- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 11683 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: SRI ANILKUMAR B S, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, S/O SRI. B.V. SRINIVASAIAH, CENTRAL CHAMBERS, F-113, 3RD FLOOR, 2ND MAIN ROAD, GANDHINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 009 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. SUBHASH SRINIVASA RANGACHAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, BAGALGUNTE POLICE STATION, BENGALURU – 560 073 REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA. 2. THE KARNATAKA STATE CO-OPERATIVE APEX BANK LTD., T. DASARAHALLI BRANCH, HESARAGHATTA MAIN ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 073 REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. M.M. WAHIDA, HCGP FOR R1 SRI. RAVIRAJ MAHALI, ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SECTION 482 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT POLICE AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN CRIME NO. 0143/2024 DATED 08.04.2024 AT ANNEXURE-E WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCUSED NO. 3 / PETITIONER HEREIN TO THE WRIT PETITION. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR Digitally signed by LEELAVATHI S R Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 ORAL ORDER This petition by accused No.3 in Crime No.143/2024 registered by the 1st respondent seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings for offences punishable under Section 34, 120B, 420, 465, 467, 468, 470 and 471 IPC and for other reliefs. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record. 3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioner is a practicing advocate and on the panel of the Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank. The accused No.1 – Niranjan M.P. obtained a loan from the said Bank in the year 2019 for which the accused No.2 – Ravindra stood as a surety. The respondent No.2 – complainant, who is the Manager of the said Bank filed the instant complaint against the petitioner – accused No.3 and six other persons including the loanee and the surety interalia alleging that the documents submitted by the said persons for the purpose of obtaining loan were forged, fabricated, fraudulent and concocted documents that since the petitioner had given a legal opinion to the effect that the loanee, Niranjan M.P. (accused No.1) had valid and marketable title to the property offered as - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 security, the petitioner and other accused persons were guilty of the offences leveled against them. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that mere rendering / giving an opinion in relation to loan documents involving immovable property would not result in the petitioner committing the alleged offences as held by the Apex Court in the case of CBI Vs. K. Narayana Rao – (2012) 9 SCC 512 and by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Garg Vs. CBI – (2023) SCC Online All 3952. It is also submitted that apart from the fact that there was a delay of almost five years from the date of the legal opinion given by the petitioner on 23.05.2019 to date of the complaint filed on 29.03.2024, there are no allegations satisfying the ingredients of the alleged offences as against the petitioner and in the absence of any evidence to the effect that the petitioner aided or abetted the other accused persons, who had obtained the loan from the said Bank, the petitioner cannot be incriminated for the alleged offences and the impugned proceedings against him deserves to be quashed. - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 5. Per contra, learned HCGP for the respondent submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. In K. Narayana Rao’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “20. We have already extracted the relevant allegations and the role of the respondent herein (A-6). The only allegation against the respondent is that he submitted false legal opinion to the Bank in respect of the housing loans in the capacity of a panel advocate and did not point out actual ownership of the properties. As rightly pointed out by Mr Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, the respondent was not named in the FIR. The allegations in the FIR are that A-1 to A-4 conspired together and cheated Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda, Hyderabad to the tune of Rs 1.27 crores. It is further seen that the offences alleged against A-1 to A-4 are the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is not in dispute that the respondent is a practising advocate and according to Mr Venkataramani, he has experience in giving legal opinion and has conducted several cases for the banks including Vijaya Bank. As stated earlier, the only allegation against him is that he submitted false legal opinion about the genuineness of the properties in question. It is the definite stand of the respondent herein that - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 he has rendered legal scrutiny reports in all the cases after perusing the documents submitted by the Bank. It is also his claim that rendition of legal opinion cannot be construed as an offence. He further pointed out that it is not possible for the panel advocate to investigate the genuineness of the documents and in the present case, he only perused the contents and concluded whether the title was conveyed through a document or not. It is also brought to our notice that LW 5 (listed witness), who is the Law Officer of Vijaya Bank, has given a statement regarding flaw in respect of title of several properties. It is the claim of the respondent that in his statement, LW 5 has not even made a single comment as to the veracity of the legal opinion rendered by the respondent herein. In other words, it is the claim of the respondent that none of the witnesses have spoken to any overt act on his part or his involvement in the alleged conspiracy. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also pointed out that out of 78 witnesses no one has made any relevant comment or statement about the alleged involvement of the respondent herein in the matter in question. 22. We have already mentioned that it is an admitted case of the prosecution that his name was not mentioned in the FIR. Only in the charge-sheet, the respondent has been shown as Accused 6 stating that he submitted false legal opinion to the Bank in respect of the housing loans in the capacity of a panel advocate and did not point out actual ownership of the properties in question. - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 23. Mr Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that in support of the charge under Section 120-B, there is no factual foundation and no evidence at all. Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy which reads thus: “120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.— When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” Section 120-B speaks about punishment of criminal conspiracy. While considering the definition of criminal conspiracy, it is relevant to refer Sections 34 and 35 IPC which are as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 35. When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention.—Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.” 24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence. 25. In the earlier part of our order, first we have noted that the respondent was not named in the FIR and then we extracted the relevant portions from the charge-sheet about his alleged role. Though statements of several witnesses have been enclosed along with the charge-sheet, they speak volumes about others. However, there is no specific reference to the role of the present respondent along with the main conspirators. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 26. The High Court while quashing the criminal proceedings in respect of the respondent herein has gone into the allegations in the charge-sheet and the materials placed for his scrutiny and arrived at a conclusion that the same do not disclose any criminal offence committed by him. It also concluded that there is no material to show that the respondent herein joined hands with A-1 to A-3 for giving false opinion. In the absence of direct material, he cannot be implicated as one of the conspirators of the offences punishable under Section 420 read with Section 109 IPC. The High Court has also opined that even after critically examining the entire material, it does not disclose any criminal offence committed by him. Though as pointed out earlier, a roving enquiry is not needed, however, it is the duty of the Court to find out whether there is any prima facie material available against the person who has been charged with an offence under Section 420 read with Section 109 IPC. 27. In the banking sector in particular, rendering of legal opinion for granting of loans has become an important component of an advocate's work. In the law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and others are included in the category of persons professing some special skills. A lawyer does not tell his client that he shall win the case in all circumstances. Likewise, a physician would not assure the patient of full recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does not guarantee that the result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much less to the extent of 100% for the person operated on. The only - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 assurance which such a professional can give or can be given by implication is that he is possessed of the requisite skill in that branch of profession which he is practising and while undertaking the performance of the task entrusted to him, he would be exercising his skill with reasonable competence. This is what the person approaching the professional can expect. Judged by this standard, a professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings viz. either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. 28. In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab [(2005) 6 SCC 1 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1369] this Court laid down the standard to be applied for judging. To determine whether the person charged has been negligent or not, he has to be judged like an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not necessary for every professional to possess the highest level of expertise in that branch which he practices. 29. In Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra [(1984) 2 SCC 556 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 335] this Court held that: (SCC p. 562, para 8) “8. There is a world of difference between the giving of improper legal advice and the giving of wrong legal advice. Mere negligence unaccompanied by any moral delinquency on the part of a legal practitioner in the exercise of his profession does not amount to professional misconduct.” 30. Therefore, the liability against an opining advocate arises only when the lawyer was an active participant in a - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 plan to defraud the Bank. In the given case, there is no evidence to prove that A-6 was abetting or aiding the original conspirators. 31. However, it is beyond doubt that a lawyer owes an “unremitting loyalty” to the interests of the client and it is the lawyer's responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance the interest of the client. Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators. At the most, he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence and cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 IPC along with other conspirators without proper and acceptable link between them. It is further made clear that if there is a link or evidence to connect him with the other conspirators for causing loss to the institution, undoubtedly, the prosecuting authorities are entitled to proceed under criminal prosecution. Such tangible materials are lacking in the case of the respondent herein. 32. In the light of the above discussion and after analysing all the materials, we are satisfied that there is no prima facie case for proceeding in respect of the charges alleged insofar as respondent herein is concerned. We agree with the conclusion of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings and reject the stand taken by CBI. 33. In the light of what is stated above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.” - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 7. The said judgment of the Apex Court was followed by the Allahabad High Court in Ashok Kumar Garg’s case supra, wherein it is held as under: “ 13. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512, the respondent Advocate was charged for giving false legal opinion in respect of 10 housing loans. The High Court had quashed the charge sheet exercising the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. In appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:— “30. Therefore, the liability against an opining advocate arises only when the lawyer was an active participant in a plan to defraud the Bank. In the given case, there is no evidence to prove that A-6 was abetting or aiding the original conspirators. 31. However, it is beyond doubt that a lawyer owes an “unremitting loyalty” to the interests of the client and it is the lawyer's responsibility to act in a manner that would best advance the interest of the client. Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators. At the most, he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence and cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 IPC along with other conspirators without proper and acceptable link between them. It is further made clear that if there is a link or evidence to connect him with the other conspirators for causing loss to the institution, undoubtedly, the prosecuting authorities are entitled to proceed under criminal prosecution. Such tangible materials are lacking in the case of the respondent herein.” - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 14. In Surendra Nath Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2020) 18 SCC 730, following the judgment in the case of K. Narayana Rao (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:— “4. Taking into account the contents of FIR, we are left with the impression that the said allegations are bald and omnibus and do not make any specific reference to the role of the appellants in any alleged conspiracy. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao to which one of us (Ranjan Gogoi, J.) was a party, it has been held by this Court that a criminal prosecution on the basis of such bald and omnibus statement/allegations against the panel advocates of the Bank ought not to be allowed to proceed as the same constitute an abuse of the process of the court and such prosecution may in all likelihood be abortive and futile.” 15. In Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan, (2001) 3 SCC 513, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence.” 16. In the present case, the charge-sheet alleges the applicant's involvement in a criminal conspiracy for commission of the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust and there is no allegation of commission of the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust by the applicant himself. Therefore, Alpic Finance Ltd. (Supra) has no relevance for decision of the present application. - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 17. All the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent - C.B.I. are on the point of scope of interference under Section 482 Cr. P.C., which reads as follows:— “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 18. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed several precedents on the scope of Section 482 Cr. P.C. and extracted the following principles:— “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 19. In K. Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar, (2000) 8 SCC 547, it was held that:— - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 “4. The trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed…” 20. In Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:— “if on the basis of material on record the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial.” 21. In Akbar Hussain v. State of J&K, (2018) 16 SCC 85, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:— “5. … At the time of framing the charge, the trial court has to consider the material before it by the investigating officer and form a prima facie opinion thereupon as to whether it is a fit case for framing of charge under a particular provision. The standard of proof test, which is to be applied at the final stage, in order to find out as to whether the accused is guilty or not on the basis of actual evidence produced is not to - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 be applied at the stage of framing of the charge. Charge can be framed even when there is a strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Court, which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to existence of the factual ingredient constituting the offence alleged.” 22. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akhil Sharda, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 820, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “no mini trial can be conducted by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered.” 23. In Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 9 SCC 35, it was held that: “exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.” 24. In Google India (P) Ltd. v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the expression ‘rarest of rare cases’ occurring in Bhajan Lal (Supra) thus:— “43. As to what is the scope of the expression “rarest of rare cases” indicated in para 103, we may only refer to the judgment of this Court in Jeffrey J. Diermeier v. State of W.B. (2010) 6 SCC 243, wherein the law laid down by a Bench of three - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 Judges in Som Mittal (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574 has been referred to: “23. The purport of the expression “rarest of rare cases”, to which reference was made by Shri Venugopal, has been explained recently in Som Mittal (2) v. State of Karnataka. Speaking for a Bench of three Judges, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice said: ‘9. When the words “rarest of rare cases” are used after the words “sparingly and with circumspection” while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasise and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words “sparingly and with circumspection”. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection.” 25. When the facts of the case are scrutinized in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned cases, it appears that the only allegation against the applicant is that he had submitted a title report dated 17.01.2015 stating that the title of the property mortgaged was valid, clear and marketable. The charge- sheet further states that prior to it, the bank had obtained a report dated 12.01.2015 from Ramesh Grover, who had assessed the market value of the property as Rs. 11.20 Crores and one Jitendra Sharma had given a report dated - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 20.01.2015 opining the valuation of the property to be Rs. 11.82 Crores. 26. It is relevant to note that Ramesh Grover and Jitendra Sharma, who had given reports to the Bank regarding value of the property to be Rs. 11.20 Crores and Rs. 11.82 Crores respectively, have not been made accused in the present case. 27. Even after the account was declared as NPA, the Bank's valuer Sri. H.P. Mittal has assessed the market value of the property as Rs. 5.29 Crores as on 10.09.2020 and he too has not been made an accused. 28. The charge-sheet alleges that the applicant had given a clean chit to the borrower's right over the land in question pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. The borrower was JML Marketing Pvt. Ltd., through its directors Kimti Lal Arora and Anil Arora. The property in question belonged to the mortgagors Rajinder Kumar Chawla and Varinder Kumar Chawla and not to the borrowers, and the charge-sheet wrongly mentions that the applicant had given a clean chit to the borrower's right over the land in question. It indicates that the applicant has been implicated in the charge-sheet in a mechanical manner, without due application of mind to facts of the case. 29. Although the charge-sheet alleges that the applicant had given a clean chit to the borrower's right over the land in question pursuant to a criminal conspiracy, no further particulars have been stated regarding the alleged criminal - 19 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 conspiracy and the persons with whom the applicant was involved in the conspiracy. 30. Section 120-A defines criminal conspiracy which reads thus:— “120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.— When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” 31. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao (Supra), while dealing with a case involving similar facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy thus:— “Section 120-B speaks about punishment of criminal conspiracy. While considering the definition of criminal conspiracy, it is relevant to refer Sections 34 and 35IPC which are as under: “34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 35. When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or - 20 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 intention.—Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.” 24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence. 32. The property in question had been acquired by the co-accused/guarantors through a sale deed in the year 1982. The loan in question was taken by the co-accused/borrowers in the year 2015. The applicant had submitted his report on the basis of the documents provided to him. Two other valuers approved by the bank had also submitted valuation reports and those two valuers have not been arrayed as accused persons. There is no specific allegation that the - 21 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 applicant had given the professional opinion in pursuance of an agreement made with any other specified accused. 33. The only material relied upon by the respondent - CBI in the counter affidavit are the letter dated 20.07.2017 issued by the Estate Officer & Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Ambala in the matter of one Nandini Gupta stating that registration of only superstructure/malba (debris) can be done as the ownership of the property lies with the Government of Haryana, and another letter dated 14.10.2020 issued by the S.D.M. in the matter of one Ankit Arora stating that registration of superstructure/malba (debris) can be done as the ownership of the property lies with the Government of India. Both the aforesaid letters were issued in the matters of two specific persons unconnected with the present matter and letters those were not in existence when the applicant had given his report on 17.01.2015. The applicant had no occasion to take into consideration the opinion of the aforesaid two authorities. 34. Even in the letters dated 20.07.2017 issued by the Estate Officer & Executive Officer, Municipal Council, Ambala and the letter dated 14.10.2020 issued by the S.D.M., there is a gross conflict of opinion as the former claims that the property in cantonment vests in the Government of Haryana whereas the latter claims that the same vests in the Government of India. 35. In the aforesaid circumstances, the allegation of the applicant having entered into a criminal conspiracy with unspecified persons and having deliberately given a wrong - 22 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 opinion in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy, appears to be bald and omnibus in character and it does not make out a case for trial of the applicant, who is a practicing Advocate aged about 71 years, for commission of the offence of criminal conspiracy. The proceeding for his trial would result in an abuse of the process of law and it would not serve the ends of justice. 36. Accordingly, the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. filed by the applicant is allowed. The impugned cognizance and summoning order dated 27.01.2023 passed by learned Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI (Pollution), Lucknow in Criminal Case No. 126506 of 2022, arising out of FIR No. RC2(E)/2022/CBI/SCB/Lucknow, and the entire proceedings of the aforesaid case, so far as the same relate to the applicant, are hereby quashed.” 8. In the instant case, the material on record clearly establishes that while the petitioner gave his legal opinion on 23.05.2019, the 2nd respondent – Bank lodged a complaint for the first time only on 29.03.2024, which was closed vide Annexure – C dated 30.03.2024. Subsequently, the 2nd respondent gave the impugned complaint dated 08.04.2024, a perusal of which would clearly establish that the necessary ingredients constituting punishment for the alleged offences have not been made out in the impugned complaint. AS held by the Apex Court and the - 23 - NC: 2025:KHC:1091 WP No. 11683 of 2024 Allahabad High court in the aforesaid judgments, mere rendering / giving of a legal opinion by the petitioner – advocate in relation to the title of the loanee in respect of the immovable property offered by him as security cannot be made the basis to constitute any offence as against the petitioner, especially when there is no material to establish the actual /active participation of the petitioner, whose opinion was based solely on the documents available with him. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner – accused No.3 would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. 9. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is Allowed. (ii) The impugned proceedings in Crime No.143/2024 registered by respondent No.1-Police, in so far as the petitioner is concerned, are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE SRL/SV List No.: 2 Sl No.: 23