mizoram 2:The Settlement Office Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. T Lalnunsiama Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. Johny L Tochhawng for R1
BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR
ORDER 11.11.2025
Heard Mr. J.H. Ricky Lalruatfela, learned counsel appearing for the applicant. Also heard Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mrs. Vanneihsiami, learned Government Advocate appearing for respondent No. 2. Page No.# 2/6
2. This Interlocutory Application has been preferred by the applicant praying for condonation of delay of 79 days in filing the connected RFA arising out of the Judgment & Order dated 30.11.2024 and Decree dated 09.12.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Kolasib, Kolasib District, Mizoram in Declaratory Suit No. 29/2021. 3. We have gone through the grounds enumerated in the Interlocutory Application explaining the delay of 79 days. It has been stated that due to miscommunication with the previous lawyer, there was some delay in coming to know about the disposal of the Declaratory Suit filed by the applicant herein and further, there was some more delay when she had to contact different lawyers for having the matter prepared for filing of the appeal. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has submitted that there are good grounds for interfering with the orders passed in the Declaratory Suit, which have been enumerated in the connected appeal and therefore, he submits that the delay of 79 days may be condoned and the RFA may be taken up for consideration and disposal on merits. 5. The respondent No. 1 has filed affidavit-in-opposition to the Interlocutory Application, wherein it has been asserted that the applicant has not been able to explain the delay of 79 days and no documentary proof of either having an infant child or of having to travel to different advocates for preparation of the appeal have been annexed to the Interlocutory Application. 6. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 has submitted that the applicant has acted in a negligent manner and therefore, the delay in the
Page No.# 3/6 present case does not deserve to be condoned. 7. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the Order dated 08.04.2025 passed in I.A(C) No. 143/2023 to content that in the absence of documentary evidence, the approach of the applicant has to be treated as casual and therefore, the delay in filing the appeal need not be condoned.
He has thereafter referred to the Order dated 10.05.2008 passed in I.A(C) No. 131/2017 to emphasis that in the absence of any documentary evidence to show that the applicant gave the necessary brief to the counsel to prepare an appeal and no dates having being referred to, the application is to be considered as bereft of specifics and is basically a very generalized statement and therefore, the delay in such cases does not deserve to be condoned. He has also referred to the Order dated 22.02.2025 passed in I.A(C) No. 134/2024 to emphasis that unless there is a proper explanation to the delay, the mere length of delay would not be material to convince the Court to condone delay. 8. He has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein the Apex Court has held that the sufficient cause should be one, which could have prevented the petitioner from approaching the appellate forum within the time frame given and any or all causes may not fall within the category of sufficient cause. 9. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 has supported the
contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and has submitted that in the absence of any explanation, this Interlocutory
Page No.# 4/6 Application does not need further consideration by this Court and deserves to be rejected. 10. In response, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant has placed reliance on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 to submit that the term ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by the Apex Court to be adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. The Apex Court in the particular case had directed a liberal approach to be adopted on principle and had observed that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. He further submits that there can be no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has submitted that in the present case, the applicant would not have benefited in any manner by causing delay in the manner, since her claim in the Declaratory Suit was regarding to the rights over a particular piece of land, which had been dismissed, and the counter claim made by respondent No. 1 as defendant in the Declaratory Suit had been confirmed by the Trial Court. He has further submitted that even as per the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Apex Court has reiterated that there should be a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach when dealing with an application for condonation of delay, that the term ‘sufficient cause’ should
Page No.# 5/6 be understand in proper spirit, since the term is basically elastic and has to be applied in the proper perspective, that substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
The Apex Court had also held that the adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice or cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate, there is no real failure of justice. The Apex Court had also noticed the distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of few days and had observed that the second calls for a liberal delineation. 12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the contesting parties. 13. It is noticed that the orders passed in I.A(C) No. 143/2023 was in the matter of an Insurance Company praying for condonation of delay with regard to the orders passed by the MACT, Mizoram, Aizawl. This Court had taken into account the fact that the appellants were having a team dedicated to look into the legal affairs and therefore, the absence of mention of dates or records was held to be against the Company’s prayer for condonation of delay. In similar situations, the Order dated 10.05.2018 passed in I.A(C) No. 131/2017 also relate to a case where prayers for condonation of delay by Insurance Company having legal teams were taken into consideration. In I.A(C) No. 134/2024, it was the State of Mizoram represented by the Chief Secretary, who had preferred the application for condonation of delay and this Court had found that such delay was not required to be condoned. 14. This Court notices that the present case is an appeal against an order
Page No.# 6/6 passed in Declaratory Suit and the applicant has stated on oath that she is the mother of an infant and that she had to approach different lawyers in Aizawl. Although there might be some weight in the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the respondents that delay may not be condoned as a matter of course, in the present case, this Court finds that a liberal approach and acceptance of the explanation given by the applicant deserves to be considered. Accordingly, the delay of 79 days is condoned. 15. Interlocutory Application stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant