Page No.# 1/10 GAHC020001702025 2025:GAU-NL:526 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/57/2025 SHRI NANDHALAL RAM @ NANDU LAL KUMAR S/O NAN KUMAR, PERMANENT R/O NAINIJOR VILLAGE, DISTRICT- BUXAR, BIHAR, PRESENT ADDRESS- KEZIEKE COLONY, KOHIMA NBAGALAND VERSUS STATEE OF NAGALAND AND 3 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND, NAGALAND KOHIMA 2:THE HOME COMMISSIONER DEPT. OF HOME NAGALAND KOHIMA 3:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE POLICE HEADQUARTER NAGALAND KOHIMA 4:THE COMMANDANT 8TH NAP BATTALION NALTOQA ZUNHEBOTO NAGALAN Advocate for the Petitioner : JOSHUA SHEQI, RUBICA KIHO,TUNATO YEPTHO,R WONCHIBENI TSANGLO,KIVITOLI SWU,YEKA SUMI,KEVI KIRE,KETHO SEKHOSE,K LILY SWU,KEDI KOSO,P MHONBENI EZUNG,ATOKA,MIKA H AYE,CHINGMEI KONYAK,NAGALI SHOHE Page No.# 2/10 Advocate for the Respondent : GOVT ADV NL, BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI ORDER Date : 30-10-2025 The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging an order of Suspension dated 09.06.2021 followed by an Order of Termination/Dismissal dated 26.10.2023 whereby the petitioner has been terminated from service. 2. As per the facts projected, the petitioner was appointed as Sweeper vide an order dated 17.06.2008 in the 8th NAP Battalion, Zunheboto and was last posted as a Cook. While in service, the petitioner was arrested on 06.06.2021 in connection with Naltoqa A G.R. case no.18/2021 with allegations under POCSO Act. The case was accordingly registered as Zunheboto Women PS case no. 0001/2021 under Sections 376(2)(j)(I) IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act. In the meantime, the petitioner was put under suspension vide an order dated 09.06.2021. In the trial pertaining to the criminal case, the petitioner was convicted vide a judgment and order dated 13.03.2023 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 20 (twenty) years with fine. 3. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence was the subject matter of challenge in an appeal preferred by the petitioner in this Court vide Criminal Appeal (J) No. 03/2023. While the criminal Page No.# 3/10 appeal was pending before this Court, the impugned order of Termination/Dismissal dated 26.10.2023 was issued. It is also the case of the petitioner that the appeal preferred by him against the order of conviction and sentence was allowed by this Court vide order dated 23.07.2024 whereby the conviction was set aside. It is the specific case that the petitioner was honourably acquitted by this Court. After such acquittal, the petitioner had submitted a representation on 30.09.2024 to the State authorities along with a copy of the order of this Court praying for re-instatement which was not considered and accordingly, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. I have heard Shri Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Shri V. Zhimomi, learned State counsel for the State respondents. 5. Shri Sheqi, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the penalty imposed is a major penalty which has to be done by strictly following the procedures laid down in the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1967). He has submitted that even the aspect of suspension is covered by Rule 6. The penalty including the major penalties are provided in Rule 7 and the procedure for imposing penalties is provided in Rule 9. 6. By drawing the attention of this Court to Rule 9 of the said Rules, he has submitted that a detailed procedure has been laid down Page No.# 4/10 which requires giving of adequate and reasonable safeguard to a delinquent employee. The same requires framing of definite charges which are to be communicated to the delinquent in writing so as to enable him to submit his written statement of defence. It is also provided that if the disciplinary authority is not satisfied with the explanation, an enquiry is to be conducted by appointing an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer where, the Department is required to prove all the allegations against the delinquent in his presence by adequate evidence to be led by witnesses. He has submitted that in the instant case, though some charges were framed, the inquiry was done as a mere eye-wash as he was admittedly in custody and the appeal against the conviction order was pending in this Court. He has submitted that the petitioner has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and therefore, the impugned action of termination is liable to be set aside. On the issue of honourable acquittal, the learned counsel has submitted that in such an event there may not even be a requirement to hold an inquiry as the law in this field requires such a delinquent to be reinstated. 7. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following cases:- (i) Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr Vs. Mehar Singh, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685; (ii) Union of India and Ors Vs. Methu Meda, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 1; Page No.# 5/10 (iii) Union of India & Ors Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 ; (iv) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd Vs. Mahesh Dahiya reported in (2017) 1 SCC 768; (v) Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570; (vi) G M Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446; (vii) Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175. 8. In the case of Mehar Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had interpreted the meaning of honourable acquittal. A similar principle was also laid down in the cases of Methu Meda (supra) and G M Tank (supra). 9. In the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), the following has been laid down; “18… whenever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment of not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it… non furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge.” Page No.# 6/10 10. The said principle was reiterated in the case of Mahesh Dahiya (supra). In the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra), requirement of adhering to the principles of natural justice in a disciplinary proceeding has been emphasised. In the case of Ram Lal (supra), it has been clarified that when the charges are identical and the witnesses are the same, discretionary jurisdiction can be invoked by the Court to interfere with the penalty in a disciplinary proceeding which has been initiated after a criminal charge. 11. Per contra, Shri Zhimomi, learned State counsel has opposed the writ petition and has submitted that the affidavit-in-opposition has been filed. By drawing the attention of this Court to the Memorandum of charge dated 01.07.2021 issued by the Disciplinary authority, the learned State counsel has submitted that the same was received by the petitioner and his signature is found in the said Memorandum which has been enclosed as Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition filed on 21.08.2025. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the Attendance Sheet of the Preliminary hearing held on 27.09.2023 which was also attended by the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner was aware of the allegations and charges against him, and therefore, the petitioner did not suffer from any prejudice. He has also submitted that the nature of allegations were serious requiring an appropriate action, which was accordingly done. The learned State counsel accordingly prays that the writ petition may be dismissed. 12. Shri Sheqi, learned counsel for the petitioner, in his reply has Page No.# 7/10 submitted that a sham enquiry was held inside the jail only as an eye-wash. He has submitted that no defence assistant was provided and the same proceeded on certain statements recorded under section 161 of the CrPC in the criminal case. He has submitted that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 13. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 14. The Rules of 1967 have laid down the procedure for imposing penalties. In Rule 9, there is a requirement of framing definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which an inquiry is proposed to be held and such charges are required to be communicated in writing to the government servant so as to enable him to submit his written statement of defence. The government servant is also required to be permitted to inspect and take extracts of the records for preparing his defence. The Disciplinary Authority may thereafter cause an inquiry either by himself of by an Inquiry Officer and the procedural safeguards are required to be given to the government servant and thereafter, the report is required to be prepared. It is a well settled position of law that a copy of such Inquiry report is required to be forwarded to the delinquent to seek his views and only after the said opportunity is given, the disciplinary authority is entitled to take a decision on the matter. 15. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the disciplinary Page No.# 8/10 authority was initiated at a time when the petitioner was in custody. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State has however indicated that the charges were indeed communicated to the petitioner which was also received by him. It also transpires that the preliminary hearing was held on 27.09.2023. It however becomes clear that such inquiry was held in a jail office of the Central Jail, Dimapur. It appears from the report that 4 (four) numbers of witnesses were produced, but the petitioner has contended that he being not conversant with the process of law, was deprived of an opportunity of cross-examining the said witnesses as no defence assistant was provided to him. It is also the case of the petitioner that the report of the Delinquent Officer was not furnished to him and the decision to terminate was taken by the disciplinary authority without any opportunity. 16. This Court has also noticed that the basis of the disciplinary proceeding was the same charge as that of the criminal case. As noted above, the conviction made by the learned Trial Court was however interfered with by this Court vide judgment and order dated 23.07.2023 by which the petitioner was acquitted. Though it is argued that the petitioner has been honourably acquitted, a scrutiny of the judgment does not support the said contention. It is a settled principle of law that the decree of proof in a criminal case and in a disciplinary proceeding are different and as such, there may not be any bar on the department to cause a disciplinary inquiry. However, this Court would hastily add a caveat that such disciplinary proceeding has to be done strictly by following the settled position Page No.# 9/10 of law including the procedures laid down in the Rules of 1967. The inquiry which has been stated to be held inside the Jail cannot be termed as a fair procedure, inasmuch as, the records do not show that the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 17. On the aspect of the requirement to furnish a copy of the Inquiry report, the law is well settled and in this connection, one may gainfully rely on the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra). The subsequent case of M.D, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 has further clarified the law and has settled that the same would have a prospective operation. Certain relevant observations are extracted herein below: “ Hence it has to be held that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to receive a copy of the inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 18. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it appears that there has been gross violation of the procedures laid down in the Rules of 1967 and also the requirement which has been provided in a catena of decisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which requires giving of a reasonable and adequate safeguard to a delinquent facing departmental proceeding. Page No.# 10/10 19. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the case laws holding the field, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order of termination is required to be interfered, which is accordingly done. The Termination/ Dismissal Order dated 26.10.2023 is accordingly set aside. Consequently, the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith. 20. This Court however clarifies that since the present interference is on the ground that the procedures have not been followed, the department would be at liberty to conduct a fresh Inquiry, if so advised which however is to be done by strictly following the mandate of law. 21. It is however clarified that the petitioner shall not be entitled to the back-wages on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ but would be entitled to all other service benefits deeming him to be in continuous service. It is also made clear that the de-novo proceeding, if initiated would be from the stage of allowing the petitioner to submit his written statement of defence to the Charge Memo. 22. The writ petition accordingly stands allowed in the manner as indicated above. 23. No order as to cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant