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2025 DAILYLAW 23566 (RAJ)

TEJMAL MEENA v. STATE OF RAJ AND ORS

CW/11367/2009 · 2025-02-13

Sudesh Bansal

body2025

Judgment text

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[2025:RJ-JP:6455] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11367/2009 Tejmal Meena Son of Lalu Ram Meena R/o Bapui Ka Ringh Road, Meena ki Dhani, Tehsil Bonli, District Sawai Madhopur ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan through District Supply Officer, Sawai Madhopur 2. District Collector, Sawai Madhopur 3. Additional District Collector, Sawai Madhopur ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Devanshu Sharma for Mr. Amit Dadich For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 13/02/2025 1. Petitioner has not filed any application for condonation of delay, despite giving opportunity by this Court vie order dated 17.05.2011, hence, the writ petition has been listed in the "Orders" category, however, considering the issue involved in the writ petition and the stay order dated 27.11.2009 passed ex parte in favour of petitioner, which is being misused by the petitioner, the present writ petition itself has been heard and considered on merits at this stage. 2. By means of filing this civil writ petition under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India, challenge has been made by the petitioner to the judgment dated 14.05.2009 passed by the Additional District Collector, Sawai Madhopur, dismissing his [2025:RJ-JP:6455] (2 of 4) [CW-11367/2009] application under Section 8 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952 (for short "PDR Act") and affirming the judgment dated 15.12.2007 issuing recovery of Rs.13,87,306.80/- against the petitioner. 3. This Court finds that Section 23-A of the PDR Act, provides a statutory remedy of appeal against the impugned order passed on the application filed under Section 8 of the PDR Act, hence the petitioner, circumventing the statutory remedy of appeal, has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this High Court. 4. It would be apropos to reproduce Section 23-A of the PDR Act as follow: 23-A. Appeal. - (1) An appeal from [an Order made by the Collector under section 8 or 19-A] shall lie to the [revenue appellate authority]. (2) Subject to the provisions contained in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), every such appeal shall be presented within thirty days from the date of the order. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order of the [revenue appellate authority] passed on appeal. 5. On the issue of availability of the alternate and statutory remedy and jurisdiction of this Court to entertain writ petition, reference can be given to the case of Balwinder Singh Bhati v. Padam Motors and Ors. [2016 3 LJR 840], whereunder the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was of the view, that it would not be appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the commission, as remedy of alternate statutory remedy, against the order of State Consumer Commission, lies to National Commission. In that case, reliance was placed by the High Court on the ratio decidendi expounded by the Hon'ble [2025:RJ-JP:6455] (3 of 4) [CW-11367/2009] Supreme Court in case of Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory [(2012) 8 SCC 524]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in explicit terms in para no. 4 that “....Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”. 6. In the case at hand, petitioner has invoked writ jurisdiction of the High Court against the order passed by the District Collector, despite having alternative & statutory remedy of appeal thereagainst. Following the above-referred cases and the principles laid down therein, this Court is of the view that the present case does not invite invocation of writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as no exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court, circumventing the statutory remedy, available to the petitioner. 7. In addition, petitioner's conduct does not make him entitled to get any relief from this Court, in its equitable exercise of writ jurisdiction. As such, this Court is not inclined to exercise its writ jurisdiction against the impugned order on merits, yet relegates the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy against the impugned order as available under Section 23-A of the PDR Act. 8. In view of above, without going into the merits/demerits of the present case, instant writ petition is hereby disposed of with liberty to petitioner to avail the appropriate alternate statutory remedy against the impugned order, as provided under Section [2025:RJ-JP:6455] (4 of 4) [CW-11367/2009] 23-A of the PDR Act, if so desire. Stay order dated 27.11.2009 comes to an end. 9. The period during which the present writ petition remained pending before the High Court, in good faith may be condoned by the appellate Authority, on filing application by the petitioner for condonation of delay in appeal. 10. Stay application(s) and any other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (SUDESH BANSAL),J Sachin/40